I was asked to speak about Russian threats to central, eastern, and northern Europe in the context of American security. U.S. military leaders have recently named Russia as the greatest threat to America—an existential threat to the United States, they say, the only country in the world with a nuclear capability that could destroy the United States and, of course, Canada.
Although Russian nuclear capabilities have existed for decades, Moscow's aggressive behaviour since the war with Georgia in 2008 has raised concerns that its capabilities could be matched with intent. The subsequent annexation of Crimea and military intervention in Ukraine through its military support for the separatists, but also by its covertly sending Russian troops to the eastern Ukraine, raised more fears that Moscow is pursuing a neo-imperial strategy through aggression.
This presents threats to North America on several levels. First, by violating international law Russia has undermined the security system governing Europe and the world since World War II. Second, it is setting a dangerous precedent that others could follow worldwide. Third, Russian aggression is undermining international organizations such as the United Nations, and military alliances such as NATO. Then Russia is directly threatening NATO member states in Europe, raising the question of whether it would attempt to threaten North America as well. Finally, the militarization of strategic zones, such as the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Arctic, confirms that Russia is aiming for military domination of a vast area of the world.
Russian aggression does not end in eastern Ukraine, as evidenced by Moscow's behaviour throughout central and eastern Europe, northern Europe, and the Baltics. Russia is using a number of instruments of subversion in the countries on its flanks. These tools include military threats; diplomatic pressure; spying; economic penetration; energy dependence; old comrade networks; corruption; the undermining of democratic societies and sabotaging of EU unity; the support of ultranationalists; information war; cybersecurity; and the stirring of ethnic tensions, not only by using the Russian minorities, but also other minorities throughout the region.
This is a well-thought-through, long-term strategy aiming to restore Russian relevance and influence, and in some cases domination and control in a large part of the European continent and Eurasia, as well as establishing Russia as a major pillar in a multi-pillar world. Moscow's behaviour is not opportunistic. It is carefully calibrated by its neo-imperial strategy, but using different instruments of subversion when the opportunity arises.
The Black Sea is a contested zone and a major geopolitical component of Russian revisionism. Expanding positions there is more important and more effective than land conquests. It cannot be done without control of the coastal territory. The annexation of Crimea served precisely this purpose, expanding Russia's Black Sea coastline and, consequently, the area of military domination in the sea.
This process started in 2008 with the war in Georgia, with Abkhazia, which is strategically important to Russian naval power in the Black Sea. This is why Russia is planning to develop the port of Ochamchira in Abkhazia and connect it by roads with the north Caucasus. While South Ossetia has little strategic value for Russia other than as a tool to destabilize Georgia, Abkhazia is strategically important because of its location on the Black Sea coast. Moscow needs Abkhazia to achieve military supremacy in the Black Sea, which is its strategic goal, and one major reason for its annexation of the Crimea.
The Black Sea strategy threatens to reverse NATO gains in this critical part of Europe. It also aims to deny NATO access to Ukraine, Moldova, and the Caucasus. In 2015, Moscow formulated a doctrine that focused on creating an A2/AD or an anti-access/area-denial zone toward NATO in the Black Sea, while at the same time ensuring a growing threat to the alliance’s southeastern flank.
Moscow is focusing more attention and investment on militarizing the Black Sea, while in many ways withdrawing from regions less linked to NATO, such as Central Asia, for example. Evidently, the Kremlin puts greater importance on adversity with NATO than on its competition with China.
Russian strategy in the Black Sea is already putting greater pressure on Bulgaria and Romania, including the maritime energy fields of Romania's exclusive economic zone. Romania now de facto shares maritime borders with Russia in the Black Sea waters. That means that NATO shares maritime borders with Russia in the Black Sea as well.
It is taking a toll on the military forces of Bulgaria and Romania, which have to patrol the region and respond to every violation of their airspace. Bulgaria currently has only four flying airplanes, and they're all Russian made, but it is planning to buy new airplanes soon, probably F-16s. Romania purchased 12 F-16s from Portugal and is planning to buy another 12 in 2017. That increased military equipment for the two countries—NATO allies in the Black Sea—includes buying new patrol boats.
Russian control of ports and sea lanes threatens to choke the trade in energy routes, prevents NATO from projecting sufficient security for Black Sea members, and gives Moscow a larger stake in exploiting fossil fuels in maritime locations. Offshore deposits around Crimea are now under Russian control. It could also disrupt or challenge energy supplies through pipeline connections between the Caspian Basin and Europe and set back EU attempts to pursue energy diversity. This could further curtail EU and European connections with central Asia, and undermine prospects for future natural gas deliveries from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to Europe.
The Baltic Sea is another area of interest to Russia. It occupies a pivotal position in Moscow's plans to consolidate the northern flank of its expansionist Eurasian project. It provides a vital trade route to Russia's second-largest city, St. Petersburg; hosts the Nord Stream natural gas pipeline to Germany; and is the location of the Baltic fleet headquartered in Russia's Kaliningrad exclave.
Despite Kremlin opposition over the past two decades, the Baltic Sea has become a largely NATO lake, with six member states having coastlines there: the traditional members Denmark and Germany; and new members Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In addition, since Russia's assault on Ukraine, the remaining two neutral states, Sweden and Finland, are moving closer to NATO in efforts to protect their security in this increasingly unpredictable region.
Russia's northen flank consists of two sets of countries that have experienced growing pressure from Moscow—the Baltic and the Nordic. The three Baltic states occupy the most vulnerable position, especially Latvia and Estonia, which contain significant Russian and—