Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
As I'm continuing through these recommendations, I'd also like to add some other things we have heard, including something very important that we heard in the status of women committee, and I think it behooves us to put it on the record here.
Military sexual trauma as an occupational stress injury is something that is very important, but we have to define “military sexual trauma”. We heard witnesses say that it's not currently defined. Once it's defined, it means they can get the supports they need. For instance, PTSD that comes from sexual trauma is different from PTSD that comes from combat trauma. We heard a witness say that when she went for support in a peer-support group. She was there to talk about her sexual trauma with nine men who had combat trauma. That can't happen. There needs to be very specific supports, particularly for military sexual trauma, so it's a matter of making that an occupational stress injury but also providing MST-specific group therapy treatments, outpatient programs and in-patient psychiatric care when that is needed. What we need is trauma-informed care.
The second thing is rape as a war crime. This is very important, because we use don't use the term right. We don't use the term “assault”. We don't say “violence”. If we say “misconduct”, that actually whitewashes some of the things we're talking about, and rape is a war crime. Ever since the Yugoslavia tribunal, we know that rape is a war crime. If you're raped in the military, I think that it's very important that it be treated very seriously. Frankly there should be standardized rape kits on all international operations. My understanding is that there are different rape kits, and they don't always hold up in different courts of law and different jurisdictions.
We also need to re-evaluate the code of ethics and values and the oath of service. There are a number of other things that we're hearing, and I'll continue with some of those recommendations.
I'm going to continue where Mr. Spengemann left off, on culture change in the Canadian Armed Forces.
One of the other recommendations we've heard is about addressing the use of sexually and racially coded language that supports and accentuates social hierarchies in the Canadian Armed Forces. We heard this from Professor Okros, who gave us some very tangible examples of how people learn power structures—who is the most important, who is the least important—and how that language is used. There are ways in which these things are indicated, and they really need to end. Finding ways to make sure we identify and call out this kind of coded language is going to be very important.
Number 35 recommends updating “The Path to Dignity and Respect” to identify and reflect factors that increase the risk of workplace harassment. If I may, “The Path to Dignity and Respect” was brought forward some months ago because we understood that Operation Honour and the processes in place could not function if we didn't have culture change. This is an evergreen document that has been brought forward, but I have heard from some survivors and advocates that it doesn't go far enough and it isn't necessarily in the form that we need it to be in to really address these concerns.
We're getting recommendations that, I think, will really assist in that sense, but we need to make sure that “The Path to Dignity and Respect” is evergreen and that we are constantly evolving with it. One of the problems with Operation Honour was that it had a finite period. This is not something you can say you will go on an operation for and then it will be finished. It doesn't end. “The Path to Dignity and Respect” is something that really allows for continuous work on culture change. I also think that when we look at culture, we have to look at culture as a system, because system changes will lead to culture changes. If you build it, they will come. That's very important.
Number 36 recommends addressing social factors that inhibit sexual violence reporting and challenging central tenets of the CAF, such as obedience to authority, normative conformity and group loyalty. We did hear from a number of witnesses that the culture of CAF is very important.
I think we need to make it clear. We are not attacking the culture of the military, of the Canadian Armed Forces, in the areas where there are very good aspects. There are aspects that really build team. They build loyalty. They build a sense of service. These things are very important, but we did hear from the professor that this also creates normative conformity—in other words, the thing that causes what you probably would hear in the term “brotherhood”.
The very fact that we call it “brotherhood” suggests that it is within the normative, so it's making sure that we keep the good parts of the culture—of honour, of respect—and that when we're doing the culture change we get rid of the things that sometimes people are blind to and don't even realize they are doing, because they are part of that normative culture and don't even realize that it is excluding others. I think that was, in fact, the testimony from Professor Okros, which was probably some of the most important testimony that we had.
In number 37, we're recommending providing clarity in Operation Honour on which aspects of Canadian Forces culture must change and which are allowed to remain the same. I'd like to clarify this one a bit and say that I think we know that the acting chief of the defence staff has said that Operation Honour “has culminated” and that we need to look at what comes next.
At the same time, there were good things. We need to identify what were the good aspects, continue those and not throw out the baby with the bathwater, making sure that we are identifying those things but also realizing and really assessing why it didn't work. What was it—with all the good intentions—and why is it that Operation Honour did not achieve the results that we wanted it to achieve?
It's only in reflecting on that and reflecting on the failures that we're able to look forward and say, “Here are the things we need to do in order to make it better, and you know what? We will put forward other programs, other institutional changes and process changes, and then we'll probably at some point realize that some of those aren't working. It has to continuously evolve, and we have to be self-reflective all the time and listen to the people who are speaking out, who are impacted by this.
The next thing would be number 38, which is re-engaging military leaders with the Deschamps report. We have heard the Deschamps report. We all know that these answers are there, that the solutions are there. There were many things put in place as a result of the Deschamps report, but I really think that we need to re-engage and make sure that we, at the highest levels, really implement those things, but also, are not frozen in time. I mean, we have learned a lot through this very committee study, which is exactly why it is so important that we get these recommendations, so that we can get the report and so we can table it in the House and make sure that we are in a position to provide these recommendations to government.
Number 39 is about examining how sexual misconduct interacts with consent in asymmetric professional relations. We've heard a lot about chain of command, about the hierarchy. We've heard a lot about how hard it is if you want to report that the person who perpetrated the aggression is a superior. That's something you see everywhere, but it is amplified in the Canadian Armed Forces because of the chain of command, because it's such a hierarchical structure that it becomes very difficult to talk about consent when you have this very hierarchical obedience to authority. I mean, how do you consent when you are junior to somebody who then...? We heard some of the witnesses say that when they decide when you can shower, when they can decide on minute things in your life, it is really hard, then, to even say that consent can exist in that environment.
I would continue, then, with number 41, which is emphasizing that non-reporting does not entail providing consent to sexual misconduct, a sexually unwanted interaction or a sexually asymmetric relationship. I think what the witness was trying to say in this was that just because you don't complain does not mean you are consenting. Just because you don't go to an authority and say, “My superior officer has done this and this and this,” does not mean that you're okay with it. I think that needs to be very well understood.
Number 42 is recommending through “The Path to Dignity and Respect”, that the CAF clarify, redefine and describe the problem at hand, which is sexual misconduct and how it ties to culture and climate within the Canadian Armed Forces.
Number 43 recommends encouraging representation and participation at all levels, both civilian and military, to give women in leadership positions place and visibility. I think we sometimes forget that this impacts the civilian employees of the Department of National Defence and those who work alongside our women and men in uniform. It's very important that everybody be included in this discussion.
Number 44 recommends addressing the need to change the CAF incentive structure so that abuses of power are not “explained away” or “covered up” by CAF members.
I'll reiterate something that I said yesterday in the status of women committee with regard to the concept of “the good soldier”. You can imagine that people say, “Well, you know, he might be a womanizer, but he's a good soldier” or “a good aviator” or “a good sailor”. Well, you can't be. You can't be a good soldier and be doing these kinds of behaviours. It is exclusive. You cannot be both things.
What this recommendation is getting to is that, when you are doing incentives and rewards and performance evaluations, what is considered relevant and what is not? Someone might say, “Well, you know, that's their personal life; that's not relative to whether they should be promoted.” How you lead and you interact with people—the characteristics and your own character—are not things to be seen as peripheral. These are things that have to be seen as core, particularly when you are advancing through the ranks into leadership positions. This idea that something is considered to be, in the way it says here, just sort of “explained away” has to stop.
Number 45—and I'll end it at this one—is to examine the CAF promotional structure and review career advancement incentive structures in order to create a more supportive environment. Frankly, we have been hearing that in the performance evaluations, there needs to be, as I said, this way of evaluating that is going to be inclusive of this, so that people who perpetrate these things don't get promoted up the ranks. That way you don't end up in the situation we are in now.
Madam Chair, I have more, but I'll leave it there, because I see some other hands up and I want to make sure other committee members have a chance to speak.