Evidence of meeting #8 for National Defence in the 42nd Parliament, 1st session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was threat.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Deputy Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Department of National Defence
We have left the cyber-domain now, and we're now talking about the warning system.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON
Yes, now we're talking about something else.
Deputy Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Department of National Defence
I mentioned that system was put in place as a result of a threat as perceived in the late 1970s. There are some capability challenges out there we can mitigate operationally, but from a capability point of view, we have to look at something else. With respect to sustainability of the system, it is supposed to last until 2025. At that point, in order to replace it, I'll have to refer to the commander of RCF, who's in Canada and who is the one who represent NORAD's requirements. When we talk about complicated systems like this, they don't fall off the earth at a certain point. There is a graceful degradation. We can plan to replace equipment in time, and we're starting the work now to replace it, but absolutely, there's going to be a requirement to take a look at new things closing into 2025.
Liberal
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
Thank you very much, Lieutenant-General, for being here this morning. As the minister has clearly said, everything is on the table in terms of this defence review. I want to back up a bit, and talk about NORAD in general. Of course, there's no doubt of its success in its main mission, which was set up for airspace warning and control, and with very efficient operations. It's very successful. Since the U.S. Northern Command and the Canadian Joint Operations Command were set up, it seems like we're moving away from joint operations to bilateral coordination. I wonder if you have any comment on that change, because things seems to become more murky once those two commands are set up.
Deputy Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Department of National Defence
I think it was when USNORTHCOM and Canada Command were formed and then eventually CEFCOM, which became CJOC, there was clearly an effort to try to protect North America from more than just the aerospace domain. At that point, the question of NORAD was discussed.
Since then, in 2006, the NORAD agreement was renewed forever, in perpetuity, and therefore we have been working in the aerospace domain and with maritime domain from a maritime domain perspective. The practical execution of continental defence now, if you want to call it this, is performed in our domains through NORAD but also performed with a combination of the operational output of NORTHCOM, CJOC, and NORAD. The three commands have tried to recommend staff talks about how we make progress on our agenda now, because we are working very closely together and we are producing joint effects. Let me give you an example, which also illustrates a little of the difficulties.
If you have a submarine approaching North America, that submarine is a problem for the maritime component commander in Canada under CJOC and then for NAVNORTH in the United States, which is their maritime component commander under the command of NORTHCOM. How to address that submarine approaching is done through a joint task force. Bilaterally we join forces, maritime patrol aircraft, surface ships, and so on, and we will pursue the target as it arrives.
As soon as that submarine launches a cruise missile, the cruise missile becomes a NORAD responsibility, which is perfectly in line. For that matter, it's a bit difficult but, ultimately, the point I want to make here is that as we prosecute the submarine bilaterally through a combined joint task force, which is fully under the command of the commander of NORTHCOM who is also the commander of NORAD, at the end of the day, it arrives back in Colorado Springs anyway.
This is how, as we look at the future under tri-command, we are now starting to challenge ourselves with questions such as whether the aerospace domain is sufficient to defend North America or whether we should think about going into a binational as opposed to bilateral approach. That's very important for us. Binational means that we're integrated and Canadians have a say; bilateral means that you arrive at what you have and that very often you're not in the command chain. Is it a better construct to defend North America? This is the advice of commanders now preparing to craft for both chains of command and look to the future, again with the common objective of providing in a NORAD type of construct, so binational, a continental defence perspective. I don't know if a solution is going to come out of it, but this is what we're preparing to craft.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
Thanks for that response because I think it's quite important. It's a question that needs to be front and centre in the review. It's not just a question for the commands but for Canadian policy-makers. Do we see Canadian interests better served by the bilateral or a binational approach. So I think that's a very important question you've just raised.
Some people would argue that with NORAD looking at additional capacities like maritime warning, there's a danger of duplication, that Northern Command and CJOC have grown functions and capacities that are like NATO, and now NORAD is growing some functions that are like things that already exist in the others.
Can you comment on that?
Deputy Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Department of National Defence
This is another reason why we have to ask ourselves the same question. In rationalizing the command and control we have organized, are we as efficient as we could be with the common purpose of defending North America? This is one of the very critical factors that would be a part of the advice to both chains of command.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
Turning to the question of threats, when you responded, you talked about not being able to imagine threats to the U.S. that aren't also threats to Canada. But I want to turn that on its head. One of my concerns is that I can imagine threats to Canada that the U.S. does not perceive as threats to it, particularly in the Arctic. I've raised this question before.
So my question, focusing a little more narrowly on aerospace functions, is whether those joint agreements apply in a case where we perceive there is a threat to our sovereignty, for instance in the Northwest Passage where the United States differs on our territorial claims.
Deputy Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Department of National Defence
That's a difficult policy question. NORAD is only in aerospace. From a maritime warning point of view, where we might see something wherever, if it is in the maritime domain, we have a mission to report to both national chains of command. So it would not apply. It would not stop the commander of NORAD from delivering the mission that has been given to him by virtue of the agreement.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
You are saying that the maritime warning function would continue and Canada would be provided the information, despite the fact the U.S. might not see that as a joint threat to North America.
Deputy Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Department of National Defence
Yes, that would be my experience.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
That is reassuring.
The second part of that would be, if an air response were required to a perceived threat from perhaps even a military ship or submarines moving through the Northwest Passage, would the joint command of NORAD apply to that response?
Deputy Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Department of National Defence
I would say yes, sir.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
In terms of budget, one of the things we haven't really talked about is what we actually commit to NORAD, because a lot of the resources remain with the national commands. Do you have any idea—or does anybody before us have any idea—of what we are spending for the NORAD function itself?
Deputy Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Department of National Defence
It is a difficult question to answer because.... NORAD is a force employer. We benefit from forces that are presented to us from both the United States and Canada. Other than for specific pieces of equipment, such as north warning system radar, something that is really specific to NORAD, it is difficult. In the case of the RCAF, for example, General Hood will be providing the aircraft-ready crew and the bases from which to operate in Canada. I don't have a number; that is the bottom line. It would be complex, but if this is something that you would like to see, I can always ask for some data.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
I think it is of interest to the committee to know what we are actually spending for what we are getting back.
Related to that is the question of the north warning system. I think everyone makes reference to the fact that it is reaching the end of its useful life. Who in NORAD would be responsible for preparing recommendations, in terms of what is needed and how we replace that system, and to what government would they go? Do we replace that system, or is there an alternative?
Deputy Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Department of National Defence
As per the agreement, the commander of NORAD is responsible for delivering or executing his mission. Once in a while—actually, on a monthly basis—we get readiness reports, where regions and units, and whatever agency is responsible, or stakeholders in the NORAD mission, will state that we have capability deficiencies in this area, and so on.
Those capability deficiencies are then tabled, requirements are compared vis-à-vis our operation plans, and then we file those operational requirements, those mission requirements, to both national chains of command. The same data goes up to the U.S. as it does to Canada through the chief of the defence staff. It lands here in Ottawa somewhere, and it is prosecuted. It is managed in the same way that our capital programs are usually managed here in Canada. Our main partner in the elaboration of mission requirements and replacement of equipment in our case is General Hood with the RCAF. He receives those capability requirements and will make sure that they are acknowledged and taken into consideration in whatever project goes forward.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
As raised by Ms. Gallant and the Conservatives, I think that in terms of procurement, 2025 is fast approaching. So if we were going to try to replace that—
Deputy Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Department of National Defence
Yes, sir.
NDP
Randall Garrison NDP Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC
—we would need some kind of recommendations—or not. That is the question about the north warning system, whether we need to replace that system with something else that might perform the same functions more cheaply.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal Stephen Fuhr
We will have to circle back on that because we are out of time. I am sure there will be a lot of time today, with only one witness, but we have to move on.
Ms. Romanado, you have the floor for the last seven-minute question.
Liberal
Sherry Romanado Liberal Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. St-Amand, thank you for being here today and for your service to our country.
We heard a little bit about the control part of surveillance. We've been talking a little bit about surveillance. I'm going to ask the question about the elephant in the room. As parliamentarians we have a responsibility to our citizens for their safety, and also a fiduciary responsible.
In terms of procurement, we've been hearing a little bit from witnesses about replacing our fighter aircraft and interoperability. Regarding current infrastructure in Canada, our landing strips in the north and so on and so forth are not currently long enough for certain aircraft.
We've heard that our tanker refuelling capacities are currently working very closely with our CF-18s. We've heard in the news recently that the U.S. Congress is split over funding the air force base in Alaska. I understand that for their F-35s, they are going to have to spend $500 million to retrofit the base in Eielson. We've heard that Australia is expecting to spend $1 billion for its base in Williamtown.
In your expert opinion, how important is it that any replacement fighter jet, whatever it may be, is able to work with our current infrastructure? In the event that something is chosen that cannot work with our current infrastructure, how many more millions, if not billions, will be required to retrofit our current infrastructure?
Deputy Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), Department of National Defence
That's a two-part question, Madam, if I understand correctly.
The first one is about interoperability and the use of our current infrastructure. Perhaps the best indication that our current infrastructure might not be a good base of reference is to look at the structure. For example, the way NORAD is structured, our main operating bases are probably going to be permanent, but the four operating locations date back to a threat that was perceived in the 1970s. I can't say that the latter structure would be totally adequate for what's to come, especially if we're thinking about next 30 to 40 years. That's one comment.
The second comment is that interoperability is absolutely critical. When you think of what NORAD does, just image a triangle with fighter aircraft at the tip. That fighter aircraft, of course, is critical to control. This is how we control the airspace. It relies on a system which has platforms, long base radars, airborne early warning which can communicate data link, people that are qualified, the training system, the standards, and so on and so forth.
It is better to take a look at the tip as the result of the whole triangle and in the triangle, of course, you have the infrastructure. There's no doubt in my mind that changes may be required no matter what replaces the F-18. It may or may not be required because it's not only a matter of runway, operation, or base location, it's the whole system here. It involves the sensor to sensor ability to communicate, man-machine interface, the weapons that would be used, and so on and so forth.
It's a very difficult question to answer now. With respect to the amount of money that would be required, again, it would depend on which platform the Government of Canada decides to purchase. At this point, I would deflect the answer to Gen. Hood because I really have no idea.
Liberal
Sherry Romanado Liberal Longueuil—Charles-LeMoyne, QC
If I'm understanding correctly, we're talking about something that can increase significantly in terms of costs based on whatever is chosen to ensure that it is capable to work within the system that we currently have.
Switching gears a little bit, in terms of the NORAD Next initiative, I'd like to get your thoughts on include “all-domain” awareness. Should we be focused strictly on maritime and aerospace, or should we be looking at land and cyber as well?