I thank the committee for the invitation to appear. I'm going to direct my remarks specifically to NORAD, and to ballistic missile defence and to air defence.
First of all, the defence of North America can't be separated from Canada's overall foreign and defence policy, which is largely expeditionary. That is, Canada doesn't provide for its security by so much the direct defence of Canada or North America, but through a global engagement.
In some sense, it's that global engagement that makes both Canada and the United States potential targets. This was so during the Cold War, and I think it's the same thing now. As my colleague Chris Sands said, an attack on North America is not going to come out of the blue. It's going to arise in the context of tensions that are more than likely going to originate overseas, whether in Europe against Russia, or in the Middle East against state actors or non-state actors.
It's our global engagement that makes us kind of vulnerable, and why we need to provide for the aerospace defence of North America. I think that applies, as well, to ballistic missile defence. If we are going to be engaged overseas against actors who have this capability, then providing for a limited ballistic missile defence of North America is going to be necessary. This is I think why the United States has moved to improve its systems in the post-Cold War, post-9/11 era.
The next point is that the future of NORAD really doesn't depend on whether we participate in ballistic missile defence or not. I think the Americans have made adjustments. After 2004, when we agreed that information from NORAD could go to the American ballistic missile defence units and, even in 2005, when we declined direct participation, NORAD made the adjustments. It's not the first adjustment that NORAD has made. The United States would prefer, would welcome, Canadian participation, but it isn't a deal breaker as far as NORAD is concerned. The main issue for Canada is the question of the direct defence of Canada. I think here that participation in ballistic missile defence would enhance that.
The other point in terms of North American defence is that while NORAD deals with aerospace defence, and to a limited extent maritime warning, a lot of what goes on in North American defence and security is outside the national NORAD context—the relationship between United States Northern Command, Canadian Joint Operations Command, the myriad of relationships between the two navies, between the U.S. Coast Guard and the Canadian navy, and between all the security agencies.
North American defence and security cooperation is much broader than NORAD, and in some sense NORAD is the exception, in the sense that you have an institutional arrangement unique by national command. Most of what takes place takes place outside of the NORAD formal framework, and traditionally both governments have been comfortable with that arrangement, as well as the United States.
When the United States established U.S. Northern Command—a unified command under the American unified command plan with primary responsibility for the defence of the United States, and other responsibility for its area of operation, which included Mexico, parts of the Caribbean, and Canada—there was discussion of a much larger combined joint arrangement. Canada declined that, and this again was no major problem for the United States.
In terms of the air sovereignty, the point made by the member was something that I think the committee needs to look into. Is our air sovereignty, our fighters, too far from major urban centres? That's a Canadian problem. NORAD cannot dictate where Canada deploys its fighters, but certainly it's something we may want to look into. Again, I think, NORAD can certainly help in this regard, since its air sovereignty and protection was its first mission.
Overall, I think as far as Canada and the United States go—and I echo the comments of my colleagues—NORAD and broader North American security and defence relations are working. They work to the benefit of both countries, and here it's not so much the United States asking Canada to participate, but in the United States welcoming Canadian participation, accommodating it. In fact, the United States and those involved in the direct defence and security of the United States actually enjoy working with Canadians, the highly professional Canadian Armed Forces and the highly professional Canadian security services. It's this relationship that really makes it work.
It's working as well in the Arctic. Notwithstanding the long-standing disagreement over the international status of the Northwest Passage, U.S. Northern Command and Canadian Joint Operations Command have engaged in numerous planning and exercises regarding security in the Arctic. Again, it's this sort of approach that has made North American security work.
As far as what priority this should be in the defence review, apart from domestic past and aid to the civil power to which we look to the Canadian Armed Forces, North American security is the one other operation that is non-discretionary for Canada. It's something we can't avoid. We can limit our participation in various overseas operations, in various UN operations, and in various aid missions overseas, but North American security, along with domestic roles, is the other activity that the Canadian Forces cannot avoid and should have a call on our assets for.
For most of the Cold War, even during the height of the Cold War, it didn't demand excessive access because the direct defence of North America really lay in the American atomic deterrent. In the post-Cold War era, in the post-9/11 era, new threats have arisen that I think raise the level of priority for North American security in its military and non-military functions.
I think it is a non-discretionary activity for Canada. Fortunately for Canada, it's also a comfortable activity in that whatever we do to provide for the security of North America has a direct bearing on our immediate national security. The assets it draws are not excessive, and this would include ballistic missile defence. We don't necessarily have to build and develop our own systems; we can contribute to the American systems and make it truly North American, have Canadians at the sites, as we already have in terms of air defence, and thereby make a contribution and bring ballistic missile defence fully under the NORAD umbrella where it should be, because it is an aerospace threat. The other threat we'll maybe have to concern ourselves with now is changes in the cruise missile threats that are coming from Russian development.
It is something that I think should be a priority for us. In particular, if Canada is to continue to engage overseas in activities against state and non-state actors that could threaten North America, then providing for the defence of North America has to go along with that activity.
I'll end it there.