Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for inviting me here today.
Russia is becoming progressively more paranoid, as a considerable number of ex-Soviet bloc countries have applied for membership in either the EU or NATO. This is unnerving Russia, as it needs to maintain a strategic depth between the former Soviet bloc countries on its vast borders. It will need this battle space to be able to successfully manoeuvre in the event of a potential NATO attack or threat. Considering its history, Russia is not prepared to be invaded again.
When Russia illegally pushed into the Crimea, it utilized a hybrid warfare military strategy that blends conventional warfare, irregular warfare, and cyberwarfare simultaneously to achieve success. Through a combination of kinetic operations and harnessing other subversive efforts, the Russians attempted to avoid attribution and retribution.
In a practical application, the Russian concept of non-linear conflict exemplifies a typical hybrid war strategy. A non-linear war is fought when a state employs unusual, conventional, and irregular military forces in conjunction with psychological, economic, political, and cyber assaults. Hybrid warfare can be described as the use of flexible and complex dynamics of the battle space, which in turn requires a highly adaptable, well-trained, and resilient response. Unfortunately, neither the Ukraine military nor NATO was fully resilient to provide this response when this occurred.
Confusion and disorder ensue when weaponized information exacerbates the perception of insecurity within the population as political, social, and cultural identities are pitted against one another and plausible liability abounds. To use the Ukrainian conflict as an example, Russian hybrid tactics were used extensively during the annexation of Crimea. The subsequent civil war in eastern Ukraine caught the west totally off guard, particularly the U.S. and the U.K., who were unable to formulate any type of response.
NATO's inaction can at least be partially attributed to the rigid NATO military organization that it currently employs. More critically, Russian military and intelligence experts have accurately identified and exploited international legal frameworks governing the use of force against another sovereign state.
NATO military strategy, above all, must emphasize non-linear thinking in conflict modelling. The Canadian military, while aware of the use of hybrid warfare, is not trained to adopt non-linear thinking when they are undertaking conflict modelling and planning. To date there hasn't been any measurable western or NATO response to Russia's aggression in Crimea or Ukraine, other than providing political and economic assistance.
Unless the legal framework defining the act of aggression is reworked, other liberal democracies may be at risk. It seems increasingly clear that the primary method of ensuring continued rule of law is by overhauling our traditional interpretation of conflict. The west must develop a framework of strategic deterrents of weaponized information, finance, and other subversive forms of aggression. A one-size-fits-all policy will no longer be an effective deterrent in the future.
From the beginning of Russia's engagement in the hybrid war in Crimea, there was a profound emphasis on maintaining a degree of plausible deniability. The Russian flag was raised by residents of Crimea, not Russian soldiers. Russian forces were stripped of any identifying markers or insignia. Cyber-attacks were launched at Ukrainian critical infrastructure facilities and systems. These attacks were structured in a manner that attempted to obscure Russia's involvement.
Of course it's widely understood that Russia was responsible for the violation of Ukraine's sovereignty. However, the confusion that was spawned by the disinformation campaigns, cyber-attacks, unmarked Russian special forces, and later actions in eastern Ukraine would see the west committing further inaction by allowing the Russians to consolidate and then normalize the acquisition of Crimea by the Russian Federation.
Concepts of hybrid warfare are not taught at DND offices, which results in DND not being able to consider the manifestations of hybrid warfare when planning future military operations. Why is this?
It is because we do not utilize a whole-of-government approach, and neither do we fully explore these concepts, which include psychological, educational, economic, military, finance, political, legal, cyber, intelligence, and communications security. To my knowledge, apart from the U.S. military, no other NATO members' planning processes involve planning for hybrid warfare or linear conflicts.
How can we combat, train, and prepare for Russian active hybrid measures in the future, such as those currently being inflicted around the globe, if we do not understand how they work? This change now requires that the U.S. and its allies adopt a new legal, psychological, and strategic understanding of warfare and use of force, particularly by Russia.
In terms of options for Canadian international assistance in Ukraine and a UN peacekeeping mission in the Ukraine, numerous questions need to be asked before committing to any peacekeeping missions, for example, where and how to keep the peace, and how this can be achieved. Russia wants to be involved in any future peacekeeping mission. It will be impossible for Russia to be part of the peacekeeping mission, because Russia is on the side of the conflict as an aggressor.
What would a peacekeeping mission in eastern Ukraine look like? What are Operation Unifier's rules of engagement if they are attacked by hostile forces? Are there plans to deal with implanted Russian actors, both in the government and in the military?
Russia's veto on the Security Council would override a Ukraine-Canada peacekeeping ambition.
Contributing to a UN-led intervention in Ukraine and the troubled breakaway eastern districts, on the surface, might appeal to the current government as it would be in line with their method of the “Canada is now back” mantra, while at the same time fulfill the government's pledge to deliver 600 troops and 150 police officers to UN peacekeeping support operations overseas. There has been talk about a UN peacekeeping mission in the Ukraine since 2015, and so far, nothing has really happened.
In terms of our options, option one being to deploy UN peacekeepers, Russia might agree or not agree to a UN peacekeeping force in Ukraine. The Russians might demand to be part of it, and I don't know how that will be achieved. This peacekeeping mission could possibly be led by Canada; however, Russia might veto Canada as the lead mission as it could be seen as being too close to the U.S.
The discussion, organization, and deployment of a future UN peacekeeping force could take a considerable amount of time before deployment, somewhere between two to three years. At this time, Canada has agreed that a future mission would assist, while at the same time indicating that Canada has not yet decided where to commit the CAF in a peacekeeping role.
In terms of option two, what is required in training to provide full-spectrum military operations training to the Ukraine military? It is not just basic training and policing training, but more dynamic, full-spectrum training. The answer is to staff a command college to provide full-spectrum hybrid military operational training to Ukraine senior and junior military officers. There is a requirement to provide cyber-training and systems threat assessments to the Ukraine government, as well as the military.
A number of questions still need to be asked. What are the Canadian Armed Forces rules of engagement and resident capability to extricate those 200 Canadian troops if required to do so? If they are attacked, surrounded, or told to surrender, how does DND plan for another Russian offensive wave into the Ukraine? Has the CAF developed suitable evacuation plans to respond to all possible scenarios, and have these plans been tested? Is Canada prepared for an escalation in fighting, and what would be the ramifications to the military training teams currently in the Ukraine?
The rest of my presentation basically mirrors what my colleague mirrored, so I will not go that far. I will provide a complete breakdown of my presentation if anyone requires it to read later.
Thank you very much.