Canada has a long and impressive history in naval shipbuilding. The last two major Canadian naval vessel procurements—the Iroquois class destroyer program of the 1960s and 1970s, and the Halifax class frigate program of the 1980s and early 1990s—were carried out in this country at Canadian shipyards and by the Canadian marine industry. I know that you've recently heard of the success of the recent modernization program for the Halifax class frigate. This was, in part, due to Canada's marine industries.
Then, as now, there were controversies over these programs, particularly over the frigates, chiefly with respect to cost, schedule, and the ability of Canadian industry to deliver. Does it sound familiar? Yet, in the final analysis, Canadian industry delivered an impressive capability with the Halifax class, which has served Canada and the RCN well for a quarter century and has led to significant exports of components and technologies developed right here in Canada.
In fact, Canada has proven to be very capable at military shipbuilding in the past, and we will be again if we have the resolve to stay the course with the NSS and have the right perspective on things. We should also not allow ourselves to be seduced by the off-the-shelf bumper sticker. Our well-established military buying pattern tells us that in Canada there is really no such thing as acquiring complex programs off the shelf.
These so-called off-the-shelf solutions are frequently altered through multiple change orders, often significantly, to meet unique Canadian needs and requirements. We should, therefore, be building the industry in this country to satisfy those unique needs, as our allies do.
The fixation over the last couple of years as the NSS got going has been around cutting steel or, to be more precise, the work on the hulls of these vessels. This is actually the visible part of shipbuilding. It's being carried out on both the east and the west coasts, and it will create jobs and growth. Approximately 17% of the total defence sector employment was located in Atlantic Canada in 2014, even before the work of NSS began. That number stands to grow significantly in the coming years.
While cutting steel is obviously important and valuable work, we also need to consider that the hull typically accounts for only 35% of the cost of a warship. Fifty per cent of the value is in the platform and mission systems, and another roughly 15% is in design and systems integration. These are the jobs that, on average, pay 60% more than the average manufacturing wage, and these are the jobs that employ engineers, technicians, and technologists, which make up 30% of the defence industry's workforce.
According to studies on the Canadian marine industrial base that were carried out by Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada and Statistics Canada, Canada has significant capability in some of these areas of shipbuilding, such as naval ship-borne mission systems, components, maintenance, repair, overhaul, and even simulation, and our strength in these capabilities is, in part, a legacy of previous naval vessel construction in this country.
Let us not lose sight of the possibilities to drive innovation, high-wage employment, and exports in the less visible yet more valuable part of naval recapitalization. The initial acquisition phase of a contract is a smaller proportion of costs than life-cycle costs that include things like the mid-life upgrades, technology insertions, and long-term supportability. It is in these areas that Canadian industry can achieve the greatest return on investment. If we lose sight of this potential because cutting steel for 15 ships is our only focus, we've missed the opportunity of a generation.
For our part, the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries, or CADSI, is actively engaged with Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, or ISED, on research on the Canadian marine industrial base. This work will improve the government's and industry's understanding of what leading edge marine capability exists in Canada. This helps ensure that capable Canadian companies get a fair shake on the systems, systems integration and other future work.
Finally, I would like to say a few words on budgeting. The recapitalization of the RCN has been estimated to cost approximately $30 billion over 20 years, but it's now conventional wisdom that those initial estimates, conducted in good faith years ago, are in need of upward adjustments. Warship inflation alone, which runs at 9% to 11% in the United States, has increased these numbers substantially. Furthermore, as any business person knows, the real cost of programs this complex becomes clear only when you get close to design and build, which we're only getting to right now in the project. This, by the way, is not at all unique to Canada.
Going forward, the government should be flexible to adjust cost estimates over time, as assumptions alter due to changing variables. Neither industry nor government have much control at all over the price of steel, foreign exchange rates, or any other input cost variables, and certainly not the pace of technological advancement. These costs alone will have changed since the outset of the project.
In conclusion, as a country that has some 58,000 kilometres of mainland coast on three oceans and a significant continental shelf, plus new challenges to its sovereignty in the Arctic, having a first-rate navy and Coast Guard should be bread and butter. Canada should be firmly committed to having a permanent and sustainable domestic naval shipbuilding industry, as do all of our G7 partners.
The NSS, while far from perfect, provides a road map to that end state. We should stick to it. It's a time for us to be bold, not nervous. It's a time to be resolute in the face of the challenges we're going to confront, not afraid of the decisions that we're going to need to make.
Once again, thank you for inviting me to appear before your committee today.