Thank you very much.
My comments will focus on the value added of UN peacekeeping and the urgent need for Canada to upgrade its training for effective re-engagement. I will hopefully build very much on the previous speakers.
UN peacekeeping is no miracle cure and there are no guarantees of success, but when properly mandated, resourced, and managed, UN peacekeeping offers the best chance for a country to transition from civil war to stable governance. Peacekeeping is the front end of a complex, long-term process of helping conflicting parties create the necessary conditions—political, socio-economic, and security—for sustainable peace. At the centre of this effort is the peace process.
Complex political problems always lie at the heart of violent conflict and require political solutions that are negotiated and agreed to by the parties. A capable security force will be essential in both the peace negotiation and implementation phases, but it is the supporting element of the overall mission nonetheless.
As our Afghanistan experience has so dramatically and tragically illustrated, no amount of military robustness and professionalism on the part of international military forces can make up for the lack of a credible peace process. That, of course, remains true to this day. The statistical evidence is clear. Looking at all past wars of the last quarter century, only 15% have ended decisively on the battlefield and, in these cases, the rebels prevailed at least as often as the governments they fought. All the rest ultimately had to be settled at the negotiating table.
It is precisely because of the primacy of the peace process that today's multi-dimensional UN peace operations are much more than military operations charged with providing a safe and secure environment. The core of the effort comprises civilians mandated to facilitate the peace process, promote the rule of law, and support the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance. Increasingly, mandates like that of MINUSMA in Mali also include security assistance to the elected government so that it can reassert its authority nationwide. This military assistance is in concert with diplomatic and technical support for national political dialogue and reconciliation efforts.
For a collective enterprise of this magnitude to succeed, as UN peacekeeping does more often than not, the international effort must be perceived as legitimate and impartial. It must have the broadest possible international support within a coherent legal and operational framework. Only the UN Security Council can mandate such an operation, and only the UN organization can lead the mission if it is to be broadly, internationally acceptable.
Headed by a civilian in the role of special representative of the UN Secretary-General—of course you had at least one here in Carolyn McAskie, Canadian former SRSG—with all the other components, including the military and police reporting to him or her, the very structure of the UN peacekeeping mission reflects the centrality of the peace process. This stands in sharp contrast to NATO-led military missions, even where authorized by the UN Security Council to assist in stabilizing the conflict, because the military mission is separate from the UN political, diplomatic, humanitarian, development, and governance mission, not an integral part of it.
How can the military effectively support the peace process under a separate command structure? My 10 years of training exercises with senior NATO commanders preparing for their deployments to Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo have demonstrated time and again that a divided command structure at the operational or strategic level is a recipe for a less effective command structure.
NATO-led stability operations lack the perceived legitimacy and impartiality of UN-led operations precisely because their political and military leaders are seen to represent a very specific set of powerful countries and interests. Not only does the separate military command structure undermine coherence in the international effort, NATO leadership can constitute a gift to spoilers on the ground decrying alleged foreign occupation, the presence of additional non-NATO forces notwithstanding.
Of course I hasten to say that narrow national interests are still in play in the capitals of UN troop contributors, but the structure and composition of a UN peacekeeping mission at least works to mitigate this tendency in both perception and reality. An integrated mission under the overall authority of the SRSG also allows the UN command and control to be decentralized to the operational level. This contrasts with the more centralized top-heavy command structures operating in NATO, which was a constant focus of concern in all those years of exercises that I participated in.
To recap, the main comparative advantages for a UN peace operation is its integrated command structure under civilian authority, which in turn reflects the primacy of the peace process, and which facilitates unity of purpose and of effort, and the fact that the UN is the only organization through which the forces of the P5 and all major powers, including rising and regional powers, can jointly participate. Only the UN, therefore, offers the possibility of a politically diverse and operationally capable mission, but if and only if the P5 and other major powers invest in UN operations.
I want to touch briefly on the challenge of consent. This picks up very much on the comments by the opening speaker on the outer limits of UN peacekeeping, and on General Fraser's comments as well.
Consent, impartiality, and non-use of force are core principles of UN peacekeeping, yet Security Council mandates have grown increasingly ambitious, especially around the use of force. Peacekeepers are deployed in theatres where they do not have the consent of all parties. Extension of state authority through military means and policing is now part of the core UN peacekeeping mandate, as we've seen in Mali, requiring use or projection of force not only to fend off direct attacks from spoilers but as part of deliberate strategies to expand and secure the authority of a government in contested territories.
This type of mandate and use of force against spoilers must not obscure the fundamental lesson from the landmark 2000 Brahimi report on UN peace operations, that peacekeeping cannot substitute for an effective political process. This in turn means the greater the number of parties outside the agreement, the greater the difficulty in keeping the peace process credible.
Exacerbating this problem is the increasing tendency of the Security Council to include in mandates the “targeting” of certain groups for “degrading”, so as to seemingly move them totally beyond the negotiating pale. This might be seen as the anti-terrorist them-or-us mindset infecting peacekeeping, but peacekeeping is based, and this is its value-added, on the fundamental premise that even highly problematic rebel groups must still be engaged to the maximum extent possible if peace is to be achievable.
I want to briefly turn to training. Leadership and international peacekeeping training and practice requires a world-class international training centre at home. As all the speakers have said, peace operations have evolved dramatically since Canada was last engaged in any significant way and continue to do so. Modern, complex, multi-dimensional UN peace operations require in-depth training and education. That was the recommendation of the Somali inquiry way back when peacekeeping was a lot simpler.
If the Government of Canada is to fulfill its oft-repeated promise to lead an international effort to improve and expand the training of military and civilian personnel deployed in peace operations, then we must urgently re-establish our own capacity to undertake world-class, multidisciplinary peacekeeping training here in Canada for Canadian and international military police and civilian peacekeepers. Such training is also indispensable for an effective re-engagement by Canada in UN-led peacekeeping operations.
To this end, Canada should establish a Canadian international peace operations training centre under civilian leadership, at an arm's length from government, with reliable funding, and clear links to and support from the Department of National Defence and Global Affairs Canada.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.