As I just mentioned, I did the mission in the Arabian Sea. I took a tanker with me, and we did a six-month deployment to the Arabian Sea to do counterterrorism and counterpiracy. One of the challenges I had when I was there was that we didn't have adequate air assets to do the surveillance.
I was responsible for about two million square miles of ocean, and often I only had four ships. I needed air assets. The ally to whom I went and said, “Can you not give me some more air assets?”—and it wouldn't surprise you who that ally was—their response was, “Well, it's a pity you didn't bring any, isn't it?”, because we had not contributed to that aspect.
From that moment on I've always been of the belief that if we want to lead in missions, and do deployed missions, we have to bring many of the capabilities, the integral capabilities, with us. That's why it's very important for us not to rely on allies for key areas of capability, like combat search and rescue, attack helicopters, and tankers. We need those capabilities, and in those periods of time when we are gapped, they fundamentally limit the Canadian Armed Forces' ability to do its job.