Mr. Chair, ladies and gentlemen, I will be speaking to you in the language of Shakespeare, but I will be able to answer your questions in the language of Molière, if you wish.
You all know who I am, in some ways. I've had the distinct honour to serve my country in the Canadian Forces for over 37 years. I retired from uniformed service in 2012. I have since continued my engagement in defence and security matters through support to the Canadian Forces as a senior mentor. My commitment to the security and defence of Canada continues today, as I am currently employed as chief executive, Lockheed Martin Canada.
It's a pleasure to be here today to address this important matter. In 2001 I wrote a paper in staff college essentially concluding that the alliance was bound for failure unless major changes were to take place. Events of 9/11, my assignment to NATO Joint Force Command Naples, Italy, and my subsequent appointment as theatre commander for Operation Unified Protector drastically changed the face of NATO and my attitude towards it. I witnessed the awakening of a vibrant alliance, albeit a slow one. Today I believe that NATO remains relevant and is a cornerstone of Canada’s defence and security policy.
My relationship with NATO goes back to 1977 when as a young lieutenant I was flying tactical helicopters on Reforger in Germany. A few years after General Henault, I too commanded 444 squadron. In fact I was the last commanding officer, and took the squadron back to Canada on completion of my tour. On the morning of 9/11, I was on duty as deputy commander of the U.S. NORAD region. In an article 5 response, as the general mentioned, we saw NATO AWACS come to North America to help defend the United States. As a U.S. general commented to me at the time, we saw the blood flowing backwards. I also served as commander of the Canadian NORAD region and deputy commander of NORAD, and I witnessed then a resurgence of Russian bomber activities on the northern slopes of North America.
My colleague General Henault spoke to you about the strategic imperatives of NATO. I'll focus my comments at the theatre level, where strategy meets operations and delivers the application of controlled force.
I am content to see NATO forces being engaged on multiple fronts on land, at sea, and in the air. The general mentioned them, so I will not, but they all serve as a sterling example of the many versatile capabilities of the alliance. We need to remain engaged lest we will yield our democratic freedom to nefarious entities.
To be clear, the threat remains present. In light of Russia’s hostile activities, I offer to you that we are in a second Cold War. My concern, however, is that there may be only one side spending money on it. NATO has suffered a long period of reduced funding, and we are seeing some of the results today. In Canada, we have a willing Canadian Armed Forces that suffers from a lack of appropriate funding and a resulting reduction in capabilities due to a lack of modernization.
Actions from China, North Korea, and Iran are other clear indicators that a threat to our society exists through either direct actions, indirect attacks, or even the mere potential to act.
Actions of despotic governments and their criminal acts against their own people must also be taken into consideration. Such have created mass migrations of refugees. Today there are over 66 million displaced persons. Military casualties are decreasing but civilian casualties are increasing. Frequent small-scale attacks on harmless civilians are easier to hide, yet create as much harm as any conventional combat action. We have a responsibility to protect those who cannot defend themselves and to create an environment in which diplomacy and self-government may take root. R2P is hard to avoid, but it must be approached in a holistic manner.
These threats will exist for the next decades, and therefore, when addressing our needs and capabilities, we must build an armed force that can keep our country secure for the next 40 years and beyond. Our force composition, posturing, and equipping must be tailored to these long-term requirements that transcend the mandate of any single government.
I, with many others, fully support the new defence policy of a strong, secure, and engaged Canada. I congratulate the government on the new policy and can only ask that the commitment to seeing it through remains, regardless of the political party in power. We have heard such plans before, and I would hope that we will learn from the past and we will see its evolution unabated.
From a commander's perspective, the mission I was assigned in Libya was an out-of-theatre R2P operation. We were given the task of taking all necessary action to protect the population. This was not a regime change, as some have mentioned. In fact, my wish was to see Gadhafi in front of the International Court of Justice to bring closure to this sad period in the lives of Libyans. This was a true R2P mission conducted by NATO.
Glaringly missing from the directions provided was the absence of a clear end state. This must be the second question answered before forces are committed. Lacking such, we ended up stating our own understanding of the end state, which was subsequently approved by the North Atlantic Council. It's important for me to say that the political end state is essential to any military commander.
I view my selection as commander for the mission as the result of a long career in the military, but also—and really, what's important to me—I was known to the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, SACEUR, and the commander of Joint Force Command Naples. I believe that a Canadian in command was politically acceptable to the alliance, and, having served in the U.S. for many years, the country as well. My point here is that when we have Canadians in NORAD, they help in the bigger picture as well, because it enables us to put people in leadership roles and positions.
This mission, as with all military operations today, extended beyond the purely military realm. We adopted the comprehensive approach of “PMESII”—political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure—as the analytical start to assess the operational environment. This is an important point I wish to make, because conflict resolution today requires a full-spectrum approach, not just a military response.
Three major lessons were reinforced to me and my team. This is a matter of relationships, and one should not be exchanging business cards on the first day of the conflict. In fact, this is a job that must be taking place today.
I know that this committee is doing that in its travel. Congratulations, sir, and your team.
Doctrine and procedures are for the guidance of the wise and the blind obedience of the fools. We must remain flexible, and cannot adapt the next conflict based on the last one. We are the ones who must adapt.
Agility of the mind is something that does not come easily sometimes with 32 nations, especially in large alliances such as NATO.
I'll take the next few minutes to cover some more specific lessons learned. I hope they apply as much today as they did in 2011.
The first is readiness. It took NATO 12 months to begin combat operations in the Balkans. We had three weeks to get ready and assume command of the mission. A crisis today and the decision to act will not take months. We will only have a few weeks at best, or more people will die. We must have the right force structure and readiness that will allow fast and decisive engagements. We must have readily deployable, interoperable Canadian Armed Forces.
Next is intelligence. Situational awareness is the key. “Need to know” is a thing of the past. Today there is a pressing need to share. During the mission, I was part of Two Eyes, Canada and the U.S.; Five Eyes, Canada, the U.S., U.K., New Zealand, and Australia; and of course the various NATO classifications. This created conditions where not all members of the team had access to information. I took the deliberate decision to extend the passage of information to every member country that flew combat missions. I could not accept losing a single member of the force because we did not share information, thus potentially affecting my own centre of gravity, which was the alliance cohesion. This also created resentment from some of the countries that were part of it, because they felt they were not given the full picture. Acknowledging the existing agreements in effect, we must retain the flexibility to share, and not be encumbered by policies.
Next is boots on the ground. We conducted the mission without NATO forces on the ground. This was imposed by the United Nations Security Council resolution not to have occupying forces deployed in theatre. This artificial limitation, made for valid political reasons at the time, forced us to adapt in a way that had not been done before. We should be mindful of imposing such restriction on any commander in any future mission. On the other hand, I believe we showed that a mission could be accomplished using air and maritime power projection, without any casualties to our own forces. Further, force disengagement took seconds.
With regard to weapon systems, interoperability is essential. We must maximize the potential of future force structures and composition. The more we have in common with other NATO forces, the more effective we will be. Further, conflicts are now taking place among the population. We must therefore have the right small-yield weapons that will minimize collateral damage. Even a tactical mistake will take on strategic implications in a few hours, placing an entire mission at risk.
Next is cultural awareness. We can no longer impose our own standards on those we are trying to help. We conducted operations during Christian Lent and Ramadan. We adapted accordingly. I would have considered it a failure if we'd had to have a hearts and mind campaign during the mission. This was ours to lose from the start, and it influenced the way we conducted operations. A diverse force, be it gender, religious, or political diversity, must be the new norm.
In terms of information operations, the use of all means to achieve the objectives must include non-kinetic activities. Social media has become a critical element in the commander's arsenal. The risk is that it will extend beyond the geographical area of operations, and we must be prepared for that. A server in China or a server in Russia could have to be dealt with outside the geographical location that political entities may have given us a task. I believe greater efforts must be placed on understanding this concept, this problem, and on facing it, because strategic communication activities are truly important.
I'm running out of time, so let me conclude. Much has been written on whether the intervention in Libya was successful. On this I quote NATO, that the UN mandate was carried out to the letter and the mission was terminated on 31 October 2011 after having fulfilled its objectives. I was confident that I had the support of the Government of Canada and that of the leadership of NATO and its partner countries. The challenge, however, was that while the military portion was completed, much more was needed and is still going to be needed in the future. Social, political, constitutional, legal, academic reforms, amongst many others, were never followed through.
This is an important discussion that must take place today, before the next engagement. We must have a plan after the military has done its job. This was clearly lacking. I will offer to you that we have not learned from Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya. It was good work from the military, but how about this comprehensive approach. Wherever we send our sons and daughters in the future, we will need to have a plan for the next phase of the campaign or accept that our effort may be for naught.
NATO provides the world with a political, diplomatic, and military capability that has no equal, and we must safeguard it. It brings international legitimacy to conflicts, and it tells the world that we will not stand idly while innocent civilians suffer or our national sovereignty and freedom are at risk. NATO is stronger today, but it must continue to evolve. I believe that Canada must continue its quest to retain, and indeed increase, its contribution and lead the change.
My time is running out, sir. Much more can and should be said, and I'm pleased to see that you are having these discussions today. I pledge to you my support in this endeavour. I congratulate you on your work and your commitment to NATO. It's a journey, not a destination.
Thank you very much.