Madam Chair, thank you very much.
I'd like to thank my colleagues for their fulsome interventions as well. We have a lot of good substance on the floor this afternoon.
Madam Chair, I want to circle back to the Wigston report, which I had introduced earlier with respect to its executive summary. I want to circle back briefly to a comment by Air Chief Marshal Wigston in the introduction in which he refers to two components of the work to change the culture. The first of which, of course, is that it's “the right thing to do”. It is morally wrong what is happening in the Canadian Forces and, as we saw, in so many other forces, including the British armed forces.
The second argument he makes is that it is not only morally the right thing to do to achieve culture, but all of us who do this across jurisdictions will achieve a better armed forces system in the process. He calls it “performance enhancing”, the conclusion being that anybody who engages in sexual misconduct, harassment or worse actually weakens the defence forces, weakens every member currently serving, and then by reputation, also past serving in the forces. I think that was a point very much worth highlighting.
Following up on Mr. Wernick's testimony, colleagues have also referred to the fact that there are a number of other countries that are dealing with this. It's by far not Canada alone. Any country, basically, that has armed forces that are subject to democratic control are facing similar issues. That's not for a moment to say that as Canadians we have to worry about this less because other countries are equally handling this unsuccessfully or incompletely so far. It's the opposite. It's acknowledging that this is a systemic problem that has to do with the culture of masculinity that's been described by many of our witnesses across jurisdictions and across allies.
In some brief research this morning, Madam Chair—I think I spent 15 or 20 minutes looking at this issue—I discovered that there were questions, and in many cases initiatives, in Sweden, Poland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and in the United States in addition to the work that I described earlier with respect to DCAF, the centre for the democratic control of the armed forces in Geneva, and also NATO, which had looked at this issue.
For the benefit of our analysts, who I am very happy to see online—and I'd like to thank them, through you, Madam Chair, for their tremendous work in preparing our draft report—I think it's important to flag that this is a pan-jurisdictional issue with comparative elements and comparative opportunities.
I'd like to get back into the Wigston report in a bit more detail. The introduction actually highlights the fact that the Wigston report itself refers to Canada and the Canadian experience. What we say and do will not only achieve change here, but will also very potentially and very tangibly influence the policy opportunities and opportunities for progress on the part of our allies, especially the ones we work with most closely, including the Five Eyes.
Madam Chair, the Wigston report makes the following identifying statement with respect to the issue we're studying. It says:
For the purpose of this report we defined inappropriate behaviours as those which: breach laws, norms of behaviour or core values and standards, including sexual offences and bullying, harassment and discrimination, that harm or risk harming individuals, teams and operational effectiveness, and that bring or risk bringing the reputation of individuals, units, the Service or Defence into disrepute.
That is the definition that they have adopted. I put it to colleagues for their consideration.
The report continues to say that:
The Armed Forces and Civil Service operate to different terms and conditions of service, however Defence people exist within a shared culture and environment. The report focuses on the Armed Forces, regular and reserve, however it identifies opportunities to work better as a whole force, including the MOD Civil Service, wherever we can. The need to adopt a whole force approach is reinforced by the lessons of others, in particular the Canadian Armed Forces who went through an extensive process of review in 2015.
Madam Chair, that's just to underscore the point I made a minute ago with respect to the Canadian experience actually being looked at by other forces as well. The review that's being referenced there is the ERA that my colleague, Mr. Bagnell, just took a detailed look at in his previous intervention.
The Wigston report itself then comprises three separate sections. Part 1 is an assessment of the current situation in the United Kingdom. Part 2 considers what more could be done to stop inappropriate behaviours from occurring, and part 3 makes recommendations on what more could be done to deal with inappropriate behaviours when they have happened.
The report states:
A key recommendation of Part 3 is the establishment of a new Defence Authority responsible for cultures and inappropriate behaviours, external to the single Services' chain of command and responsible to a Defence Senior Responsible [officer], emulating the successful models of the Canadian Armed Forces, Australian Defence Force and United States military.
For context, Madam Chair, this report of course was put out in 2019, some two years ago and prior to the specific incidents that this committee is also studying.
Mr. Bagnell, in his previous intervention, made reference to a very important component of the external review authority, or the ERA, which is the question of data. Here, I think, the British experience is also helpful to this committee in its deliberations as we go forward in the coming weeks.
Under the subheading “Management information”, the chief air marshal says the following:
To build a comprehensive picture of the behaviours and culture of any organisation, it is necessary to have a single repository where all key data is collated, monitored, tracked and analysed. The resulting intelligence can then be used to inform the chain of command to address issues at the earliest opportunity by enabling resources to be directed to specific hot-spots—situations with a high risk of victimisation for example—or to specific types of behaviour.
Annual statistical data and courts martial outcomes from cases in the Service Justice System, the Service Complaints system and surveys, as well as reports from the single Services, demonstrate a significant effort to capture available information. We observe that the convergence of data and information within each Service lacks depth and [that] there is no coherent analysis at MOD-level. Serious cases within the Service Justice System and the Service Complaints system capture broad headline data sets, such as gender, age, type of offence [and] complaint, but this is superficial and at present there is insufficient metadata captured to provide an appropriate level of insight, nor is there a consistent approach across minority groups. Furthermore, we do not automatically receive comprehensive data or information on cases dealt with in the Civil Courts, so [we] cannot describe the full scale of the issue within Defence at the most serious level; this would require a change to primary legislation. We judge that better and more coherent data would provide actionable information for the chain of command at all levels—and centrally for Defence—to identify where additional training, support and intervention is most needed.
Madam Chair, I'm going to get into some of the recommendations that are being made, but I would preface the fact that mentioning the recommendations does not necessarily mean that we should accept them. In fact, in some cases we may legislatively—by virtue of our customs, procedures and constitutional structure—not be able to adopt them as easily, but they are here for us to consider because, in my submission, they have the right level of granularity. They have the right level of specificity. They will move us forward.
With that in mind, I would like to mention three recommendations that the chief air marshal has put forward under “Management information”.
The first is:
Defence must improve the level of detail and metadata captured on serious unacceptable behaviour as well as instances of lower severity, to provide a single comprehensive picture of inappropriate behaviours across the organisation.
The second is:
Defence should consider amending primary legislation to require the sharing of information from the civilian Criminal Justice System.
The third under this rubric is:
Defence should develop performance measures relating to inappropriate behaviours for use at Defence Board, Executive Committee and Performance and Risk Reviews.
Madam Chair, with this recommendation, you'll recall a brief exchange I had with Rear-Admiral Patterson. I asked her if there was an option to include gender equality championships—I think that's the way I put it at the time—in performance evaluations within the the Canadian Forces. Her initial reaction was “Absolutely”, so there may be some ground here, based on this very specific British recommendation, for us to make a recommendation in parallel in our system that would achieve culture change and progress.
The report also makes recommendations with respect to the use of surveys. Again, this is not for us to accept. It's for us to debate and potentially to accept what we find appropriate and constructive. The report reads as follows:
Defence should conduct a harassment survey in 2021 building on the Army Sexual Harassment Survey 2018, informed by an independent advisory group. In line with recommendation 3.1, Defence should consider a “call for evidence” on inappropriate behaviours in conjunction with this survey, in order to provide supporting detail to the survey.
In parallel with that, it states:
Defence should better coordinate and focus the bullying, harassment and discrimination elements of continuous attitude surveys to improve understanding, reduce duplication and streamline data analysis. Use of contemporary, on-line survey formats should also be considered.
This is a set of very tangible, very specific recommendations that go to the issue of data management. A first step is to call the problem what it is and I think in many respects this committee has done that. Getting the data that speaks to the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the problem is equally important, and then having the opportunity to actually analyze the data at the right level, with the right specificity and granularity, is crucial to taking us forward.
The report makes a recommendation under “Climate assessments”. “Climate” in this context is not in the context of climate change but with respect to the work atmosphere and climate.
The report says:
A proactive process for assessing the Command climate and behaviours is now well-established across all three Services. The Army has developed and matured a tiered process, including the completion of focus-group based analysis within units, led by trained facilitators. The Naval Service conduct a similar advisory process as do the Royal Air Force. This approach, utilising focus groups, by trained facilitators, is seen as leading practice and is utilised by other nations and organisations including the United States military. Such data, although confidential, can be analysed centrally and utilised as a tool to understand behavioural themes.
There you can see that the reference in this report, just in the few brief sections that I outlined, to both Canada and the United States really puts us onto, in some ways, a common denominator with our allies with respect to the nature of the problem, not only acknowledging that we have the problem but also finding potential solutions. These two suggestions here vis-à-vis Canada and the U.S., adopted by the British report, indicate that collaboration and joint problem-solving may well be worth our while. At a minimum, taking account of and reviewing the reports by leading countries in our group of allies and friends would be extremely worthwhile for this committee.
The recommendation that follows from this is that “Climate assessments and advisory visits should be sustained and exploited across Defence.”
I'll finish with the recommendation on “Values and standards” and I'll come back in subsequent interventions.
It says:
Each Service has established and operates a core set of values and standards. These values and standards, developed over time and from extensive operational testing, reflect the unique culture, ethos and operating environments of the respective Armed Forces and Civil [defence]. Values and standards for the Royal Navy, Royal Marines, Army and Royal Air Force are well established, comprehensively communicated and understood. The governance surrounding the Civil Service Code is less well recognised, as noted in the Sue Owen Review, which observed that in some workplaces, “staff are looking for a more explicit articulation of the behaviours they should expect to see.” Communication of the Civil Service Code must therefore be amplified and include military line managers of civilians.
The recommendation that follows is that:
Single Service values and standards should be sustained but communication of the Civil Service Code should be amplified.
This is also relevant.
Again, page by page, I'm surprised at how poignant these recommendations are, specifically with respect to the issue in Canada also potentially or actually involving civilian employees of the Canadian Forces.
There really is some substance here, some fodder for deliberation and some opportunities to achieve real and tangible progress. As we go through these experiences in other countries, I would encourage all my colleagues to take note, and also our analysts, and I look forward to reactions from members of the committee.
I'll leave it there for the moment.
Thank you.