Professor Charron and Professor Huebert, it's great to see you again, and thanks for your time.
I want to start out by presenting a big-picture question taking us back to the two principal threats that you mentioned, Professor Huebert, those being Russia and China, and put that into the context of our needs to take a look at our submarine program in particular.
I also want to draw attention to recent news that China is aligning itself more closely with Iran than what we may have seen in recent history. When you talk about reinvention of our navy and our naval strategy, I wonder if you could comment on the more precise parameters of what you see in Russia and China in terms of platforms and in terms of numbers, and our need to anticipate rather than react. Also, casting an eye over to our friends in Australia, who are a much smaller Pacific nation with a much smaller coastline—we have the longest coastline in the world—we see that they are engaged in a submarine program that is now, in terms of numbers, in the range of six to 12. I wonder if you could comment on that.
I would like to hear from Professor Charron as well. What is it, in terms of this strategic threat from Russia and China, that we should precisely be keeping an eye on and doing in the intermediate term?