National Defence Committee on Oct. 23rd, 2017

[Paul Grod]

I was put on that list immediately after I visited Ukraine with Prime Minister Harper when he went to show support for Ukraine right after the Maidan revolution and the fleeing of President Yanukovych. At that point, Prime Minister Harper was advocating for Russia to be excluded from the G8, and was successful. After that decision was made, out of spite, President Putin then created that list of 13 people to put on the sanctions list.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

How did you come to be asked by Mr. Harper to participate? It was touted as a very partisan delegation. The National Post did a story on it after the fact, stating that it was a partisan delegation. I'm curious how you got to be involved in it.

[Paul Grod]

As president of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress. We are a major stakeholder in supporting Ukraine in its struggle for democracy. That's the reason we were asked to be part of that. I've been on virtually every trip with prime ministers and ministers. I was just in Ukraine a year ago with Prime Minister Trudeau. I went to Ukraine with Stéphane Dion when he was minister. It's a regular—

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Okay. I just want to put that on the record too. You would consider yourself to be non-partisan.

[Paul Grod]

Absolutely non-partisan.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Thank you.

I think that's all my time.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

We're going to move to five-minute questions.

Mr. Spengemann.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you very much, gentlemen, for being here.

Thanks for your leadership in the community, Mr. Grod, and for your expertise, Ambassador Westdal.

I have five minutes. I want to explore three themes with you. One is Putin's endgame, if that's the right term. The second is the economics of Donbass and the broader area around Ukraine, and that border with Russia. Last is the commitment to the Minsk agreement.

If you were to speculate on where Putin wants to be in 2017 or in 2020 as a global leader, what kind of picture comes to mind? How do you see him, as objectively as you can, in terms of security and also economic and cultural leadership? Does he want partnerships? Is he isolationist? Is he expansionist?

Please, just briefly state each of your personal characterizations of him as a leader.

[Chris Westdal]

I don't think he's expansionist. I think that he wants respect for Russia. I think that he wants to contain NATO. As I mentioned in my remarks, I don't think, as he's accused, that he has any interest in having war or a broken Ukraine on his western flank. What he will not tolerate on his western flank is NATO, and he wouldn't tolerate that in the Caucasus either. I think that he wants to play a role with Russia as a great power. There are only a handful on earth and Russia is one of them.

I think that we need to accept that Russia is an age-old civilization. It's a thousand years old. It's a civilization unto itself. It's been written off fatefully before. As I said, I think we wrote it off and thought that we didn't have to pay attention to its interests 25 years ago. We do have to pay attention to its interests. It does want to be our partner in the Arctic. It does want to be our partner against terrorism. It has a very deep interest in the accommodation of Islam. A sixth of Russians are Muslim. I think that it wants to be a great power. It wants to be respected, and it doesn't want NATO in either the Caucasus or Ukraine, among other things.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you.

Mr. Grod, how would you characterize Putin?

[Paul Grod]

First of all, I think we all believe in a people's and a nation's right to self-determination. That underlies why that whole premise of spheres of influence is fundamentally flawed.

Putin's endgame is to restore something like the old Soviet Union. At the end of the day, it's spheres of influence. He has stated very publicly that one of the biggest tragedies in history was the fall of the Soviet Union. Unfortunately, it's not just Vladimir Putin. It's also the Russian people who have trouble recognizing the Ukrainian nation as its own nation. The whole concept of one big Slavic people is something that is very much front and centre for Putin and Russians. I think Putin's endgame is to restore, more or less, a model of the Soviet Union where he can control, either directly or indirectly, those countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. He's doing that by destabilizing them.

When you look at the trends, he's been successful in destabilizing the regions around Azerbaijan and Armenia with the frozen conflict there. He's been able to destabilize the Transnistria region with a frozen conflict there. He's done it in Ossetia in Georgia, and he's now doing it in eastern Ukraine.

He has recognized that by destabilizing, he's able to exert control over those countries. He's also starting to destabilize the international rules-based order. We're seeing that in terms of supporting various right-wing initiatives in Europe. We have to be cognizant that by breaking down the rules-based international order, Putin is able to exert control over the world, quite frankly.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

In terms of the costs for Mr. Putin to continue to fight over the Donbass, what is your assessment of that? Is that attractive land? Is that a region that yields continued value for him to fight over, or are we approaching a threshold where he says it's too expensive for him and he's going to bow out?

Ambassador Waschuk was speaking to the committee a couple of weeks ago and sort of suggested that maybe the costs are becoming too high for Putin to continue to fight over this area.

[Paul Grod]

It's difficult to say. Number one, that region was the industrial heartland of Ukraine. Since the war broke out, that economy has been decimated, so to say that it is extracting high costs, absolutely.

The question is, is Russian President Putin looking for an off-ramp? I'm not sure. I can't read his mind. However, I think we have to be prepared always to allow him an off-ramp.

The peacekeeping mission could, in fact, offer him an off-ramp. If he thinks it's too expensive for him to continue, whether it's just the region or the sanctions that are being imposed on him and his supporters, if he feels those costs are too high, he might be forced. That's the important thing. We're trying to force his hand to bring peacekeepers into that region.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thanks very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you both.

Mr. Yurdiga.

[David Yurdiga, Conservative, Fort McMurray—Cold Lake, AB]

Thank you, Chair.

I'd like to welcome our witnesses here today.

It is a very troubling time as we see how it unfolds as time goes on. What I'm really concerned about is that I see sanction after sanction levied against Russia and it doesn't seem to be working. I'm not sure if the world players are all following the sanctions, because obviously, that's a lot of pressure on Russia.

What are the major drawbacks with sanctions? I don't see Russia actually moving an inch. Is there movement? I'd like to get a feel for how the sanctions are working.

[Paul Grod]

Number one, the sanctions are extracting financial penalties against Russia and those who are supportive of Putin's aggression around the world. I think there is a significant economic impact on Russia with these sanctions. That's why you're always hearing Vladimir Putin calling on the world to stop these sanctions, because it is a very important lever.

How could we live with ourselves by trading with a country that is currently responsible for an active war that has taken the lives of at least 10,000 innocent people, for invading another country, for taking over a territory illegally? Should we be rewarding that kind of behaviour? In fact, we should be increasing sanctions until that behaviour stops. That is the value of the sanctions policy.

[David Yurdiga, Conservative, Fort McMurray—Cold Lake, AB]

Chris, would you like to comment?

[Chris Westdal]

If you ask what those sanctions were imagined to achieve, one, they were going to change Russia's mind. Well, they haven't.

Two, they were going to isolate Putin, remember? They were aimed at his oligarch friends and supporters. They were going to weaken Putin's power base and separate them from the leader. They haven't done that at all. If anything, they have consolidated his standing both with powerful people in the country and with the public. It seems quite clear to me that those sanctions don't work.

Furthermore, even while they impose economic costs, they have some effects that are surely counterproductive in the view of those who want sanctions. For example, they have in fact encouraged some revival in Russian agriculture, because agricultural products that were being imported, including pork from Canada in substantive amounts, no longer are arriving imported. That has now been an encouragement to Russian agriculture. It has in fact contributed to the diversification of the Russian economy, which everyone has always called for, thinking that it's too dependent entirely on the petrochemical sector.

[David Yurdiga, Conservative, Fort McMurray—Cold Lake, AB]

Thank you. I know my time is limited.

I'm really concerned that maybe we're not doing enough. We have to push for a diplomatic solution to this, because obviously Russia is not freely going to give up Crimea and we, as western civilization, are not going to allow it to expand.

How far do we need to go to have this diplomatic solution?

[Paul Grod]

First of all, before you have a diplomatic solution, you need to have willing parties that are looking for a diplomatic solution. Right now, Vladimir Putin is not looking for a diplomatic solution in Ukraine. He has not reached out for one, and that's why we need to continue to, first, provide Ukraine with the ability to defend itself, and second, help it become a successful economy and a successful society, which I think Canada has been doing an amazing job of.

Although 25 years might seem a long time, you're reforming a post-Soviet country, and quite frankly, other than the Baltic states, there is no other post-Soviet country that has as strong a democracy as Ukraine.

Ukraine has weak democratic institutions, but they're building and they're working on them. That is a sign that, over 25 years, there has been a lot of progress made, so we need to continue to do that, and again, put enough pressure on Russia to actually entertain and be brought to the table in order to allow for a peacekeeping mission to Ukraine. That's what needs to happen for a diplomatic solution.

[David Yurdiga, Conservative, Fort McMurray—Cold Lake, AB]

Go ahead.

[Chris Westdal]

Just briefly, I think Russia is open to diplomatic solutions. Russia is prepared to implement the Minsk agreement, but it needs to be implemented by both parties. I think Russia is prepared to imagine a United Nations role. Of course there is disagreement about where United Nations peacekeepers might be based, but those could be worked out.

With respect to the United Nations force, we should be promoting that, but we should not imagine we're in a position to lead it, because by key parties, including Russians and the rebels in the Donbass, we are not regarded as non-partisan. We just aren't. I don't think we would be acceptable leaders in that group. We might be able to participate in it, and we should promote it, but I don't think the notion that we will lead a UN peacekeeping mission in the Donbass is realistic.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Ms. Alleslev.

[Leona Alleslev, Liberal, Aurora—Oak Ridges—Richmond Hill, ON]

Thank you very much.

Recognizing I only have five minutes, I would like to hear what your recommendations are, Mr. Westdal, please.