National Defence Committee on Feb. 15th, 2018

[Richard Fadden]

I'll stay for three, and then I have to run.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Garrison.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. That's the question I was going to ask.

I want to ask about the national shipbuilding strategy, particularly Mr. Fadden because I know he has to go.

You talked about the problems of this regional aspect of invading procurement, I guess I would say, all the time. In the previous Parliament, we had all-party support for the national shipbuilding strategy, as an attempt to get around constantly re-doing things for regional benefit and also to build up a shipbuilding industry as a part of our national defence capacity in this country.

Do you think the shipbuilding strategy is achieving that goal? Has it improved things in that area or not?

[Richard Fadden]

It's a good question. In the short term, Irving shipyards in Halifax have done the refits of the frigates that the admiral talked about. They are working on, I believe, the Arctic vessels, or they're starting to work on them. They have the contract for the major service vessels. To the extent that they have that, and they know they'll have it, and presumably, funding will continue, I think is a good thing.

I'm not sure that, despite all of that, we are going to successfully compete with South Korea with shipbuilding writ large. I'm using them as an example. The success of the shipbuilding policy will depend to a considerable degree on the Government of Canada's ongoing commitments to spending money on shipbuilding on those shipyards in Canada. I just have trouble imagining that the French, for example, are going to use Irving or their colleagues on the west coast to build any of their destroyers.

I'm making a joke of it to some degree, but I think it has gone a long way towards providing stability. That's medium term. My worry would be the long term. I'm not sure about the long term without ongoing, significant investment on the part of the federal government, for the Coast Guard, the Mounties, DFO, and the military.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Of course, we have had New Zealand commissioning work from the west coast shipyards.

[Richard Fadden]

Yes, and they're very pleased. Yes, I know.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

There may be other possibilities around the world.

[Richard Fadden]

I don't disagree. I'm just saying it's going to be an uphill battle, in my view. That's all I'm saying.

[Randall Garrison, NDP, Esquimalt—Saanich—Sooke, BC]

Okay. Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

I won't suspend, but I want to thank you, Mr. Fadden, for appearing today. This panel's been fantastic. We'll probably see you again; I know you're in Ottawa. Thank you for coming.

[Richard Fadden]

Thank you for having me.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

It was our pleasure.

To the rest of our witnesses, we have about 30 minutes left. I'll be, predictably, fair with the timing.

I'm going to take one question. I don't do it very often and I think the committee would like to hear this.

To the question of valued participation, of the 29 NATO countries, how many of those countries can integrate with NATO, or the U.S. for that matter, with land, air, sea, special forces and command? Would you put Canada on that list?

I'll start with Mr. McRae.

[Robert McRae]

Canada's definitely on that list. We've participated, I think, in pretty much every NATO operation, whether it's sea, air, or land, that I can recall. There have been a lot of operations since the end of the Cold War.

We're interoperable with the U.S., and that's what counts, by and large.

I have to say, and this is something Denis and I were discussing before the meeting, that there's really only a handful of countries at NATO that can make that claim. Often it's the same countries doing the same missions: us, the U.S., the U.K., France, the Netherlands, Belgium, on occasion. Countries like Germany often have the capability but politically are reluctant to participate; ditto, occasionally, the Italians and Spanish. The other countries of NATO, especially the newer countries, the newer members, clearly don't have the range of capabilities that would permit broad-spectrum participation in all operations in NATO. The list is fairly short. It's probably seven or eight countries.

Denis may have a military view on it.

[VAdm (Ret'd) Denis Rouleau]

I do.

In fact, Canada is definitely on that list. When NATO countries operate, go into a theatre of operation, they'll go under what is called NATO procedures and rules. Those seven or eight countries have the equipment, have the ability, have the knowledge to operate, and really, to come together with the rest of the nations. Canada even goes further than that when it comes to integrating with an American battle group. When an American battle group sails out of Norfolk, meaning an aircraft carrier sails out, she sails out with a series of escorts that come with her.

In the beginning, 10 years ago, we would add a Canadian ship to the battle group. Now the Canadian ship takes the place of an American ship into the battle group, fully integrated under American procedures, which, in many cases, will be different from NATO procedures when you're operating within the NATO environment. Canada is well positioned to do all that.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Thank you. Those are very important answers for this committee.

I have Mr. Spengemann, Mr. Bezan, and Mr. Garrison. We'll go to five-minute rounds and there will still be more time.

Mr. Spengemann.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Mr. Chair, I'll split my time with Mr. Gerretsen and/or Mr. Fisher.

Thank you very much for your previous comments. Mr. Fadden had wanted to talk about the political component of NATO as being equally significant to the military component. You also mentioned the frictions between the United Nations and NATO, probably driven by perceptions that NATO's primarily military in nature. I wonder if you could elaborate on the politics of NATO, the political opportunity, and perhaps specifically through the lens of the current transformation in Iraq and the residual threats emanating from Daesh, or a potential successor to Daesh. What political work, what political opportunities...?

[Robert McRae]

I think one of the most important things to bear in mind is that the NATO council, 28 countries around the table, chaired by the secretary general, is all civilian at the top. The summits are our leaders, prime ministers, presidents, and so on. Ministers are on the next level, and then ambassadors. So there's civilian leadership of NATO. Our military colleagues have their military committee, other military subcommittees, and so on, which provide advice to the political leadership. The decisions as to whether or not to conduct an air campaign over Kosovo are made at the political level. These are political decisions. That's, in a sense, the most important thing.

Second, within NATO—and this happens in different forums—some of the formal NATO council and the ambassadors, for instance, meet informally at least once a week, often more. There are political discussions of the issues of the day. Prior to the Libya air campaign, there was a discussion in January of that year about what was happening in Libya, what the implications were for NATO, and the values that NATO stood for.

Interestingly, a lot of these operations, whether they were in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, or Libya, were effectively humanitarian operations. These were to protect civilians in situations of conflict. That's where the origin of these missions often began, through the political discussions around the kinds of values and rights that NATO espouses and—

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Ambassador, I'm sorry to cut you off. This is important insight. I think there's lots of room for discussion, but thank you for that point. It's important.

I'm going to pass the remainder of my time to Mr. Gerretsen or Mr. Fisher.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Thank you.

I'm scribbling notes down so fast here. There is so much testimony coming out. I think it was Mr. McRae who said it was important to bring the full spectrum and not let others have to fill the gap in missions. Have we, in the past, been able to do that? Are we anywhere near being able to provide that full spectrum now? Through our new defence policy, do you think we'll get to the point where, if we're not there now, we will be?

[Robert McRae]

I would ask Denis to follow up.

I have to say that Afghanistan was a bit of a wake-up call. The idea of pooling resources in a combat mission with our closest allies did not really pan out. I think that even today in NATO, when the secretary general, as a way of overcoming budget issues, encourages allies to pool resources and capabilities, Canada, certainly when I was there, would intervene by saying, “We understand the theory, but on the ground in a combat situation, pooling resources with allies does not always work out.” As close as those allies can be, including the U.S. and the U.K., by the way, when you need the helicopters for a medevac, when you need the UAVs to see where those IEDs are being planted, and our allies say, “Yes, we hear you, but we're busy; we have commitments of our own for our own troops”, and you don't have those ears and eyes, and you don't have the medevac when you need it, that's a wake-up call.

We've acquired the helicopters and UAV capability, and I think we're in a much better position today to understand that, when we go somewhere, we bring the whole kit we need, and if we don't have the kit, we don't go.

[VAdm (Ret'd) Denis Rouleau]

That's absolutely correct.

[The Chair, Liberal, Stephen Fuhr]

Sorry, Admiral, but I'm going to have to stop it there. There'll be more time, and hopefully we can finish that thought.

I'm going to give the floor to Mr. Bezan or to anybody on his side who wants it.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

I appreciate it. I'll be splitting my time with Mr. Viersen.

As you know, Ambassador, there have been some changes within the European construct on setting up PESCO, now that they have their permanent European security and co-operation organization. I've had some concern about whether that's being competitive or does that include capacity building? I'd like to get your ideas about it.

Just in the last few days, there has been a new centre of excellence established in Finland on hybrid warfare. We were talking about that earlier. It's open to European and NATO members. The signatories are Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the U.K., and the U.S.A. Canada is absent from that list, and I'm hearing through back channels that the Europeans aren't happy that we didn't come in to the original memorandum.

Do you think Canada should be a member of the centre of excellence on hybrid warfare?

[Robert McRae]

I think it's a good question. I don't have inside information as to what the debate in Canada was on this issue. Certainly, hybrid warfare, as we've discussed, is an important new issue that NATO needs to confront. On the surface of it, I would agree. I would suggest that this is something Canada can bring a contribution to, frankly.

More broadly on the European side, if the European Union wishes to do more on the defence side, we should encourage them to do so. There's no substitute for NATO because the U.S. is there around the table and they all know it, but if the Europeans are prepared to take up some of the slack and take on missions that maybe NATO would not, great. Let them fill that gap. They've often taken on policing missions in the past below the level of high-intensity combat. I think there's much to be gained in terms of encouraging Europeans to do more on their own in the defence capability.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you.

Arnold.