Madam Chair and members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to speak today.
My name is Dr. Maya Eichler. I am an associate professor and Canada research chair at Mount Saint Vincent University in Halifax. My research focuses on gender integration and sexual violence in the Canadian Armed Forces.
I will take this opportunity to reflect on the limitations of Operation Honour. I will argue that it is time to refocus our attention on military culture change and accountability through external oversight. I will highlight two limitations of Operation Honour. Operation Honour aimed to eliminate sexual misconduct, but it never asked why sexual misconduct happens or how institutions change. Let me explain.
Operation Honour never addressed the root causes of sexual misconduct. Most significantly, Operation Honour did not make the link between sexual misconduct and military culture, specifically, the role of gender and masculinity in it. The Canadian Armed Forces is a unique workplace that is designed around an unstated but institutionally assumed white heterosexual male norm. The culture of the military is the outcome of a long history of legally sanctioned sex and gender discrimination against those who don't fit that male norm. Legal discriminations have been removed against women and LGBTQ2 members, but those labelled as “other” for not fitting the preconceived norm of the Canadian soldier are often still treated like less than ideal soldiers.
This entrenched white heterosexual male norm of the Canadian soldier is at the very core of military culture. It is the perpetuation of that norm that enables gender-based violence, including sexual harassment, sexual assault and such other “isms” as racism. When we talk about root causes, we need to also keep in mind the unique nature of the military as a federally regulated workplace. The military makes exceptional demands on its workers, but it has weak workers' rights. The military gives number one priority to operational readiness, demanding from its workers unlimited liability, universality of service, total dedication to work, uniformity, hierarchy, obedience, as well as loyalty to the group and mission before self. Yet there is no union or independent oversight body to truly defend military members' rights or support their work-related concerns.
It is these exceptional demands of military work that have often been used in the past to justify the military as a—if not the—quintessentially male workplace. As such, it is simply astounding to me that Operation Honour documents routinely lack any reference to gender, masculinity, or men, or the unique dynamics of the military workplace. It will require a foundational shift in the military's culture, gender and workplace in order to address sexual misconduct in a meaningful way.
This brings me to the second limitation of Operation Honour, which is its incorrect and simplistic assumptions about how institutions change. Operation Honour assumed that change can come about by ordering everyone to stop engaging in sexual misconduct, that is, by changing individual behaviours. No one took steps to ensure that CAF members had the resources and supports they needed to implement Operation Honour. This situation was compounded by a generalized lack of institutional expertise on sexual misconduct, culture change or gender issues. CAF declared Operation Honour its top institutional priority, but its words did not match what people on the ground were seeing. This disconnect produced fatigue and resistance.
Perhaps even more importantly, the problem with Operation Honour was that it was about the military reforming itself. There is no evidence that such an approach can work and bring the necessary changes. This is especially the case considering the military showed reluctance, if not some resistance, towards following the recommendations of the Deschamps report. Rather than setting up the recommended independent external accountability centre, CAF chose to self-monitor. Time has proven that this type of approach—it did not address root causes, was reactive and inconsistent, and was based on self-monitoring—was too linear and simplistic to succeed and solve the complex problem it sought to address.
We have an opportunity right now to capture these lessons learned from Operation Honour, and to move forward towards culture change and accountability through external oversight.
I conclude with two key points. The CAF needs culture change. First, the CAF needs a comprehensive strategy that acknowledges its institutional role and responsibility in preventing sexual misconduct, along with all other forms of discrimination and violence in the military workplace. Second, the CAF needs oversight. Given the ongoing resistance to military culture change, long-term independent, external oversight is required. This is the only way to ensure true accountability, and the only way to ensure the health and well-being of all women and men in the Canadian military.
I was pleased to hear the minister acknowledge on Friday that toxic elements of masculinity exist within the Canadian Armed Forces, and that he recognizes the need for a complete and total culture change. To me, the important question today is: What are the next steps that your committee can take to move this process along in a way that provides clear direction to the minister, the department and the Canadian Armed Forces, including on creating some form of oversight?
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.