Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to start by thanking both generals for their service to Canada, and all three of you for your service to NATO.
I want to focus on one of the points that General Henault raised. It was about NATO's recognition of the necessity to put equal emphasis on projecting stability, defence, and deterrence. Certainly, one of the interesting things in Canada right now is that we've had all-party support for projecting stability.
My concerns that I've been asking about here in committee are on the defence and deterrence part of this, which have received less attention. In particular, the U.S. nuclear posture review, which was on February 2, talked a lot about low-yield nuclear weapons or tactical nuclear weapons—which, I always want to point out to people, are slightly larger than weapons dropped on Hiroshima—and basically seemed to abandon the no-first-use doctrine pretty explicitly in saying that nuclear weapons might be used to respond to conventional disadvantages or attacks.
What is NATO's role here in trying to either adapt to or combat this lowering of the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, and would Canada have a particular role in that?