National Defence Committee on March 9th, 2020

[The Chair, Liberal, Karen McCrimmon]

Thank you everyone. We will call this meeting to order.

I'd like to express a welcome from all the members of the committee to our very esteemed guests who are here with us today. Thank you.

We have a bit of business to do before we get into the testimony, because we have not approved the subcommittee minutes. I wanted to ask permission to deal with the subcommittee recommendations at the end, during committee business time.

Is everyone all right with that?

[Some hon. members]

Agreed.

[The Chair, Liberal, Karen McCrimmon]

Thank you very much for that.

I will therefore hand it over to our esteemed guests and welcome them to make their opening statements.

Thank you.

[MGen Jocelyn Paul, Director General, International Security Policy, Assistant Deputy Minister, Policy, Department of National Defence]

Good afternoon, Madam Chair and members of the committee.

I am Major-General Jocelyn Paul, and I am the Director General of International Security Policy at the Department of National Defence.

This means I am responsible for managing our defence and international security relationships and providing advice on international defence relations.

I am here with Lieutenant-General Mike Rouleau, Commander of the Canadian Joint Operations Command.

I am also joined by Sandra McCardell, director general of the Middle East bureau, and Mr. Giles Norman, the executive director of security and defence relations, both from Global Affairs.

It's a pleasure to be here today.

My intent is to provide you with a high-level overview of Operation Impact before turning to General Rouleau, who will provide you with more details on the dynamics in theatre.

Operation Impact is the military component of Canada's whole-of-government response to Daesh in Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon.

Through this strategy, Canada is investing up to $3.5 billion over five years to help set the conditions for security and stability and to reduce human suffering.

Under this strategy, the Canadian Armed Forces contributes to the Global Coalition against Daesh. We contribute to NATO mission Iraq, and we also provide bilateral training and assistance to both Jordan and Lebanon. While distinct, these activities all work towards the common objective of strengthening the capacity of regional security forces, so that they can contain the threat posed by Daesh.

Let me take a few minutes to walk through each of these activities.

The Coalition was established in 2014 and includes 82 member countries and organizations committed to tackling Daesh on all fronts.

In addition to military operations, it includes four civilian-led lines of effort. The first one is stabilizing liberated areas. Second is preventing the flow of foreign terrorist fighters. Third is dismantling Daesh financing and economic infrastructure. Fourth is countering Daesh propaganda.

Countries may contribute to one or more of the coalition's lines of effort based on their expertise and capabilities. Canada is one of the few coalition members that contributes to all five lines of effort: military and civilian.

While NATO had been working with the lraqi security forces for some time, NATO Mission Iraq was established in 2018 to complement the Coalition's counter-Daesh operations.

NMI, the NATO mission in Iraq, is a non-combat training mission focused on strengthening the capacity of Iraq's Ministry of Defense, the office of the national security adviser and relevant national security institutions. More than 20 countries contribute to NMI. We are proud to have led that mission for its first two years.

Canada also deploys training and assistance teams to Jordan and Lebanon to strengthen their capacity to withstand Daesh and the spillover effects of the conflicts in Iraq and Syria.

This regional capacity building includes the delivery of training, infrastructure development and equipment. In all of these efforts, we respect the sovereignty of our partner nations. I would emphasize that we are in Iraq at the invitation of the government.

Since we first deployed to Iraq in 2014, the Coalition and the lraqi security forces have made tremendous progress in the fight against Daesh. But our mission is not over, and the Coalition and NATO are at an important juncture.

As the threat landscape in Iraq changes and the needs of our partners and forces evolve, both missions will have to adapt together. In February, NATO defence ministers agreed in principle to expand the NATO mission in Iraq so that it can take on some of the coalition training activities. We expect that these deliberations will be iterative and Iraqi-led.

I would like to close with a reminder that, while we are here to talk about Operation Impact, the military is only one piece of the puzzle. Through our whole-of-government initiatives, and in collaboration with allies and partners, we are working to set the conditions for long-term success so that our regional partners can tackle the maligned ideology that has created so much suffering in the region.

I trust that this context is helpful, and I thank you for your attention. I will now turn the floor to General Rouleau.

[LGen Mike Rouleau, Commander, Canadian Joint Operations Command, Department of National Defence]

Good afternoon, Madam Chair, honourable members.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today alongside Major-General Paul and my colleagues from Global Affairs Canada to provide you with up-to-date information on Operation Impact.

I commend the committee for wanting to learn more about this complex, rapidly evolving mission on behalf of Canadians and I am eager to provide whatever clarity and understanding that I can from my perspective as the operational commander.

Before taking your questions, I'd like to briefly address three points to help frame the discussion.

First, I'll describe my role as the commander of Canada's joint operations command and what topics I can and cannot speak to from that position.

Second, I'll speak to different elements of Operation Impact, as described by Major-General Paul, and clarify which are under my direct command and control and which are not.

Third, I will provide you with an update on the latest developments on the ground, what's been happening there and where I believe the mission is headed in the near run.

Let's talk about my role as Commander Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC). First, regarding my roles and responsibilities, let me say that I work on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Vance, to provide leadership and alignment of over 20 Canadian Armed Forces operations at home and around the world.

I do not get to pick which operations I command or the ends they are meant to achieve. These are given to me through chief of the defence staff direction, which is in turn shaped by Government of Canada policy.

Within that context, I'd be more than pleased to speak to you, at a level of detail that does not risk the security of our military capabilities or deployed personnel, about how the forces under my command are executing Operation Impact, as it was assigned to me.

There are currently up to 850 military personnel assigned to Op Impact and, as Major-General Paul noted, these forces are divided into three parts. There is our U.S.-led coalition conducting Operation Inherent Resolve. The second one is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's mission in Iraq, commonly referred to as NMI. Third, there are two Canadian training and assistance teams, CTATs, that are deployed to Jordan and Lebanon. In the discussion, we sometimes lose sight of these Jordan and Lebanon elements when we talk about Operation Impact. We tend to focus exclusively on Iraq, but it's a regional piece.

The defined joint operations area for this operation includes the countries of Iraq, Kuwait, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. It is important that the committee understand that, while I am ultimately responsible for all Op Impact personnel from a national perspective, I do not exercise daily command and control of all of these elements. Specifically, although the NATO training mission in Iraq is currently led by a Canadian officer, Major-General Carignan, she and the approximately 200 Canadian Armed Forces personnel working in NMI answer to a NATO chain of command and not to the Canadian chain of command. In addition, the majority of activities conducted by Canadian special operations forces in Iraq are commanded by the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command.

Let me now go over an operational update.

Now, Madam Chair, having clarified those few points, allow me to provide you with a quick overview of the situation on the ground for Operation Impact, which remains somewhat fluid, particularly in Iraq.

Currently, most of the enhanced force protection measures that we put in place following the U.S. airstrike that killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimani on January 3—including the pause in training operations and the relocation of Canadian personnel—remain in place.

Nevertheless, despite ongoing tension and uncertainty, the multinational commitment to defeating Daesh remains, and military operations are gradually returning to normal.

Under coalition leadership, joint military operations against Daesh have resumed, and I have authorized the redeployment of certain Canadian personnel from Canada to Kuwait in anticipation of moving them into Iraq in the coming days to ultimately resume their training mission as the situation permits. To be clear, these moves are conditions-based, not time-based, and I cannot predict exactly when the resumption will take place.

A very short few days ago, it appeared that we would be in a position to resume operations imminently, but now the latest source of uncertainty affecting the timeline of the mission is the spread of novel coronavirus, or COVID-19. I can assure you that we are monitoring the situation closely, taking steps to protect our personnel and maintaining the operational flexibility to get back to our core business as soon as the situation allows.

In looking ahead, at this point, as a result of force protection and various other considerations, the immediate future of Operation Impact is not clear. However, what is clear is that the operational mandate to support the coalition and NMI and to conduct capacity building in Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon extends until March 31, 2021. I intend to do everything with my team and within our capacity to fulfill that mandate until the CDS directs me otherwise.

I've been very fortunate to witness the Canadian Armed Forces and their partners make tremendous progress against Daesh over the past few years. I got promoted to general in 2014. Shortly thereafter, when I was commanding, we put special forces into Iraq, so I've personally been involved in this mission since September of 2014 as a commander of either a special forces command or, now, CJOC.

We now find ourselves in a crucial phase of the mission where, having helped defeat Daesh militarily, we must now help consolidate that defeat and ensure that Daesh cannot return. Achieving this will require a nuanced understanding of various regional dynamics and close collaboration with civilian partners. It will also require strong leadership on the ground, along with flexibility and agility to respond to challenges and changing circumstances.

I am proud to say that the commanders and forces under my command exhibit all these qualities. I saw these on display in early January as we successfully adapted to the very rapid changes on January 3, as a result of the strike, to protect our forces and preserve our operational capabilities.

If we can retain this level of leadership and collaboration going forward in Operation Impact, then Canada will continue to make a contribution we can be proud of.

I thank you for your time and welcome any questions you may have.

[The Chair, Liberal, Karen McCrimmon]

I thank the witnesses for their testimony. That was very helpful.

We'll move on to the questions now, with Monsieur Martel.

[Richard Martel, Conservative, Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, QC]

Thank you for being here today.

Mr. Rouleau and Mr. Paul, I would like to talk about the lack of ground air defence, which hinders our operations.

Given that the Iranian regime has demonstrated a willingness and ability to attack allied bases with missiles, do we plan to have such a system?

[LGen Mike Rouleau]

In terms of protection and ground air defence, all our bases in Iraq are protected by the U.S. We are looking at possibly consolidating our bases, but I can assure you that every base has air defence protection, and beyond every base, the tactical sector has some protection, more broadly, from the U.S. forces.

As for acquiring new systems for Canada, Madam Chair, I cannot comment. The commander of the army would be able to do so.

[Richard Martel, Conservative, Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, QC]

If the Iraqi government formally asked the Americans to leave Iraq, what factors would Canada have to consider in order to continue Operation Impact?

[MGen Jocelyn Paul]

As I mentioned in my presentation, we are there because the Iraqi government invited us. There is currently a dialogue between NATO and the Iraqi government about extending the NATO mission in Iraq. The discussion is ongoing. There have been exchanges between the Secretary General of NATO and the current Prime Minister.

We are hopeful that, with the Iraqi government, we will be able to clarify the future of the mandate. Having said that, the resources that the U.S. is bringing to the region are essential to the conduct of both missions.

[Richard Martel, Conservative, Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, QC]

Some U.S. personnel have suffered brain injuries. Have members of the Canadian Armed Forces suffered similar injuries?

[LGen Mike Rouleau]

No. To my knowledge, there have been no cases of traumatic brain injuries among Canadian Armed Forces personnel. However, it should be pointed out that our people in Erbil were not as close to the explosions as they would have been at Ain al-Asad air base, for example.

[Richard Martel, Conservative, Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, QC]

After the attacks, additional protections were clearly put in place. Will they remain in place permanently?

[LGen Mike Rouleau]

Thank you for your question.

Even before the attacks, we made adjustments on the ground, because we had information suggesting the possibility of an attack. After the attacks, we took other measures, and we will actually maintain some of them forever, or for as long as we are there. However, for reasons of operational security, I cannot specify what those measures are.

[Richard Martel, Conservative, Chicoutimi—Le Fjord, QC]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, Karen McCrimmon]

Mr. Spengemann.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I would like to thank all four of you for your service and, through you, my thanks to the men and women you represent, your teams.

I've had the privilege of spending a substantial amount of time in Iraq as a UN official. It's always an extremely welcome opportunity to circle back and to receive an update, so thank you for being here.

I would like to use my time to focus on—you mentioned this, General—the concept of “whole of government” and to start out with a bit of the regional context from an Iraqi perspective, but also from a regional perspective. I'll ask you and also your colleagues from Global Affairs this. If you were to diagnose what led to the rapid assent of Daesh, what were some of the security-related factors that permitted this organization to become what it was, and what factors need to be put in place to prevent its renaissance or potentially even another organization taking its place?

[MGen Jocelyn Paul]

This is an extremely complex region. You've been out there. You've seen it yourself.

From a military perspective, when Daesh emerged, the Iraqi security forces ended up having a few challenges. I think everybody was extremely surprised to see the speed at which Daesh grew. It was extremely fast.

This is why our mandate is so important—the NATO mandate, the coalition mandate. A key aspect of it is training local security forces. We need to do our best to ensure that the Government of Iraq and its security apparatus are going to be in a better position to tackle that type of threat if it emerges in the future.

The root cause of the emergence of that threat is multi-faceted. There is a cultural aspect and a historical aspect. There's a faith aspect to it, and there's also an economic aspect. We could be talking about it for quite a long time.

Given the complexity of what's going on, this is why it was so important for us to work in the region with that whole-of-government mandate. There's no doubt in my mind that the military instrument alone will not be sufficient at all.

That may be a good segue for letting my colleagues from GAC expand a little more.

[Sandra McCardell, Director General, Middle East, Middle East Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development]

Thank you, Madam Chair, for allowing me the opportunity to answer that question beyond the security aspects.

What is clear is that the rise and success of Daesh, the Islamic State, not only in Iraq but across the world, is something that will be preoccupying us for a very long time. This is an ideology, an organization, that has found expression across the world, to the shock of most democratic societies where it has taken root.

There are a number of causes that have been identified, and you're likely familiar with them. Some of them speak to exclusion from society, a lack of acceptance in the societies where those who espouse this ideology have been living. At some point, too, there is a lack of hope, a lack of economic opportunity. There is a wide range of reasons that draw individuals to espouse an ideology as heinous as that of the Islamic State.

To link up with the work of Operation Impact, I think we need to look at why this group found footing, particularly in Iraq and Syria, and was so successful in attracting individuals from literally across the world. In that, I think there is much to speak about in terms of governance. The ability of Daesh to take root finds itself in the weakness of the Iraqi government and its inability to secure its territory and provide services for its people.

With that, one of the areas in which we work with our partners from the Department of National Defence is in looking at strengthening the state. Part of the work that they do is with Iraqi security forces. There are others who work with reinforcing police capacity as well, to be able to provide the security that the country needs.

As well, we see that there's a need to support the unity, stability, diversity and democracy of Iraq and to provide a governance structure that allows all Iraqis to find their place in their society.

Finally, we'd also point to a lack of respect for human rights, which was present in Iraq under Saddam Hussein and through.... With that, we're working to promote human rights, particularly with minorities, women and girls, so that overall we can provide a society that is resilient to the ideology of Daesh, not only by the capacity of the state to protect its citizens but also because of the strong governance and respect for human rights that the Iraqi government is meant to espouse through our efforts.

[Sven Spengemann, Liberal, Mississauga—Lakeshore, ON]

I think I'm just about out of time, though there may be a chance to circle back.

Thank you very much for those answers.

[The Chair, Liberal, Karen McCrimmon]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Boudrias, it's your turn.

[Michel Boudrias, Bloc, Terrebonne, QC]

Thank you.

I would like to talk about protecting the forces deployed in the region as part of the operation as such. At the beginning of the year, we were all concerned and surprised by the Iraqi attack on various places, which is largely unknown.

In the event of new attacks or new tensions, or for medical reasons—think of the coronavirus—would we have the depth and the flexibility to be fully autonomous, whether logistically or in terms of occupying bases and different locations, meaning with no possibility of co-operation with other partners?

[LGen Mike Rouleau]

Thank you for your question.

The short answer is no.

When we joined the coalition, we became dependent in various ways, to some extent, but we are mostly dependent on the United States. In terms of basic communication systems, of course we have our own systems, but the architecture of the intelligence system is based on the American system. I am thinking in particular of C4I, which stands for “command, control, communications, computers and intelligence”, in terms of surveillance, air strikes and protection of the forces at the various bases. This is done by the Americans. In terms of logistics, many contracts are done through U.S. forces.

So we are dependent on the United States, or the coalition, if you like, in some respects. Having said that, we try to be as self-sufficient as possible. For example, this week, because of COVID-19, we sent more personal protective equipment to our medical forces in Iraq and Kuwait.

We believe we are able to continue the mission under conditions such as those of January 3, the worst night of the mission to date. For example, after the attack, we made sure that we had enough munitions on the ground. We increased Canada's munitions in Iraq. I am more comfortable today than I was on January 3. I think we are in a good position.

In terms of COVID-19, within Joint Task Force-Iraq we are able to do four things.

We can do the screening. We can do the treatment. We can do the quarantine, if necessary, and we can do the evacuation.

If our troops contract COVID-19, we have the medical resources to take care of them. This morning, I asked our forces in Iraq whether we have the medical resources we need if the worst predictions of the number of people infected were to materialize, and I was told yes, without hesitation. So I'm not worried about that.

[Michel Boudrias, Bloc, Terrebonne, QC]

That's reassuring. I would also like to congratulate you on all the efforts currently being made in the region. I actually had the opportunity to visit Kuwait shortly before Christmas. That gave me a good picture of the situation. I was satisfied that our forces are in good hands.

I will continue on another topic: the enemy force, in this case Daesh. As we know, we cannot kill ideas with bullets.

Are we conducting counter-insurgency operations, psychological operations or public education operations in Iraq and Syria, either with our partners or on our own? Are you aware of such measures?

[LGen Mike Rouleau]

The special forces, both from Canada and elsewhere, are working with the Iraqi forces to contain what's left of Daesh. It's no longer a coherent military force with its own territory as it was in 2014-15. It is a group of people trying to lead an insurgency. So the job of special forces is to contain Daesh to prevent it from restoring itself.

We are aware of the threat posed by Daesh. Whenever there is political instability and our missions are not progressing is a good time for the people of Daesh because it gives them a chance to communicate with each other and to move around.

However, Daesh is not the only threat on the ground. There are also Shia groups. We are aware that they are not completely controlled by the government of Iraq and that they can take orders from Iran. We are also concerned about the threat posed by Shia militia groups.