Evidence of meeting #61 for National Defence in the 42nd Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was ukrainian.
A recording is available from Parliament.
4:30 p.m.
Conservative
Randy Hoback Conservative Prince Albert, SK
I'm sorry, I only get five minutes, so we have to be very quick in our questions and answers.
As we look at what we can do, one of the things we were doing before is providing support through RADARSAT, and the ability to use the intelligence gathered by the satellite information.
Do you think that's something that should be immediately happening? I know Mr. Poroshenko asked for that immediately when he came here a couple weeks ago.
4:30 p.m.
Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Political Science, As an Individual
The simple answer is absolutely, yes.
4:30 p.m.
Conservative
Randy Hoback Conservative Prince Albert, SK
Is there anything else? It ties into the fake news. If you're not getting good data and good information, how do you make good decisions? Is there anything else you see that we should be adding into that—
4:30 p.m.
Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Political Science, As an Individual
I'm going to defer to Professor Kuzio on that. I think he's better....
4:30 p.m.
Non-Resident Fellow, Centre for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, As an Individual
This is an interesting question, because it's come up already during these hearings. Certainly, the provision of intelligence would be very important for Ukrainian forces on the front line. When we talk about the supply of weapons leading to an escalation, there's been an escalation throughout the last three years. Daily, soldiers and civilians are getting killed. It's not as though there has been peace in the last few years.
I'd like to broach something that is slightly delicate, but it's on this question. If we are proposing—and I think it is a good idea—this exchange of intelligence and exchange of information between Canada and Ukraine, I'd like to highlight something for the committee. There seems to be a discrepancy in Canadian government policy. One arm of the Canadian government is supporting the reform of Ukraine's police, armed forces, and security service through NATO or bilaterally, but another branch of the Canadian government believes that the security service of Ukraine is a threat to Canadian national security. I'm working with a lawyer at the moment in Montreal on this question. We can supply the committee with this information. There seems to be a discrepancy. One arm of the Canadian government says one thing, that we want to work with these Ukrainian forces, but another arm says we should stay away from them because they're basically a threat, and maybe a potential espionage threat to Canada. Which is it? There should be one policy, not two on that question.
4:35 p.m.
Conservative
Randy Hoback Conservative Prince Albert, SK
I'll go back to you, Mr. Luciuk. On these security assurances and their impact, there were assurances given to Ukraine that if they signed on to this they would be protected. What's the feeling? Obviously they haven't been protected.
4:35 p.m.
Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Political Science, As an Individual
That's right.
There's a very strong feeling among front-line troops that I spoke to and among a younger generation in Kiev and Lviv, whom I also spoke to in the pro-democracy movements, that they were betrayed.
4:35 p.m.
Conservative
Randy Hoback Conservative Prince Albert, SK
If they wouldn't have given those assurances, do you think we'd be in this boat now?
4:35 p.m.
Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Political Science, As an Individual
Yes, I think they still would be because I don't think the Russian Federation's plans had very much to do with western guarantees one way or another because I think the Russians understood from day one that it was bogus, or certainly that it was.... We have to be very careful. These weren't treaty obligations. These weren't legally binding. These were, “Don't worry, we'll take care of you” kinds of statements. The Ukrainians naively believed that.
I can tell you one thing. My students and others have always asked me why they aren't like us now. They've had 25-plus years of independence since 1991. Why are they still like this? I always tell them the answer. Think back to the good book. Think of Moses leading the Israelites out of bondage. It took them 40 years of wandering the desert to get to the promised land, and even Moses didn't get there. Ukraine needs its Moses, and Ukraine is looking for that kind of assistance to find the promised land, which for Ukrainians is in Europe, but it will take perhaps 40 years, so until 2031. It's going to be a while yet.
4:35 p.m.
Liberal
Yves Robillard Liberal Marc-Aurèle-Fortin, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
What were Russia's communication strategies for its activities in Eastern Europe and Ukraine? Have those strategies been effective?
Conversely, what were NATO's communication strategies for its operations in Central and Eastern Europe? How could they be improved?
4:35 p.m.
Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Political Science, As an Individual
My understanding from having been in Ukraine several times in 2010 was that the NATO message was not getting out, that it was ineffectual, that it was limited, and that it was not being heard. There was at that time a considerable proportion of the Ukrainian population that was very anxious to join the European Union but quite reluctant by and large to join NATO. This was because of the perception of NATO propagated by the Russian Federation and its supporters abroad that NATO was somehow an offensive alliance, that it was the battled west from the Cold War period. There was a sense among many Ukrainians that they would like to be in the economic zone with Europe because that brought with it all sorts of obvious benefits; the NATO thing, less so.
There was always a small percentage of Ukrainians that wanted to be part of NATO from 1991 on, but that was limited, I would say, probably until 2014, as Professor Kuzio has said. Nowadays, I'm not sure. He said 78% of Ukrainians would be delighted to join NATO. My understanding was that it was closer to 75%, but we won't quibble. I'll go with the higher number.
4:35 p.m.
Liberal
Jean Rioux Liberal Saint-Jean, QC
Thank you.
My thanks to the witnesses for being here.
I went to Ukraine last summer. From what I understand, the conflict there may last a long time.
Mr. Luciuk, my understanding from your presentation is that, if more capacity was provided to Ukrainians, we would probably be able to make the pro-Russian forces retreat all the way to the border. In fact, the presence of those pro-Russian separatist groups in the Donbass region stems from Ukraine's lack of capacity. Did I understand correctly?
October 16th, 2017 / 4:40 p.m.
Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Political Science, As an Individual
The provision of defensive weaponry would help the Ukrainians make the Russian incursion into Ukrainian lands costly, continuingly expensive, both in terms of materiel and manpower. I don't think the Russian Federation is prepared to go much further than they've already gone.
They would like to maintain a destabilized, frozen conflict, a Ukraine that's sort of teetering between stability and instability. As for the so-called separatists, I actually reject that description of them. Certainly, there may have been some people of that sort, but the vast majority of those who are involved in the conflict today are essentially criminal elements. I won't use the word “terrorists” because it's overused. These are individuals who have been mustered and brought together by the Russian Federation, very heavily equipped with weaponry that the Ukrainian professional army doesn't have, and stirred up into this conflict.
I think that if Ukrainian troops were provided with the defensive weaponry they need—this is what they tell me—they would be able to defeat those proxy armies in the field and make it very costly for them to continue operating. Perhaps that would then lead to a Russian withdrawal. I do not think the Ukrainian army today, with the resources that it has available, could drive the Russian military out. That would be a very uneven contest. However, holding their own, improving their position against their opponents, and causing the Russian Federation great cost are already happening.
The Ukrainian army today, as you may have seen—some of you have been there—is incredibly professional. I was able to see how effective they are, particularly their better units, with the Canadian educational and training programs that we're giving them, essentially on peaceful things such as demining. Kamianets-Podilskyi has a beautiful demining centre. This saves lives, everyone's life. Training soldiers to be better in first aid and medical things saves lives, and also making them professional soldiers able to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of their country.
4:40 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Stephen Fuhr
That's the time.
I think we'll have time at the end to circle back with whoever else wants a question and didn't get one, but at this point, I'm going to give the floor to Mr. Bezan.
4:40 p.m.
Conservative
James Bezan Conservative Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB
Thank you, Chair, and I want to thank our witnesses for presenting today and knowing how important this study is. For those of us who have been to Ukraine many times and those of us who have Ukrainian heritage, it's something we're quite passionate about. As the sponsor in the House of Bill S-226, I'm proud that all parliamentarians of all parties supported the bill unanimously in the House of Commons, and I'm sure similar results in the Senate. I think this sends a message to all human rights abusers around the world that Canada will not be a safe haven for their money that they've been able to garner through abuse of authority and by treading on the rights of their own citizens.
I want to come back to the idea of making sure Ukraine gets the weapons they need to defend their territory. Professor Luciuk and Professor Kuzio, both of you who are students of eastern European history, if we look at military studies and their impact on the future, do you believe that diplomacy is gained through strength of negotiations because of a powerful military?
4:40 p.m.
Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Political Science, As an Individual
Professor Kuzio.
4:40 p.m.
Non-Resident Fellow, Centre for Transatlantic Relations, Johns Hopkins University, As an Individual
Since 2014 Ukraine's military has become one of the strongest militaries in Europe. Today it's about 300,000 strong plus the National Guard. Officially, Ukraine spends 5% of the GDP on defence. That's a huge amount of money. In that sense, because of Putin's aggression, Ukraine has had to invest in military...reform of the ministry of interior of Ukraine with the help of Canada, the police, and such like.
To me the most important reaction to the sending of military equipment—probably the first country to do that would be the United States and then maybe followed by other countries, Canada, Britain, Poland, for example—is that it sends a signal. That's a very crucial thing. It sends a signal to Moscow that, if need be, Ukraine is going to be supported by the west.
Ukraine today is a place that can provide lots of experience for western and NATO troops, including Canadian, because it's a country that's suffering from hybrid war. I think as Dr. Luciuk said, Ukrainian troops actually helping...it's a two-way process in that sense. I think sending the signal is as important as actually beefing up the defensive side of the equipment. Plus, we should not underestimate what Dr. Luciuk has said, which is that the Ukrainians do believe that the west has a moral duty to support them because of the nuclear weapons question.
Ukraine inherited the third largest nuclear weapons stockpile in the world from the collapse of the U.S.S.R. It gave it all up between 1994 and 1996. In return for that, it did get not guarantees but assurances, and surely at this time of need, Ukraine should receive some strong support from the West.
NATO has a choice—and Canada here as well. Either there's a conflict with Russia on Ukrainian soil or it's in the Baltic states.
4:45 p.m.
Conservative
James Bezan Conservative Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB
I agree with you 100%.
Professor Luciuk, on the issue of adding Ukraine to Canada's automatic firearms country control list, do you believe that should happen? You've been to the front and you've seen Ukrainian troops and the military they have. What type of defence weapons would they be interested in? What more can Canada be doing through the Canada-Ukraine military defence and co-operation agreement?
I would just ask also, what industrial complex is available in Ukraine for developing their own weapons, and what partnerships might be available to Canadian companies in participating in the development of defensive weapons?
4:45 p.m.
Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, Department of Political Science, As an Individual
There are several questions there. One is, I think, for a list of the kinds of things that Ukrainians are asking for now, I would just refer you back to the Globe and Mail article today, because former Secretary General Rasmussen actually lists them there. I'm not going to repeat them here.
Also, I think Ukraine does have an industrial capacity. Kharkiv, for example, is one of the major cities for the production of tanks and armoured personnel vehicles. There is that capacity. There is that ability. If I could just go back to what Professor Kuzio said a moment ago, I think what the committee needs to think about very carefully is that there's a very new generation of Ukrainians, in their thirties, who are European in heart and soul, who want to be part of the western civilized world and do not want to be part of a Eurasian federation, who nevertheless feel a sense of betrayal because they have learned “on their own skin” as we would say in Ukrainian what believing, promises, assurances, whatever you want to call them, was. You don't want to lose those people. You don't want to lose Ukraine.