Evidence of meeting #103 for National Defence in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was capabilities.
A recording is available from Parliament.
6:30 p.m.
Liberal
6:30 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
You weren't, but you are now.
You have a minute and a half, Ms. Normandin.
6:30 p.m.
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
Thank you.
Mr. Leuprecht, in your remarks, you emphasized the need to regulate not just space capabilities, but also how these capabilities are used. We've seen that, with dual‑use, it's extremely challenging. Satellite imagery of the territory can be used for military purposes.
As a result, I would like you to talk about the real possibility of regulating its use, especially since some people will want to use it for malicious purposes. One example is China, which is already doing this in the Arctic with the Xue Long icebreaker. Satellite imagery is being used for scientific reasons in order to conceal military purposes. It's hard to know what exactly is going on.
Is it realistic to want to regulate the use of space?
6:30 p.m.
Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual
Yes, Ms. Normandin.
I believe that we have a strong incentive to do so. This incentive is the space economy, meaning the resources found in space. The space economy is currently worth $600 billion a year. By 2035, the space economy is expected to be worth $1.8 trillion, in particular as a result of resource development.
I believe that, before deploying the technological resources needed to take advantage of the space economy, it's necessary to establish international regulations and standards for the use of these capabilities and the dual‑use of these technological resources.
6:35 p.m.
Liberal
6:35 p.m.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
Dr. Leuprecht, you sent us “Combined Space Operations Vision 2031”. It states, “Some nations have developed capabilities designed to deny, degrade, and disrupt access to and utilization of space-based capabilities.” Then it talks about the goal of “collaboration across a range of measures, such as: developing requirements for current and future systems to counter hostile space activities and to deter, deny, or defeat attacks or interference with the space enterprise”.
If we're looking back at history, horrific ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons exist today because they're a product of a cycle of anti-missile defence systems. They spur innovation, and that creates bigger weapons in the arms race. This is the final frontier, if we want to get geeky about it, so how do we not make the same mistakes in space as we have here on earth? How do we deter? How do we find diplomacy in the current world we live in?
6:35 p.m.
Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual
We have a peer competitor, a strategic rival, in China, which is able to compete at scale in space with the United States and with the western alliance. The effort of China, of course, is to disrupt the status quo of the rules-based order, not just on earth, but in cyberspace and in space. Of course, Canada, as a middle power, has a key interest in preserving the status quo, and that's why Canada has a keen interest in establishing clear behavioural norms. I think the incentive is space mining precisely because that's where the opportunity is the same for China as it is for all other countries. I think one of the opportunities Canada has is to ensure, for instance, equal access to space. How do we get other countries to come on board with our approaches to space? We ensure equal access to space and we ensure ethical access to space.
6:35 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
We'll have to leave the answer there. Thank you.
Mr. Bezan, you have four minutes.
6:35 p.m.
Conservative
James Bezan Conservative Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to both our witnesses.
You're talking about increasing space diplomacy with our adversaries, and I'm sure you mean Russia and the People's Republic of China. I looked at the outer space treaty, which was signed in 1967 with the U.S.S.R. Technically that's not Russia, but you hope Russia is still going to abide by it. Of course, Russia is talking about using nuclear weapons in space.
Do we trust the Russian Federation or Vladimir Putin and the People's Republic of China to actually honour any treaty that they sign?
6:35 p.m.
Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual
My argument would be that there needs to be a two-level effort. There's the effort that we just talked about of building international norms, which Canada has traditionally done well, but which in the cyber domain, for instance, for 25 years has not gotten us anywhere. In the absence of international norms, we need to work on deterrence and we need to work on capabilities for certain elements of punishment, whether it's kinetic or non-kinetic, for countries that cross over certain red lines. We also need to do that outside of U.S. leadership.
6:35 p.m.
Conservative
James Bezan Conservative Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB
Do you think the Russian Federation or the People's Republic of China is going to sign it? You're familiar with the Budapest memorandum, I'm sure. Russia didn't honour that when they invaded Ukraine. I'm sure you're familiar with the Minsk I and Minsk II treaties. The Russian Federation never honoured those. They were supposed to be in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and were supposed to reduce the overall nuclear arsenal they had, but instead they've ramped up the production of nuclear weapons. Then Beijing signed with the United Kingdom the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which was supposed to be good until 2047, and they walked away from it in 2014.
Why would we trust them to sign this when they're both very interested in having a strategic advantage in space?
6:35 p.m.
Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual
That's why we're in front of the national defence committee and not the foreign affairs committee. It's precisely because we need those deterrence capabilities. The other way to do that, if we can't agree on norms, is to forge norms. Then our adversaries know there are very real consequences on which we are prepared to follow through if they cross certain red lines.
Thomas might have something to say on this as well.
6:40 p.m.
Post-Doctoral Fellow, Frank McKenna School of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Mount Allison University, As an Individual
Thank you.
It's a fascinating question, and I would suggest that the first answer, and short answer, is no, we cannot assume that simply because rules are in place they will be followed. It is worth noting that Russia and China have both proposed some forms of rules in space. It's also worth noting that Russia has rejected the approach of norms regarding space activities and suggested that a fully legal regime would be more appropriate. My inclination is that Russia, in particular, will use the rules to the extent that they benefit Russia. If we are going to develop a rules-based framework, which I do think would be helpful, we have to bear in mind that Russia must see it as being at least of parallel benefit to them as to what they consider to be their peers.
The key point in the whole conversation around space military activity, in my opinion, is verification. If we can create a framework of rules that facilitate some form of verification that we are confident provides us with sufficient information on the capabilities that Russia and China are deploying and attempting to deploy, and from there develop an understanding of their intent in the space domain, then those rules and regulations can be useful in their own right, even if we also need to augment them by the deterrence function that Dr. Leuprecht mentioned in his response.
6:40 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Unfortunately, we'll have to leave the answer there. Thank you.
Mrs. Lalonde, you have four minutes.
6:40 p.m.
Liberal
Marie-France Lalonde Liberal Orléans, ON
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I want to say thank you to both of our witnesses for being here. I was very happy to see that we were undertaking a study on space defence. I think you are validating the notion of why this is so important, particularly at this committee.
There were references to space defence being an emerging domain. Certainly, developments are occurring at an increasingly rapid pace. We're talking about the dollar figure, but also the reality of where it brings us.
I would like to know from both of you whether there are barriers to researching space defence as an emerging domain and whether there's a lack of information on existing research data or sources to rely on.
6:40 p.m.
Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual
There are two points on that.
If you look at Australia, it has the Centre for Space Governance. We have nothing comparable in this country, so we need to generate the capabilities to see what our interests are and how we assert them in a multilateral governance framework. It is something we have not quite grasped, and it requires government leadership.
The other point is my concern about research security. Ms. Mathyssen, Madame Normandin and others have talked about research investments and capabilities. The government has finally put forward a framework on research security, but of course, it does not include any private sector actors in China. It only includes public sector research and military intelligence institutions. We need to understand that if we're going to invest in research in space in this country, we need to provide adequate research security. Adequate research security means we can't collaborate or let people collaborate with Chinese entities that are going to leverage the dual-use capabilities that Canadian taxpayers are paying for to advance Chinese capabilities in space.
6:40 p.m.
Post-Doctoral Fellow, Frank McKenna School of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Mount Allison University, As an Individual
To add to that point briefly, funding incentivization is going to be critical here as well. If we are going to have meaningful research, particularly around space defence in the academic realm and around laws governing the military component of space, the funding needs to be there for that to happen. Where does that incentivization come from? The ability of scholars to engage in that research process requires that those funds are available as well.
6:40 p.m.
Liberal
Marie-France Lalonde Liberal Orléans, ON
Thank you very much.
I'll leave you both to very quickly share a key recommendation that we could bring forward as part of this study we're doing on space defence.
6:45 p.m.
Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual
I recommend a higher risk tolerance for the government to invest in research capabilities, a willingness to fail and fail quickly, and a subvention for the private sector. We've built some of that in defence, but we've been very reticent in allowing that investment to go toward space capabilities.
6:45 p.m.
Post-Doctoral Fellow, Frank McKenna School of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Mount Allison University, As an Individual
I would reiterate my point about the fundamental understanding and articulation of needs regarding space. A second recommendation from there is understanding Canada's niche capabilities and opportunities within the multilateral defence framework.
6:45 p.m.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Thank you, Mrs. Lalonde.
Unfortunately, I have to gavel this meeting to a close. You've raised some really interesting points, which I hope the committee will have an opportunity to explore.
Before I adjourn, I'll just note that we are meeting with Minister Pistorius from the German defence ministry on Friday at 12:15 in room 125-B of West Block. I would like to exchange a gift with him. I'd appreciate it if someone was in a position to move a motion to do so.
Go ahead, Mrs. Lalonde.
6:45 p.m.
Liberal
Marie-France Lalonde Liberal Orléans, ON
Mr. Chair, it would be my pleasure to help you with this.
With the will of the committee, I move:
That, in relation to the committee’s informal meeting with the German Minister of Defence, the committee cover the cost of a gift for the German Defence Minister.
(Motion agreed to)
