Thank you for the invitation. It's always an honour to be invited here.
Based on my research areas, I want to restrict my comments on naval readiness and the defence of North America to three areas. The first is maritime domain awareness, or MDA. The second is maritime warning, especially in the context of NORAD. The third is maritime control which, while currently achieved bilaterally with the U.S., may become binational in the future. These three areas are often overlooked, but I argue that when one considers readiness, knowing your environment, the actors, activities, and potential threats approaching North America, this is essential.
Also, I find conversations about readiness tend to volte to the size of the fleet and the overseas capabilities, and they overlook the importance of information and intelligence sharing with other government departments, which hold arguably 90% of the information about vessels of interest in Canada's maritime zones.
The first area is maritime domain awareness, which is the understanding of anything in the maritime environment that could adversely affect security, safety, the economy, or Canada's environment. This is an ongoing challenge. It is dependent on technology, such as the readiness of RADARSAT constellations, the information and intelligence of other government departments, and on things as simple as the number of flying hours dedicated to surveillance and the navy's ability to compete with the needs of other government departments for those flying hours.
To improve MDA, Canada created three marine security operation centres, or MSOCs, in 2004, against the backdrop of 9/11. The MSOCs on the east and west coast are led by the navy, and they house other government departments in order to fuse and share information to aid in the creation of Canada's maritime operating picture. This picture is only as accurate and useful as is the completeness, accuracy, and assessment of the information provided by all the participants.
If other government departments, for example, choose not to participate, it compromises the left of bang picture as well as response options for the navy.
The second area is the new maritime warning mission of NORAD. This was added in 2006, when the agreement was signed in perpetuity. It is still not a well-understood mission. It has three parts to which Canada's common operating picture is an essential element.
Maritime warning involves, first, the processing, assessing, and disseminating of intelligence and operational information related to the approaches to North America. Second, it involves developing a comprehensive shared understanding of the activities in the NORAD common operating picture. Third, it requires warning and advising of maritime threats against North America.
NORAD's maritime area of operation is global, which provides Canada with more information and far earlier warning than national systems alone can provide. For the Arctic this is especially important.
NORAD's common operating picture, generated by NavNorth U.S. fleet forces, is only as good as the information provided by Canada and its allies.
The third area is maritime control or the deterrence or defeat of a threat. NORAD doesn't have this mission yet, but it could in the future. NORAD considers how to evolve in the coming weeks. No doubt the 60th anniversary of NORAD, which will take place in 2018, is an impetus.
Our navy works closely with the U.S. and the Coast Guard, as well as with other government departments within Canada. The navy works bilaterally with the U.S. to achieve maritime control, but should NORAD accept the maritime control mission and it comes to fruition, this will require a rethink of Canada's naval command and control structures.
Canada's maritime community is small, and it seems everyone knows everyone, but if maritime domain awareness, maritime warning, and maritime control in whatever form are to keep ahead of evolving threats, these sometimes orphaned functions need serious attention.
Canada lacks a national maritime intelligence-integration office like the one in the U.S., which forces a re-look at these sorts of functions. In Canada, the sharing of information between other government departments and the navy, while improving, is still a work in progress. A common maritime lexicon is still maturing. There is still no formal feedback to NORAD regarding the usefulness of the warning and advisories, and I fear there is a growing disconnect between the perceived threats the Americans feel they are facing. There are certainly growing calls for us to go after the archer and not the arrows, which I think could represent a doctrinal change for the navy and for the Canadian Armed Forces.
This concludes my opening remarks. I look forward to your questions.