National Defence Committee on April 14th, 2016

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Building off the first question you were asked, you were talking about the fact that the threat is increasing from Russia. If I heard you correctly, you said it's at the same as it was at the height of the Cold War in terms of their coming close to our airspace. Did I get that correctly from your comments?

[LGen Michael Hood]

The number of long-range aviation flights, perhaps not this year—they had grounded a chunk of their fleet for a while after an accident—but in the last couple of years is approximating the high point of the Cold War. That's correct.

Does that mean the threat is increasing? It talks about capability and intent. What is their intent?

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

All right. Then you said that when this occurs our air force, sometimes with the assistance of the Americans, will respond to it.

[LGen Michael Hood]

Well, it depends where the approach to North America is. Sometimes they'll come through Alaskan airspace, and so the Americans have fighters there. Sometimes they come from north of Alert and come down the north slope of the Arctic where we would be in position in Inuvik to intercept them. It depends. At the end of the day, it's seamless and it doesn't really matter who. That's the nature of our binational relationship; it doesn't matter who intercepts them at that time.

Now, if we're in a situation where it's a uniquely Canadian issue of sovereignty, then we need the ability to act. But as a response to Russian long-range aviation, that's a shared responsibility between our countries.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

If that threat came from the west coast, and albeit the actor might not be Russia because it might not be geographically that suited, are we in a position to be able to respond quickly, given the location of our couple of bases?

[LGen Michael Hood]

If you look at the distance between Inuvik and Cold Lake and the distance between Vancouver and Cold Lake, they're equidistant. If there was a known threat, if we had intelligence indicators to suggest that we had a threat, we would move fighters closer. We do that often. In fact, we practise monthly deploying our F-18s to Comox, and we have a facility in Comox for them to operate out of seamlessly. That's part of NORAD's readiness posture: they go to all of the other bases where they may need to position themselves. They're trained very well. I get those reports all the time. We were in Comox two weeks ago, I think, with F-18s, as part of a training evolution.

If we had a thought or enough warning they were coming, we would move them there, absolutely.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

What if we didn't have that warning, would we be, then, depending on the Americans to assist us?

[LGen Michael Hood]

I tend not to think about it in those terms. If a threat was coming through Alaska, and then was coming across our coast, we would launch fighters from Cold Lake. If for any reason the distance that they were at was far enough out that the Alaska fighters could hand off to an American fighter, it's immaterial. That's the nature of the binational relationship.

[Mark Gerretsen, Liberal, Kingston and the Islands, ON]

Okay.

[LGen Michael Hood]

To answer more precisely, I don't have any concerns of not being able to respond to approaches to the west coast from our present geographic location.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thanks very much.

Mr. Doherty.

[Todd Doherty, Conservative, Cariboo—Prince George, BC]

Thank you, and thank you to our witnesses for coming in today.

You talked a little bit earlier about how we're not very good at predicting, but we always must be ready for whatever may come down the wire. There's talk about deferring investment. We've talked about hours left on aircraft and different cycles of aircraft. I'm an aviation guy, I come from airports, and I know very well about cycles on aircraft. We've talked about limiting operations over the days as well, too, of the aircraft you have.

Does this all impact our ability to be ready as we move forward for any given task that might come our way or threat?

[LGen Michael Hood]

If I think of the air force writ large and the capabilities that we've just replaced, with the C-130J and we've brought in a fifth C-17, so we've increased our airlift capacity to respond to hurricanes in the Philippines.... We're in the process of changing our Sea King helicopters for Cyclones, we've reinvested in the CP-140, and we just brought in—

[Todd Doherty, Conservative, Cariboo—Prince George, BC]

Let's talk—

[LGen Michael Hood]

No, but my point is that it's evolving all the time. Are there new threats that we should be concerned about and be ready to respond to? Undoubtedly. And those are considered, and we will bring in projects to respond to those within the defence budget as it stands right now. Today, the posture of the Royal Canadian Air Force, in particular, is sufficient to the threats as we see them right now, although it's not foolproof. We've talked about it. An air-launched cruise missile in its present capacity, coming through the north, would be very hard to detect with our present systems in place.

[Todd Doherty, Conservative, Cariboo—Prince George, BC]

Right. Given the potential replacements to the F-18, is there a preferred replacement that does have the cruise missile detection system on it?

[LGen Michael Hood]

There's no preferred replacement. We have a statement of requirements. We've looked at the strategic environment. We've anticipated the threats. What we aspire to have is an operational advantage. It's pointless to buy anything new if it's not going to give you an operational advantage. The statement of requirements is such that it's written to favour aircraft that could deliver as we see the threats. And when I say “we”, it's not the air force, it's the Canadian Armed Forces writ large. It's not uniquely an air force capability.

[Todd Doherty, Conservative, Cariboo—Prince George, BC]

Is there an aircraft right now, currently, that would have that capability?

[LGen Michael Hood]

The project, as it stands right now, is this government has committed to an open and transparent competition, and potential bidders will be assessed against the statement of requirements, they'll be scored against them, and a decision will be made. I'm confident that there are platforms out there that will meet the requirements of Canada.

[Todd Doherty, Conservative, Cariboo—Prince George, BC]

We talked about the mission, as the government gives that to you or the responsibilities the government determines today. Recently, your mission has changed. What is the current mission of our F-18 fleet?

[LGen Michael Hood]

We brought back the F-18 commitment from operations, Op Impact, in Iraq, so it's returned to its regular posture, our standing commitment to NORAD. We have fighters on standby in Bagotville and Cold Lake on very short leashes. We have a standing commitment to NATO, which is typically six aircraft ready to go in a certain number of days, if called upon by NATO. Then we have a body of training, waiting for potential new commitments as they come down. That's pretty well the layout.

[Todd Doherty, Conservative, Cariboo—Prince George, BC]

I think the words were that we've seen an increase in the Russian incursions in Canadian or North American airspace. Would that be seen as aggressive or antagonistic?

[LGen Michael Hood]

Well, it would be a lot easier if they just filed flight plans and told us they were coming, because then we wouldn't have to go up there and see them, and we've asked them to do that. In fact, the commander of NORAD has asked them, “Why don't you just file a flight plan and we'll come by”, because it's international airspace outside of our ADIZ.

When I look at the RCAF and I think about Canadian sovereignty, what does sovereignty mean? There are many pieces. There is data sovereignty. If I look at the basic sovereignty, the RCAF is the principal guarantor of that, given the size and shape of our country. That, in my mind, is a no-fail task.

I talked about search and rescue being no-fail. Guaranteeing our sovereignty should be a no-fail task. That is why we would write a statement of requirements, to allow us to have an operational advantage against potential adversaries. I can't imagine what that may look like—well, I could imagine. Let me give you a couple of scenarios.

Is it inconceivable that someone would drop an oil platform 12 miles off the coast of Canada's Arctic? Of course not. We've seen this in the South China Sea, where you have countries plopping oil platforms, and others. That is not inconceivable. How do you respond to those types of threats?

A deterrent is the ability to respond, so I think Canada being prepared.... The RCAF, in particular, as that guarantor of sovereignty, needs to be ready for a whole panoply of potential outcomes, because to do otherwise would be ceding that sovereignty to someone else.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you.

Mr. Spengemann, you have the floor for five minutes.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you, gentlemen, both of you, for being here and giving us your expertise, but also for your service to the nation. We are grateful for both.

I want to go back to control of airspace and deterrence, and pick up a little bit on what my colleagues Mr. Gerretsen and Mr. Paul-Hus said earlier, to put to you the question of the shifting threat environment.

My first question will put a more domestic lens on. It's to put to you the testimony we've received here as a committee that one of the most worrisome threats, if not the most worrisome threat, is the increase in the risk of domestic terrorism. My question is about deterrence and proximity to that threat, looking at the west coast in particular. My colleague raised the Vancouver Olympics.

I want to suggest that maybe this threat is even a bit more systematic than just a single event, that our large cities are exposed to a threat of domestic terrorism, and that there would be airborne or aerial deterrence opportunities. If that is the case, then we would want to be as close to the possibility of that threat, physically, to be able to deter.

My question goes back to the location of our fighter aircraft in Cold Lake, and the fact that the United States Air Force is conducting, pretty regularly if not systematically, directed landings on Canadian soil. I wanted to get your thoughts on whether, in light of what I am suggesting is a shifting threat environment, our fighter aircraft are deployed well in Cold Lake, or whether more should work out of Comox. I am not suggesting a relocation of the base, but just a shift in the threat assessments under a domestic lens. I wonder if you have any thoughts on that.