I would say one of the things we're going to have to manage well, both the government and industry collectively, is our appetite for change. If you start to change too much on a ship, if you start to change 10% or 15% of the ship, you're starting to change 75% to 80% of the drawings. I've seen it time and time again, and at that point you're into essentially a clean sheet with big risks.
Therefore, collectively we're going to have to manage change. The most important part of a shipbuilding program like CSC, bar none, is to get the requirements right up front. I really applaud the effort that the Canadian navy made to do a lot of soul-searching. We went through four very rigorous war-fighting exercises. We looked at anti-air warfare, undersea warfare. We had all the classified intelligence data on cruise missile threats and other threats from around the world, from both the U.S. database and the Canadian database. We got the requirements down to a tight basket that is not the world, so that when you go buy the ship, you're not buying any more than you need but you still have the ability to execute the mission.
I'm very pleased with where we are on that. Now, when we pick a ship, all of us are going to have to constrain our appetites for change, and there will have to be that balance among Canadian content, risk, cost, and schedule, and that's what's going to take very strong leadership to push through.