The major issue is, first—and you've nailed it, sir—the situational awareness piece. I think there's been a growing recognition that we do not have the type of intelligence sharing for the high north that is ultimately needed in this context. We've seen, since 2007, the Russians resuming their long-range bomber controls in the region. Since 2008, their long-range submarines have returned to the region. In this context, we need to have better sharing for underwater surveillance capabilities and above-air surveillance capabilities.
The other part that needs to be addressed is, of course, when we had the Americans pull out of Iceland, we lost an entire capability of responding to the Russian extension of their bomber incursions. We've had to work closely with the Norwegians, the Danes, and unofficially, the Swedes and the Finns in this regard. It's at an operational level, and it's at a situational level, and it's combined with the fact that the Arctic is an environment that many of the other NATO nations don't fully appreciate just how difficult it is to operate in.
Let me end with this. The Russians have emerged as the regional hegemon in that region, and that is what we're responding to.