Canada will have a role to play in terms of North Atlantic Council decision-making, because it is consensus-based decision-making. For that very reason, we'll at least be involved in the discussions of deterrence and the postures. The deterrence, of course, is not just conventional. It is also nuclear. Of course, now we're even into cyber-deterrence as well, as Mr. Scheid has already mentioned quite extensively.
To me, the Russian threat would not change NATO's position. NATO would not adopt a different deterrence posture, in my view. The NATO nuclear deterrent, by the way, has reduced significantly since the end of the Cold War. However, we have seen—it's something in open-source information in the recent past—where the Russians have talked about the development of missiles like the Iskander missile, for example, which is a nuclear-tipped short-range kind of missile. That sort of thing is obviously of concern to NATO and all of its members.
Will it change anything? I don't think so. I certainly don't have any insights as to whether or not NATO is discussing that in any form, other than the normal summit formats, and the normal North Atlantic Council regimes, whether they're at ministerial or head of state levels. To me, the thing that's maintained NATO's credibility over time has been its consistency, especially with its deterrent posture, and recognizing that change has required some changes in that posture overall but hasn't changed its overall intent. So I don't see anything massively changing in the short term.