I think there have been some important adaptations in the last few years in terms of building intelligence capacities and understanding the conflict better. I think some other innovations, such as through the use of aerial drones to survey areas where we're not deployed in places, have made our geographics go much better than before. In some respects, then, the adaptations are actually quite good for a large organization. Obviously, it could be faster.
I think one of the interesting things I'll point to, when you talk about the link with the more political objectives, is that these huge missions have an enormous logistics lift and an enormous amount going on when it comes to the deployment and maintenance of troops and police and others. In my experience, that has made it harder to have enough attention span across the mission to focus on some of the political processes. I think some of the smaller, leaner, more politically oriented missions sometimes do a better job in finding political entry points.
I think the challenge there is that these capacities should be seen as leveraged on the political side. The extent to which you can develop strategies where the deployment of large numbers of troops and police and civilian assets then gets translated into political relevance and entry points is the big challenge for the UN. To be frank, in some settings we haven't gained enough political leverage. Mali may be one where we have slightly more. Overseeing the elections helped, as did participating in the political dialogue among the parties directly. Supporting the DDR process has helped fuse the operational and the political a bit, but it is a very difficult challenge.
Coming back to strategic reviews, it would be worth looking at the strategic review of MINUSMA. Ellen Loj led it, and she made some interesting recommendations for how to orient the missions I think more towards the political mandate of the mission.