Madam Chair, thank you very much. I would like to welcome colleagues to the discussion this afternoon, and thank my colleagues for their earlier intervention so far.
At the outset, Madam Chair, you reminded us that this meeting has been in session since May 21, some 20 days. We've had very fulsome discussions, debate, not necessarily progress, but certainly debate about how important the issues are before the committee, and how they should be tackled. I think it's incredibly important to keep in mind that testimony is at the forefront of the committee's work. That's why we have these meetings, that's why we have panels and that's why we invite people. I think it's absolutely critical that we put victims' testimony at the centre of our discussion and at the centre of the problem, particularly for those victims who have been courageous enough to come to us directly, or who have spoken to other parliamentary committees and have taken the decision to give their testimony in a public setting.
In fact, that's the very starting point of this problem for this committee—how to empower victims to have the courage, the comfort, the support to come forward. If they get the perception that, for some reason, when they come to a parliamentary committee, having taken the step of going into the public realm, they then become a political footballer, their testimony becoming some sort of a political football, that immediately will reintroduce a chilling effect on the potential of other victims coming forward in equally sensitive scenarios before other committees.
I think Mr. Bagnell is absolutely spot-on when he says this testimony not only needs to be encouraged and supported, but it needs to be put at the very centre of our discussion. I just put that to the committee for consideration.
In addition to that, of course, there's expert testimony, of which we have had substantial amounts. There's testimony from officials, including elected officials, the minister himself, high-ranking officials in ministers' offices, high-ranking officials in the Privy Council Office. That is incredibly important. Academics as well...and in my submission, also testimony from other jurisdictions that have done this work.
The committee really went through a trajectory of discussion on what was put forward. In the minds of some committee members there would be additional testimony that should be pursued at all costs. There would be that extra statement that would really close the loop on fundamental questions that, in my view, had already been answered by other witnesses. That chase for an additional witness was ultimately abandoned in favour of an additional argument, which was to hamper the work of the committee as parliamentarians normally do it.
In prior interventions, Madam Chair, I made reference to the good work of this committee, in the 42nd Parliament, on diversity and inclusion in the armed forces, which had a component on sexual misconduct. In those discussions there was no dissenting report. In those discussions there was absolutely not even a question that colleagues would be able to exercise their full parliamentary rights and privileges in those discussions, and not be somehow limited artificially to a two-minute response without having the ability to then follow up or reply, or even build on the testimony or questions of colleagues that were put forward previously or subsequently.
In a very important respect, Madam Chair, this proposal would also hamper your ability as chair and as a former serving member of the Canadian Forces, and I'm going to say as a woman, to put your own expertise, your own passion into this subject matter, and to guide the discussion as chair of this committee to a fruitful outcome. With the approach that's been suggested by the opposition, that would not take place in a natural way, because it would be artificially truncated by these two-minute segments. That would be one intervention only per paragraph or recommendation, I think, was the framing of that motion.
It's really important that we have substantive testimony firstly from victims, secondly from experts, policy-makers, academics, thirdly from other jurisdictions; but that we then have a process that allows us to go to work on the subject matter as parliamentarians, as this committee has done in the past, as members of all parties of this committee, or many parties of this committee, have done in the 42nd Parliament. We have gone through that experience, we know how it works, we know how productive it can be. We should really unleash our ability as parliamentarians to the utmost to do that work and to get behind the issue and to get on the same side of the table.
With respect to the question before us, again, it has two components. It has the case of the former chief of the defence staff, then followed by another case. The testimony that is at stake with respect to the circumstance of the former CDS, as Mr. Bagnell has pointed out, really takes us in good part back to 2015, and even prior to that period. I think the question that all of us should be interested in across party lines, including members of the Conservative Party, would be how a former chief of the defence staff could hold himself out to be so powerful that he would control the Canadian Forces national investigation service, that he would own them. This investigation goes back to a time of 2015, at the time of his appointment.
That institutionally and systematically is completely unacceptable and must be unacceptable to all of us, regardless of political affiliation. This is not a partisan question. This is a question of how we change the culture in the Canadian Forces, exemplified by this case, but not limited to this case. There may well be other cases. There are, and we certainly have been made aware of, other systemic challenges that prevent additional complainants from coming forward against officers of the Canadian Forces or members of the Canadian Forces of significantly higher rank. That was one of the issues we were most concerned about, the asymmetry between senior and junior ranks.
I've drawn the committee's attention to work that's been done elsewhere. This is not to say necessarily that because other jurisdictions are facing the same problem, the Canadian jurisdiction is somehow less significant. The problem is equally significant in all parts of the world that are dealing with it. However, because we can use those experiences as an example of the kind of work we could and should be doing—10 of the recommendations, 10 of the conclusions and in at least one case, the step of actually having a follow-up exercise within a year of completion of a report on this very same issue—that information, in my view, is extremely relevant to the committee. I've used time before this committee to put it on record, and I will continue to make submissions along those lines.
Madam Chair, at this point I would like to just simply bring to a close my thoughts on what I refer to as the “Wigston report”, the review into inappropriate behaviours out of the United Kingdom. It took place around the same time that we really started to get into this issue. It was tabled in 2019. If we look at other jurisdictions, it's roughly that period, 2015-19, where a lot of other militaries were seized with this issue. Perhaps not in all cases, or maybe not in any cases, it was through an instance involving a former chief of the defence staff like we had, but certainly, it was with the same recognition of the importance of this issue for women members of the armed forces—and ultimately, for all members of the armed forces concerned.
Wigston really gave us the impetus to take a look at what could happen if a government gets behind this issue proactively, in a very progressive way and with progressive time frames. I would like to put to the committee the concluding portion of that report. What I would like to do in later testimony is to briefly highlight some of the insights from the follow-up that took place a year later, in 2020. If we get it right and we get something out to government and government responds, we can get action maybe quicker than any of us would realize.
The Wigston report, in its conclusion, stated the following:
The Report into inappropriate behaviours in Defence makes 36 recommendations on what we should do to stop instances of inappropriate behaviours occurring, and what we should do better when inappropriate behaviours have occurred. Ultimately, the challenge of inappropriate behaviour will only be addressed through a determined effort across the whole force to change the culture, driven persistently from the top and at every level of leadership and line management below that. It requires authentic leadership; relentless engagement; and consistent communication. Everybody has a part to play.
We defined inappropriate behaviours as breaches of laws, norms of behaviour or core values and standards which harm or risk harming individuals, teams or operational effectiveness, and that bring or risk bringing the reputation of individuals, units, the Service or Defence into disrepute. We took a consciously broad view of inappropriate behaviours however we focused first and foremost on those that harm individuals. We judge that an unacceptable level of inappropriate behaviour persists in Defence, however we were unable to quantify it precisely. The evidence reflected in this report indicates a significant number of our people have experienced bullying, discrimination and harassment, including sexual, but have not felt able or been able to come forward to report it. This pattern mirrored what we identified in other organisations including the Canadian Armed Forces, the United States military and the Australian Defence Force.
The absence of reporting reflects a deficit of trust in our complaints system. Our own surveys and external stakeholders highlight repeatedly the shortcomings of the current system for raising complaints about inappropriate behaviour, with complainants citing a fear of retribution and low confidence or faith that anything would be done, or done in a timely manner. We also observed a disproportionate over-representation of women and ethnic minorities in the Service Complaints system, and a lack of data on other minority groups.
Our recommendations on what should be done to tackle inappropriate behaviour focused principally on leadership and line management at every level setting the right culture and standards; ensuring people meet those standards consistently; and being alert to when standards might slip. We also made recommendations about effective, targeted and resourced training; a centralised assurance function; the compilation of a single set of data and statistics relating to inappropriate behaviour; regular Board-level focus on culture and behaviours; and better sharing of leading practice across the three Armed Forces and Civil Service. To do better when instances of inappropriate behaviour have occurred or are alleged to have occurred, we recommended a review of the Service Complaints system to include: a dedicated central Service Complaints team equipped to deal with the most complex allegations of bullying, harassment and discrimination; a helpline for supporting complainants and respondents as well as the chain of command and line management; and a parallel channel for raising Service Complaints outwith the chain of command, including anonymous and bystander reporting. We also recommended consideration of a two-tier process for Service Complaints to streamline the process for more straightforward cases, enabling staff focus and resources to be aligned to the complexity, sensitivity and gravity of the complaint. We identified a need for central oversight of cultures and inappropriate behaviours across Defence. We recommended the establishment of a Defence Authority responsible for cultures and inappropriate behaviours. Working to the Chief of Defence People as the Senior Responsible Owner, the Authority would be responsible for pan-Defence strategy, policy and governance; a single point of reference for all management information; assurance activity across the Armed Forces; and sharing leading practice across Defence. It would also house the central Service Complaints team and related helplines and support services. The Authority would need to be fully resourced with an estimated 30-50 suitably qualified and experienced people, recognising this will be an additional workforce requirement for Defence.
Under the subtitle, “What does good look like?”, the second to last paragraph of the conclusion says the following: “Tackling inappropriate behaviour is about the determination of leaders to change...culture; everything else hangs off that. Real cultural change comes only when leaders communicate and role model those behaviours relentlessly, [when] there is a clear understanding of what they mean in practice, and where there are evident consequences for breaching them. Success might ultimately be judged when matters that arise - as they always [Technical difficulty—Editor] by junior leaders or colleagues instinctively and immediately in every part of Defence. An inappropriate comment is made, a corporal tells the perpetrator to apologise, [Technical difficulty—Editor] why it caused offence, the apology is made and accepted, and the matter resolved. We are already there in many parts of the organisation but changing embedded cultures and driving out inappropriate behaviour across the whole of Defence will take persistent and concerted effort, at every level of leadership and line management, over an extended period of time.
Finally, we would all recognise that inappropriate behaviour, and the consequences for the people affected by it, damages the United Kingdom Armed Forces' hard-won reputation for courage, determination and professionalism. We should not, however, lose perspective on the behaviour of the overwhelming majority of people in Defence who serve with courage, determination, professionalism and great pride, protecting the UK 24/7.”
Madam Chair, that's the concluding section of the Wigston report. As members will have seen through this testimony and other interventions I have made, there is a relevance, a level of granularity, an openness and an acknowledgement of additional gaps that could not be closed. There are also very precise recommendations with respect to resourcing the central defence authority, for example, with staffing levels being recommended of 30 to 50 in this case.
This is the kind of work that was done in the U.K. under circumstances similar to ours, with the exception that it did not—at least I am not aware of it—reach to the highest level of the chief of the defence staff. It's certainly a jurisdiction and an ally with whom we work very closely through the Five Eyes, through NATO, through the United Nations and through bilateral training exercises, which has not only been seized with the importance of this issue, but also looked to our country in several instances, having catalyzed the debate through the Deschamps report of 2015.
The U.K. has gone forward and made progress. I put it to colleagues on this committee that if we get to the same page on this, we can make recommendations of similar impact, granularity, relevance and timeliness, and we can really together move the yardsticks on this issue. I think the Canadian public and serving and former members of the Canadian Armed Forces expect nothing less.
Thank you very much, Madam Chair, I will leave it there. I will have more interventions later on, but that's it for the moment.