Hello, everyone.
I am a professor of political studies and Canada research chair on gender, security and the armed forces at Queen's University.
I'd like to start with a question: Can a large organization like the Canadian Armed Forces transform its culture in five years, guided by an external review and driven by an order to eradicate sexual misconduct within the ranks? It might seem impossible, but in many ways the military, as a total organization, might be better suited than most when it comes to adapting quickly in the face of adversity. CAF personnel are trained to make and carry out decisions in complex environments.
So why is this reputation for operational excellence not carrying over organizationally? That's because military culture can have unintended consequences. It can also be gamed by predators. It can be idealized and made to look untouchable by routines, traditions and rigidly hierarchical command structures.
At this time, military leaders need to re-engage with the external review authority report, also known as the Deschamps report, and think more boldly about implementing its recommendations fully. Five years might not be enough time to implement deep, transformative cultural change, but it's certainly long enough to uncover the failings of the current approach.
I have chosen four specific issues to discuss with you today. First, there should be a greater focus on abuses of power. What I am referring to here is a social dynamic that is interlinked with sexual misconduct in highly asymmetric professional relationships. This kind of implicit or explicit pressure is far more endemic and ingrained in the culture than is currently acknowledged.
While the survey on sexual misconduct in the Canadian Armed Forces has provided useful data, more is needed to examine how sexual misconduct interacts with consent in asymmetric professional relationships. A woman, or any harassed person, not speaking out against behaviour that is inappropriate does not mean that behaviour is welcome or that she is providing consent. There are many legitimate reasons for going along with these unwelcome interactions and staying silent. Many of these reasons are outlined in the Deschamps report.
People who are more junior or in more precarious employment conditions fear for their job. They might fear other types of consequences at work, like not being believed by their peers or being socially ostracized for speaking out. Another reason for not coming forward is not trusting the reporting process, or not believing you'll secure a fair outcome. The next step is to have this more nuanced talk about consent and about consent when power dynamics are at play. Some of those power dynamics are inherent to military culture. Some of those dynamics are about rank, and translate into abuses of power. Both types of power dynamics disproportionately impact women.
Regarding training, Operation Honour training should be improved to pull data from the StatsCan surveys to tailor the content to those receiving the training. The information in the training should be personalized by making clear that sexual misconduct affects friends and colleagues in the armed forces. Service members should engage in and practice difficult scenarios so that they know when to intervene and how. The resentment of mostly male service members who feel they are unfairly targeted by Operation Honour is common and unfortunate. At the same time, the training is too focused on the perpetrator, while it could engage with military culture, militarized masculinity, the under-representation of women, consent, the needs of victims and survivors, and empowering bystanders in small interactive sessions led by someone who can speak in an authentic way about the content. External experts can help in this regard, if only to provide a peer review function for the training materials.
With regard to the SMRC, one of the most talked-about ERA recommendations was that a reporting line outside of the chain of command was needed. That prompted the creation of the sexual misconduct response centre as an independent body. There is an inherent tension in the SMRC's work because of the nature of its mandate. On the one hand, the SMRC needs to hold the CAF accountable, but it also needs a good working relationship with the CAF, including with the chain of command, which might undermine perceptions of the SMRC's independence. Constant review and oversight of the SMRC through both internal self-assessments and external audits might be needed, as the protection of the SMRC's independence in the face of its growing mandate is paramount.
Finally, the path to dignity and respect strategy is a promising approach, because it puts culture and climate front and centre, thereby making cultural change everyone's business.
While it makes sense for this document to define culture and climate along with a series of indicators, it should dedicate more attention to describing the problem at hand, which is sexual misconduct and how it ties to culture and climate. Basically, the scope of the problem needs to be crystal clear before jumping into the solutions.
A journey of cultural change needs to convey shared responsibility for sexual misconduct. The percentage of CAF members who have witnessed sexual misconduct is pretty astounding, but how many people intervene, speak up or report? If one does not engage in sexual misconduct, it does not mean they perform their duty with honour. The standard of performance is much higher than that if you want to get to zero tolerance. It is the notion of collective responsibility that should be stressed more forcefully throughout the document because everyone can do better on this front.
This is not about the duty to report; it is a standard of daily conduct. The challenge moving forward is not simply about how to eradicate sexual misconduct within the military. It entails identifying positive steps to create a culture of equality for women in the CAF and a culture centred around respect for all.
Thank you.