Madam Chair, thank you very much.
I'd like to thank both my colleagues immediately preceding me, Mr. Baker and Mr. Bagnell, for their interventions.
The human dimension of this is front and centre. It ranks top of mind. It makes this an issue that we simply need to tackle. The expectations could not be higher, and we need to move forward and bring a report that will make a difference, that will change the Canadian Armed Forces structurally.
Mr. Baker made reference to the experience that we see elsewhere in the world. In previous interventions a few weeks ago, I had a chance to introduce some of these considerations and experiences. I introduced them, Madam Chair, because this is really an addition to the substance of these experiences, which is helpful to the committee as we now very rapidly approach the deadline in our time frame for consideration of this report, as proposed by the motion, which in fact is next week. I'm hoping that the committee will take a different path and will allow for more incubation of these issues and more impactful recommendations before we break for the summer recess.
I raise these considerations from other countries—and they include South Africa, the U.K., Sweden, Australia—in addition to institutional work that was done by NATO and by institutions like the Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, as it was then known in Geneva.
The fact that there's such a great incident rate in so many countries around the world with militaries that are similar to ours in structure, orientation, expertise, vision and training really underscores the structural, systemic nature of the issue that we're facing. It simply isn't limited to the cases, however many we have here in Canada and as disturbing as that is. Unless we change the structure, it is a recipe for the generation of additional cases and additional victims.
That is one part of the consideration for why these comparative experiences from other countries are so important and why we actually should work together with militaries elsewhere and share our expertise and share our story, as the the United Kingdom has done. I raise that as one example that's particularly salient.
The Wigston report, which was put together by Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Wigston, conducted a thorough review in 2019. The advantage that we have from the U.K. experience is that the very next year, in 2020, they published a progress report on unacceptable behaviour. Therefore, not only did they get out front of the issue in considerable detail and with recommendations that are impactful and, in my submission, to some extent replicable and emulatable here in Canada, but they also did the follow-up work to see if the recommendations worked. It has actually harnessed, in the very short term, the reaction within the British Armed Forces and the British public.
One of the key considerations that's before the committee and in all of the interventions of my colleagues across party lines is the question of trust within the Canadian Armed Forces, trust by serving members and former serving members, and the trust that victims should have in coming forward in voicing concerns and making complaints. On this level, I think the U.K. experience is helpful, and I'm going to put forward to the committee for consideration some of the thoughts that relate to the question of trust, particularly with respect to the chain of command that's been subject to the discussion today and is relevant to the motion.
The chain of command really is a fundamental structural obstacle with respect to the resolution of sexual misconduct cases, and the U.K. really took this issue seriously, acknowledged it and came up with, I believe—