Thank you very much for this opportunity to speak to you and to be heard.
We speak of readiness. The key question to ask is, readiness for what? National sea power spans what I call three conceptual spheres, which are safety, security, and sovereignty. Although officially a military organization that is focused on sovereignty at sea, the RCN is engaged in a very wide array of missions and tasks that range from such things as boater safety to multi-threat combat operations. These spheres of activity can overlap significantly, and they can vary with the circumstances. Largely informal arrangements, naval activities are often poorly defined and therefore poorly understood. The navy provides the Government of Canada with its most ready and responsive military force. The culture of the organization has always been focused on quick reaction, which is the inspiration for its motto, which is “Ready, Aye, Ready”.
The ships are large, well equipped, and reasonably swift. Canadian sailors are self-reliant people, and the practices of seamanship demand that they be multi-skilled. This makes them very useful in military official and unofficial roles. The history of the RCN was focused on the North Atlantic and the trans-Atlantic linkage with Europe. Two world wars and the Cold War have shaped the navy's institutional values, its organizational structure, and its practical capabilities. The navy that exists today is a perpetuation of the forces developed during its first century of existence. The navy is now in transition. It is suffering from a poorly planned and executed renewal process. Ship numbers and types, operational capabilities, and experience levels are unusually low. Old helicopters provided by the RCAF, no sustainment ships, and retired destroyers have diminished the navy to a local defence force. While it has added new capabilities to the frigates and the submarines, and new helicopters are very soon to arrive, the navy is far less ready to engage in distant, long duration, and complex military operations.
I return to my original question. Readiness for what? If the mission or task is local defence for short durations against a low-level threat, then the RCN has reasonable readiness and capabilities to handle such issues. Technologies make the Canadian modernized frigates the equals of any other, and the same is also true for the much-maligned submarines. The crews are well-trained and led. The RCN is also capable of local operations and tasks supporting other government departments and agencies in the safety and security spheres. The RCN contributes significantly to the maintenance of Canadian safety standards and laws in our national waters. It also does this effectively in foreign waters in co-operation with multinational coalitions and bilaterally with allies.
If the mission or task is for long-range, large capacity, or high-intensity operations, then the RCN will have great difficulty in maintaining the effort and producing significant results. In effect, it is a symbolic force. It shows the flag and then leaves. The fleet is simply too small and too narrowly focused on anti-submarine warfare to be of much value outside of that core capability.
The days of the RCN's self-professed categorization as a rank 3 medium power global force projection navy ended with the withdrawal from service of the last “Protecteur-class“ replenishment ship. Those ships provided the support, supply, and sustainment logistics needed to enable naval operations at short range for long duration or at longer ranges for high-intensity operations. The navy places high priority on tactical proficiency. Conformity to best standards of practice is considered extremely valuable. Little else matters.
This focus on practical issues leaves the navy with a critical shortage of intellectual capacity and organizational skills. In effect, the navy is overtrained and undereducated. Alternate methods of action and “out of the box” thinking are not Canadian naval strengths. Mindset is a critical aspect of readiness often overlooked.
In my view, there are three major areas of weakness that affect naval readiness in Canada.
At the institutional level, the navy is simply too small for a country of our size. In a 2010 study, my master's student, Matthew Gillis, conducted a global survey of naval and Coast Guard forces and compared the RCN to other navies by population, area of responsibility, and gross domestic product.
By any standard of measure, the Canadian navy, especially in manpower terms, is at least only half of the strength that it should be. This diminished stature in a unified forces structure leaves the navy vulnerable to the creation of unified doctrines that do not reflect naval concepts and practices. Simply put, the tyranny of the majority dictates a common approach to all problems in all environmental circumstances. The naval view is largely ignored.
At the organizational level, the navy needs to diversify its structure and functions. The first sign of this is actually on the way in the form of the Arctic and offshore patrol ship. I predict that this utilitarian and flexible ship will become the naval equivalent of a pickup truck. It has reserve cargo capacity and utility spaces that will make it valuable in a wide array of safety, security, and sovereignty tasks.
If the RCN already had such a ship in service, it would be off the coast of Haiti by now loaded with disaster-relief supplies and using its landing craft in areas cut off by the storm. A major step toward improved readiness would be to make humanitarian assistance and disaster relief official missions of the Canadian navy.
At the practical level, the navy is limited by all manner of shortages of people, spare parts, and supplies. Young people are waiting interminably for training. Spare parts are being emergency-transferred from ship to ship. Operations have to be carefully planned to avoid logistical exhaustion. The margins for naval operations are simply too fine. In the event of the unexpected, no contingency reserve exists to make up for shortages in these areas and many others.
The future will be complex and unpredictable, so say the two Canadian Forces future security horizon studies. If you haven't seen them, I highly recommend them. In my view, the next major conflict is likely to be in either the far western Pacific or in the Arctic. In either case, the strategic context for Canada and for the RCN will be suddenly reversed. No longer a supporting force for Europe, Canada will be on the front line of a new and vast operating environment. I do not believe that the navy is ready for this circumstance or for any other that departs from the past strategic context that has shaped the RCN.
The force that the RCN will become is being decided upon now. Rather than a low-endurance, narrowly focused combat force, I believe the Canadian navy needs to diversify, significantly expand its logistical capacity, and integrate its procurement processes into developing the national industrial base. Only in these ways will the RCN become a truly ready, flexible, and reliable force.
I thank you for your attention. I look forward to your questions.