It's with regard to ambiguities to start with, and also I made a recommendation to modify my role as CSE commissioner. At the present time the minister, through an authorization, could authorize CSE to intercept private communications abroad incidentally or unintentionally, if you wish. In my case, I review those activities after the fact. Some academics in particular and some media have criticized that approach saying that maybe CSE, like CSIS, should be subject to going to the Federal Court to ask for a judicial warrant. I find that almost impossible because, first of all, when CSE targets somebody outside Canada, for example, at the time, they don't know the names. They don't have any particulars, so it's really hard to obtain a judicial warrant when you're dealing with a foreign agency.
I suggested to the minister that a commissioner, as a retired judge with a lot of experience and some knowledge about the activities of CSE, maybe should act before the fact. In other words, when CSE makes a demand to the minister with regard to an authorization to intercept, let's say, private communications—and in the National Defence Act there are conditions that the minister must respect—I'm suggesting to the minister that maybe when he receives that request from CSE, it should go through me and I should have a look at it.
It's not a judicial warrant, because I'm a retired judge. Nonetheless, you would have some judicial eyes look at the conditions, look at the request, and advise the minister he shouldn't sign something that doesn't meet the conditions in the National Defence Act. In other words, it's to change the timing of my intervention. I should do it before and not after the fact. This would help the minister with regard to his accountability to Parliament and to the Canadian public.