Mr. Chair and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here to offer some brief thoughts on NATO from the perspective of a practitioner with the alliance who was in uniform for 39 years.
I have had the opportunity to participate in NATO deployment exercises and operations at every rank from young sub-lieutenant to flag officer. I had the privilege to command the Standing NATO Maritime Group, the NATO fleet, back in 2006-07, as it was Canada's turn to assume command then. I also was the last Canadian commander to do so. Other countries, such as Denmark, Norway, and Spain, started to acquire command platforms to enter the command rotation. Unfortunately, we were busy decommissioning our command ships during the same period.
During that one year in command at sea, we transformed the role of the fleet to expand beyond a simple presence into countering human-, weapon-, and drug-smuggling operations from northern Norway to Cape Verde off the African coast, demonstrating the ability of the alliance to deploy out of traditional areas of operation, and indeed, very much in line with Canada's overseas deployability principle. The chairman of the NATO Military Committee at the time was General Ray Henault, also the last Canadian flag officer to hold that position.
The fleet went on the following year to circumnavigate Africa and later got directly involved in counter-piracy operations, as the threat was changing. Today, Canada alternates with Australia, a non-NATO member, in taking command of CTF 150 against piracy, a shore command position in the gulf.
My talks to the crews of the two Canadian flagships when I was in command were always focused on reminding them to do their job proudly as everybody else was watching them to see how to do it right. To this day, I firmly believe that is still the case.
Having attempted to retire in 2010, but failing, I was assigned to Brussels as Canada's military representative at the NATO Military Committee. Needless to say, it was a very busy time. Canada was completing its combat role, for which every allied force in the theatre had the highest respect, and transitioning into a very important training role for the Afghan forces.
Then came Libya and Colonel Gadhafi. Interestingly, the NATO operations were to be led by yet another Canadian, Lieutenant-General Charlie Bouchard. Canada was once again present on the water with a frigate and also in the air with a sizable air contingent. Although NATO has 28 nation members, only eight nations participated in the operation against Libya.
Our continued participation in the Balkans air policing rotation, as well as our current presence in Latvia, are strong indicators of our commitment to the alliance, and NATO knows that.
Every time I hear debates regarding the required 2% of GDP spending on defence, I always redirect the discussion to contributions to operations instead. No, we do not spend the stated 2%. That's true, but we're always there when the alliance requires us to be. What is the advantage for the alliance for a nation to spend their required 2% or more—some do spend more than 2%—but never deploy their capabilities? For many, the worst wear and tear comes from running their gear through the car wash at home.
A similar approach can be seen by nations imposing caveats so severe that their troops in theatre can perform patrols only inside the wire and by day only. While there were far more than 28 nations involved in Afghanistan, you don't need two hands to account for those involved in real combat operations. Canada does not impose caveats on our troops and their assets. We expect them to be used for what they've been trained to do.
Yes, during recent financial restraints, Canada pulled out of some programs such as AGS, the air ground surveillance system. During the same financial squeeze, it also pulled out of the AWACS program, which we had been a member of since its start. In fact, we pulled out of AGS only to initiate our own acquisition program so that, once required, we could deploy to the NATO operations. The fact that we pulled out of AWACS was not only due to financial restraints; there was also the fact that it took so long to deploy these assets in Afghanistan, despite the repeated operational commanders' requests. It is something that the alliance cannot be proud of. Hopefully, they have learned a lesson.
When it comes to people, in addition to those within the Canadian capability contribution—ship crews, air crews, and all this—we have a presence in NATO posts like Brussels, Naples, and everywhere around the world. The requests continue to be for more Canadians, but not just for more Canadians, they're looking for more Canadians instead of other nations' officers and staff. That's a very different ask.
To conclude, if we are to continue to be able and willing to answer the NATO call among other commitments, we will have to be serious about capability replacement. There used to be a plan called the SCR, “Strategic Capability Roadmap”. It probably exists under a different name now. It described the capability in hand, the planned obsolescence, but more importantly the planned replacement program start time to avoid capability gaps. I don't need to tell anybody on this committee that we've passed all those deadlines now.
I do hope that recently promulgated defence policy will be executed in a very efficient, and most importantly, timely manner, in order to allow Canada to continue to deserve the respect earned by so many over so many years within NATO.
Mr. Chair, I stand ready to answer questions at your discretion.