Evidence of meeting #25 for National Defence in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was navy.
A recording is available from Parliament.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
Thank you to both witnesses for being here with us again.
You said the second need was to maintain our shipbuilding strategy. My question for you is which shipbuilding strategy? What we had initially was a shipbuilding strategy that talked about Arctic patrol ships, originally eight, then six, and now five. We talked about service combatants that used to be a minimum of 15, and now it's a ceiling of 15. We've talked about the supply ships. The number used to be three, and now it's two, maybe three.
My concern is that while everyone says they support the shipbuilding strategy, the strategy is actually morphing into something less than it originally was. It's becoming a ceiling rather than a floor of what the military needs.
Do you have any comments on that?
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
Absolutely. That's a very good question.
It's a typical Canadian response that instead of understanding that the ship strategy as it has been conceived and as the experts have called for is supposed to be seen as an ongoing process, rather than an end-all, and as you've pointed out, there has been a growing tendency to say that we're not dealing with an ongoing process. We're saying how do we achieve a final end product of five, six, or seven Arctic offshore patrol vessels with 14 or 15 surface combatants.
We know, and this is the part that's so frustrating for us, that from a technological perspective, from an economic perspective, and most importantly from a military perspective, you cannot stay with technology. The only way you can ensure that your naval assets have the best and most modern navy is to have constant, ongoing upgrading.
The only way the Americans, the Japanese, and the French have been able to do this is by having a shipbuilding strategy that says, “We will have one hull that is constantly being built. We will constantly be upgrading the technology, keeping in mind that we want to be able to retroactively retrofit. We want to have one aircraft carrier coming out at a time and one submarine coming out at a time.” It is an ongoing, never-ending process.
From today's economic industrial perspective, the idea that we build a whole class of vessels, as we did in World War II, is simply outdated thinking. We find ourselves paying for these huge numbers of vessels with great technology for their day, and then we just let them fall apart because we can't maintain the workforce that is necessary.
The shipbuilding strategy, in theory, as was put forward, needs to be thought of as an ongoing process. We build the Arctic offshore patrol vessel, but instead of trying to compress it as we're doing right now—and that's the problem—we spread it out, and then we get ready to start putting in the surface combatant.
The problem we face of course is that because we have always done it in group blocks, we need to meet that obsolescence today, so we have two pressures coming in. On the one hand is the immediate requirement, and on the other hand is the recognition that we have a rare opportunity to get it right, but it's going to take a little bit of pain and political patience. That's one thing, of course, that we have difficulty dealing with as a democratic state.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
My second question is about the tendency to substitute the strategy for everything. The shipbuilding strategy was to replace certain capabilities. Submarines, which you talked about, or long-range patrol aircraft are not part of the shipbuilding strategy, but we talk about the shipbuilding strategy as if it were the solution.
As somebody who represents a base where submarines have been refitted, I was glad to hear you talking about submarines. Could you talk more about the necessity, especially in the Asia-Pacific region, of maintaining our submarine capacity?
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
Absolutely.
One of the great difficulties we face whenever we talk about submarines—and this gets right back to your colleague's comment on secrecy—is that we don't know their record of success.
In other words, if you talk to Rear-Admiral John Newton or anyone who has submarines under their operational command, they'll tell you that they can't talk about how successful they are. We will hear about every single failure, every time one goes bump in the night or there is some episode. We often do not focus on the fact that the other nations maintaining submarines have had far worse accidents than what we have had.
Having said all that, why we need submarines relates first of all to something which Dr. Charron was referring to, and that is domain awareness. The only way that our allies and friends will share information in terms of what their submarines are finding and doing is if we have submarines. If we don't have submarines, we don't have shared undersea water domain awareness.
Second, we need to have that independent capability so that the Chinese or any future threats don't just think, “Oh, we only have to think about the Americans. We don't have to think about the Canadians because they have no capability.” It factors into their calculations.
The third factor, and this is one which, as Canadians, we don't like talking about, is that into the future, given the nature of where torpedo capabilities are going, the only way that you are going to defend against a submarine with a torpedo that has a 100-mile torpedo range at speeds almost approximating those of surface missiles is by having your own submarine.
Having a surface vessel means you're just going to be a floating target at some point for submarines, given where technology is going. If you want to defend against submarines, you need to have submarines yourself.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
I'll wait for another round to talk to Professor Charron.
I have just one follow-up question.
The question of off-the-shelf designs for Canadian ships. Do you think this is a relevant part of the debate, given your emphasis on the technology rather than the hulls?
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
The reality is, and this is the thing, as academics and politicians, we have difficulties. We like black and white, right?
The issue is, of course, what do you mean by off-the-shelf technology? This is where so many of us get so tied up. We sit there and say that this is sort of pure, made at home. We think of an Albanian-style complete containment of capabilities. We know where that leads you. To say off-the-shelf, how far do you go? Even if you design it yourself, the experts that are designing it inevitably are being influenced by others.
I have difficulty always when someone pushes me a bit and says, “Do you want to build it in Canada, or do you want it off-the-shelf?” My response is always, “Okay, tell me the difference between the two.” I do think the necessity is to ensure that we have the capability of assembling our naval capabilities on Canadian territory.
It doesn't matter for the replenishment vessel if it's a Berlin-style design, as long as we have the capability to build it in Canada and aren't hostage to other forces that all of a sudden want to interfere. I think that's the way to go.
That's where the Australians are going with the French design of their submarines. It's going to be a French design, but they're going to start building them in Australian yards at one point. Quite frankly, history tells us that's the way to go. That's how the Japanese became a naval power after World War I, precisely by working with the Brits that way.
That mix is the way to go. It's the very answer that you and I don't like, but that's the reality of where we go.
Liberal
Sherry Romanado Liberal Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC
I'd like to thank our two witnesses for joining us again. It's a real pleasure to see you both.
My first question is for Professor Charron.
You talked a bit about an area of which I am quite concerned. Our NORAD agreement right now only talks about domain awareness and not domain control in terms of our maritime. You alluded a bit to that in speaking about the fact that it's an opportunity with the 60th anniversary of the NORAD agreement coming up.
Can you talk to us about what the pitfalls are of the fact that we do not have maritime control as part of our current NORAD agreement? What should we be looking at when we're looking at reviewing that? What should we be looking at, given the current threats and those that are forthcoming?
Assistant Professor, University of Manitoba, Director of the Centre for Security Intelligence and Defence Studies at Carleton University, As an Individual
While NORAD has maritime warning, maritime domain awareness is still essentially the responsibility of both states.
I am just undergoing the start of a study to look at what would be the implications if NORAD were to include maritime control. NORAD itself is undergoing these looks. It's called EVONORAD. They're not only looking at maritime control, but cyber and possibly other elements.
My comment vis-à-vis 2018 is I'm concerned that this looming date may quicken the minds before we're fully ready to think about all the implications. We are differently structured from the U.S. Whereas they have NORTHCOM, which can command maritime, land, air capabilities, we have a bifurcated system in Canada, where we have CJOC, but we also have 1 Canadian Air Division in Winnipeg, which takes care of all sorts of the air elements, especially vis-à-vis NORAD. CJOC has the maritime and the air expeditionary forces. We don't have that sort of seamless, as they like to say in NORAD, one belly button to push.
We also have, of course, MARLANT and MARPAC. We also have the Arctic. We have MARLANT that takes care of the Arctic, and is the main communication centre for the common operating picture. If we are going to transfer maritime control to NORAD, we have to think about those C2, command and control, structures, to make sure they're not an impediment to being able to react with NORAD.
At the same time NORAD is thinking about things like what should be its role. If NORAD becomes a strategic as opposed to operational role, one thing that could be considered is to make one of the NORAD regions basically the combatant commander, which then has some interesting implications in the relationship of Canada's NORAD region, CANR, to CONR. We also have Alaska NORAD region.
Everybody is starting to think about these implications, and we're still working through them. It's a bit like trying to change the tires of a car that's still running. We don't have the luxury of asking if everybody could just stop so we could just think about this. We have to keep responding to threats at the same time as considering these changes to command and control vis-à-vis capabilities and our relationship with the U.S.
Liberal
Sherry Romanado Liberal Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC
You mentioned you're starting a study on this. I'm curious about when that study will be completed.
Assistant Professor, University of Manitoba, Director of the Centre for Security Intelligence and Defence Studies at Carleton University, As an Individual
It will be completed for summer 2017.
Liberal
Sherry Romanado Liberal Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC
Once it's public, would that be something you could share with the committee?
Assistant Professor, University of Manitoba, Director of the Centre for Security Intelligence and Defence Studies at Carleton University, As an Individual
Of course. Yes, it's there. It's always public.
Liberal
Sherry Romanado Liberal Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC
Thank you. I'm going to come back to you if I have time.
My next question is for Professor Huebert.
You talked about a different way of looking at our procurement, where it's, forgive the pun, a pipeline of procurement. You're creating this constant conveyor belt of ships, any kind of asset in terms of our military defence. It's different, as you said, from what we've done in the past, where we make the big order, the big announcement, the big splash; we hope for the assets to be delivered, and then don't touch them for the next couple of years.
Since as part of the defence policy review we're looking at such questions, what would you recommend to us? Would you recommend that we move to a long-term strategy that has short-term objectives to fill the current gaps we have in capability in naval—of course, right now we're looking at naval—but aerial and land as well? Then, for a long-term strategy, it will require a different way of thinking in government, because every time a new government comes in there is review of projects and so on. How would that long-term planning and long-term strategy look for our military procurement?
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
That's a very good question. The immediate overall answer, I'd say, is that it's not going to be a one size fits all. When it comes to certain elements of procurement, it's still going to be that you have to buy everything at once. For example, if we decide that we want to retain heavy armour, which at one point we were thinking of getting rid of, the Americans and everybody still tend to buy their Leopard 1s and Leopard 2s all in a bulk. There's a bit of spreading out, but there's not the technological payoff you get in naval assets.
To a very large degree, naval hauls are unique because of their huge expanse, because of the industrial capabilities, because of all the difficulties. When I start talking about, as you put it so well, a conveyor-belt style of procurement, I'm really talking in the context of a naval asset, and this is by looking at who has really been successful in modernizing their navy.
The Brits have not. Let's be clear on that. The Brits are now starting to face major problems. They basically have followed our procedure.
The Japanese have very clearly adopted an American style, which is this conveyor line; in other words, keep it going. In fact, if you look at the Japanese submarines, they retire each of their submarines after 20 years. They're very strict in that context. They have another submarine that comes forward at that point. They say it's a competitive process, by the way, but they have two companies that take turns. The companies know that they're going to get the turn to build the next submarine next time and they're keeping their workforce. In other words, they get to say to us, “Oh well, we're being competitive about it.” It's not competitive, but it works very nicely. I believe it's Mitsubishi, and I can't remember the other company, that builds them. They keep these 20-year-old subs, and therefore, you have them going in that context.
When I talk about that particular element, I'm talking primarily from a naval perspective. It doesn't really work with, say, fighter aircraft, because we know all the challenges that come in that particular context. If we look at land forces, once again it's a different kettle of fish in that context.
The challenge that we face always—and you've hit it brilliantly, and I congratulate you for being honest on this—is, of course, the political payoff. As you pointed out, any of us who've looked at white papers or new strategies know that, in the Canadian context, the only time we ever have a white paper is in the first term of any government. We should be having white papers all the time to respond to issues, quite frankly, but from a political perspective, we only ever do it when a new government comes in. They'll do in their first term. They'll change everything, and then by about the second term everything goes back, because there are certain strategic imperatives that limit what we can actually do.
In my mind—and I'm speaking as a political scientist—we have to figure out a political payoff for government. That's the political reality: you need to have that capability of saying, “We did this.” The question is, how do you do it? The question in my mind is, how do the Americans then succeed to do that with their carriers? How can they make sure that enough Democrats and Republicans can go back home and say, “Look, we're responsible for all the successes of the Ford class, and the other guys are to blame for all the failures”? We know how the system works. The Americans have worked out that political waltz that goes in that context.
I say this as a serious question, because if you do not have the political agreement that we will get credit for this, we tend not to go ahead. That's not Canadian; that's American. That's part of the democratic process. That has to be worked into the system in such a way that it doesn't have to be the major priority, but it has to be a function of it.
However, the critical point, and you've hit it right on, is that for certain units you have to have that ongoing capability, so you retain that workforce. That becomes the critical element of any future ship. As well, you have to be able to suffer the pain in the medium term and short term of readjusting to the bust and boom building cycles that we've had on the naval aspect, and that's the real challenge right now.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Stephen Fuhr
Thank you.
We're going to five-minute rounds of questions.
Mr. Gerretsen, you have the floor.
Liberal
Mark Gerretsen Liberal Kingston and the Islands, ON
Mr. Huebert, I'd like to examine a comment you made earlier about the potential of a more isolationist approach that you might see come out of the U.S. government, regardless, I think, of the outcome of the election. There's perhaps a tendency to go in that direction, and you highlighted that nicely. If you look back to post-World War II, that was a time of isolationism within the U.S., yet the relationship between Canada and the U.S. actually solidified and grew during that time. I think one might argue that the motives for the U.S. being a defender, for lack of a better expression, of Canada is not so much because they see it as a goodwill opportunity, but more because they see it as an opportunity to genuinely protect themselves at the same time by having defence of the continent.
I wonder if you could expand a bit on that. I'm not saying at all that it should ever be the excuse of Canada. I agree that our military should be ramped up, to use your term. However, could you expand on the isolationist approach and the comparison that you used, in relation to what I just contributed?
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
Absolutely.
We could have a nice argument. I would say that the Americans, particularly under FDR, very decidedly moved against isolationism in the post-Second World War period. That's a point of discussion we can have over a coffee or beer.
On your point of what it means for Canada, you're absolutely right. The Americans, in terms of any form of isolationism, will of course say the defence of North America becomes the most important. Where it will, in my view, have the biggest impact on Canada is in our freedom of action. In other words, any time that they've moved to isolationism, the Americans will turn around and say, “Okay, Canada, we're doing this for North America. This is going to cost you this much more.”
Dr. Charron has emerged as our leading scholar on NORAD today. If we look historically, we see some of the previous scholars on NORAD, such as Dr. Sokolsky and Dr. Jockel, have pointed out that we have a pretty good deal. The Americans, because they tended to see benefits of close relationships, tended to pay for the bulk of what NORAD was requiring.
A more isolationist America, which I think Trump summed up when he pointed to the Baltic states and said, “You have to pay more for NATO membership”, goes against everything we've said in terms of proper deterrence. It's that attitude that you have to pay for more. I think that's the first thing you have to worry about.
The second part on isolationism is, if you don't have that capability of saying, “No, we want to do this; we want to make sure we have the ability to make important decisions” when it comes to submarine forces, or interceptors, or any of these aspects, that means you have to have that more capability so that if the Americans do start thinking more insularly, you're ready to say when we're protecting North America, “We already have these assets. This is the role we're playing, and by the way, you can't tell us in terms of doing this because we're already spending a whole bunch of money here.” Hopefully, more reasonable voices in the U.S. will understand that so we're not just told by an isolationist America, “Thou shall be doing that”, with all the sovereignty ramifications carried with that. That is my big fear.
The bigger fear, if you want to go really extreme, is the type of emotional backlash that we've seen starting to be unleashed. Look at what's happening in Britain as they move towards separation from the EU. As we're seeing the rise of some of the far right in France, we see that the question becomes that isolation tends to be associated with extremism from a national perspective. I don't think we want to be focusing too much on that, but we need to be cognizant of it within the Canadian context also.
Liberal
Mark Gerretsen Liberal Kingston and the Islands, ON
Thank you.
I really want to get to the second part of my question. You've been talking a lot about ramping up the navy, as you put it. I think, to the layperson, that means spending more money on more ships, submarines.
Ms. Charron made a very good point. She talked about how readiness is more than just buying things and having the physical infrastructure. She talked about information sharing, about being ready more holistically, and it can be done by more than just spending money. What are your thoughts on that? Do you agree with her position on that?
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Calgary, As an Individual
Oh, I always disagree with Dr. Charron, to my peril.
It's part of the overall package. This is the problem we face: it's not an either/or. She's absolutely right when she talks about information sharing, when she talks about the types of structure capabilities we need to put in. But, to get taken seriously on that, you need to have the assets, I'd say the so-called boots on the ground, but when it comes to the navy, that metaphor gets all wet. The issue, of course, is you have to have that capability to have information sharing, and that you need all of it.
I would push back when you say that Canadians in general would say this means more money, but it also means that we are then able to make more money. Without the maintenance of an open maritime trade system that we are part and parcel of—and we tend to lose sight of this—if we don't have the means of being able to provide that protection, if it becomes a greater challenge by a peer challenger such as China, we're going to start seeing impacts economically suffered by the country. In other words, a stable maritime shipping system is in our economic interest.
The question becomes, what role do we play in that context? We can never be the dominant player. We're not going to be the British navy. We're not going to be the American navy. The issue is where do we fit, with a recognition that if we don't fit, ultimately the system could become very expensive for us.
By the same token, I appreciate your comment: how much is too much in terms of spending?
Conservative
Pierre Paul-Hus Conservative Charlesbourg—Haute-Saint-Charles, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Huebert, you said that, as an academic, it's sometimes difficult to obtain accurate information on the different threats that Canada may face. Rest assured that I have the same issue. Since becoming an MP, I have been receiving much less information than when I was a senior officer in the Canadian Forces. In the Canadian Forces, we had access to information that was much more sensitive than the information sent to us here. We'll work together to identify the problem.
Ms. Charron, you mentioned three different areas, namely, maritime knowledge, maritime warning and maritime control. With regard to maritime knowledge, I want to go back to the threats. We often hear about threats, but I think the problem relates to the proper identification of the intention.
In terms of threats, Canadians in general tend to believe that it isn't possible; that no one would attack Canada; and that we're nice, lovely and kind. I think the threat isn't necessarily a first level military threat—and I want your opinion on the subject—but more likely a threat to take control of the territory for economic purposes. It would be a matter of entering our territory and establishing a presence that may then become a military threat if Canada responds to it.
Can Canadians be convinced to see the threat as something other than a possible attack by Russia or China, and much more as a territorial threat against Canadian sovereignty? I want your opinion on the subject.