National Defence Committee on May 8th, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

The meeting is now back.

Pursuant to a motion adopted by the committee on November 2, we're resuming the study on space defence.

Joining us for this hour is Christian Leuprecht, professor at RMC, a familiar face at this committee, and Thomas Hughes, post-doctoral fellow, Frank McKenna school, Mount Allison University.

I'm going to ask each of you for an opening five-minute statement. Since appearing by video conference is always more of a task than being here in person, I'm going to ask Thomas Hughes to go first, please.

You have five minutes, sir.

[Thomas Hughes, Post-Doctoral Fellow, Frank McKenna School of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Mount Allison University, As an Individual]

Thank you very much.

Good afternoon, everybody. It is a privilege to provide comments to this committee.

The space domain is a complex defence issue, but it's important to appreciate that, although we discuss space, the space domain is in itself an enabler. That is, actions in the space domain facilitate civilian and military actions in other domains. Consequently, thinking about the space domain and defence requires us to consider not only what happens in space, but the ripple effects of actions within the space domain. Similarly, the space domain is inherently connected to earth, and conflict related to the space domain may be most effectively prosecuted by targeting components of the space architecture that are not actually in space.

The space domain is likely to have particular significance for Canada due to the Arctic. Satellite-based communications are vital, and it is difficult to conceive of comprehensive surveillance of Canada's Arctic territory without leveraging the space domain. This also provides an opportunity for Canada to develop capabilities in the space domain that are intended to enhance our awareness of, and ability to facilitate and support activity in, the Arctic.

From this foundation, I will draw your attention to three practical and conceptual challenges.

The first is the dual-use issue. That is, satellites can perform roles that have both military and civilian functions. Thus, satellites that are actually intended for malign use may be plausibly denied by using the cover of a civilian function. For example, at a very basic level, imagery of Arctic ice taken from space can be used for scientific research or to assist in military planning. Alternatively, tracking objects in space could be done to ensure that existing satellites are not in conflicting orbits or to generate targeting coordinates to facilitate the use of an anti-satellite missile.

Conversely, this raises the difficulty of demonstrating that a satellite is solely intended for benign purposes, increasing the possibility of unintended escalation. While existing surveillance capabilities provide us with a strong understanding of when objects are put into space and who is responsible for their launch, the intended function of these objects and the way in which data that they collect is intended to be used is rather more difficult to discern. The consequent inability to unequivocally differentiate between military and civilian space infrastructure adds a political element to the existing conversation about protecting our space-related assets from attack. Addressing this lacuna through national technical means and potentially an international confidence-building regime that generates greater clarity on the function of objects in the space domain is vital.

The second is the necessary interconnection of private industry and state interests in space. Private industry has been crucial to using the space domain for both civilian and military purposes, developing physical infrastructure and engaging in research. This also represents a political and operational challenge. An overreliance on private industry may make it difficult for Canada and its partners and allies to pursue their space-related goals at the speed of need and to ensure consistent function at critical junctures. The restrictions on the use of Starlink following its provision to the Ukrainian armed forces are a reminder of this potential challenge. In addition, the sensitive nature of information that may be required by defence departments from or about the space domain complicates the interface with private industry, raising challenges in data collection and dissemination.

Third, as we develop our use of the space domain, it is also important to consider how this changes others' understanding of our vulnerabilities and capabilities. Generating an awareness of how others view our actions in the space domain is crucial for enabling us to maintain an effective deterrent posture without being seen as an aggressor. However, the ability to hamper adversaries from using the space domain to support their military operations is a vital capability. To be clear, we need to abide by existing regulations and understand the ethical implications of any defence-related activity in the space domain. Nevertheless, ensuring that we have an awareness of the role of the space domain in our adversaries' military doctrine and the capability to disrupt their use of the space domain, potentially through interdicting communication between ground stations and objects in space rather than targeting the latter directly, is a crucial aspect of future military capability, particularly as the Canadian Armed Forces moves towards a pan-domain approach to operations.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you.

Professor Leuprecht, you have five minutes.

[Prof. Christian Leuprecht, Professor, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual]

Mr. Chair, members, thank you for your invitation.

I'll be speaking in English, but I can answer your questions in the official language of your choice.

Picture the following scenario. China wants to fire a shot across the proverbial bow, but instead of targeting U.S. infrastructure, which would risk drawing a strong response, China targets a Canadian satellite. China has several capabilities to do so, including anti-satellite missiles and a robotic arm, which China demonstrated in 2022 it can use to move a satellite out of geosynchronous orbit. Would this constitute an attack on the continent, on Canada or on NATO? The space domain falls outside of the transatlantic theatre.

Canada needs clear and definitive answers to these questions to deter malign actors with the capabilities, intent and demonstrated will to target Canadian and allied assets in space. Deterrence also depends on a qualitative overmatch of adversarial capabilities, and space depends on Canada's ability to conduct multidomain warfare.

All that presents a formidable challenge for CAF readiness and capabilities.

In real dollars, today's CAF has roughly as much funding at its disposal as it did at the end of the Cold War, and the staff contingent is about one-third smaller, yet its tasks have vastly expanded, in part because it now has two additional domains. In addition to land, sea and air, it has cyber and space. In a globally integrated threat environment, cyber and space are highly dynamic domains that are integral to the four core functions of DND, which are reassuring allies and citizens, deterring conflict, being able to fight and protecting Canadians.

Canadian civilian and military communications, national security and a wide array of civilian and military functions and operations depend on space. This is especially true in the north and in the Arctic, which are disproportionately dependent on space capabilities.

China has deployed anti-access and area denial systems along its archipelago. Canada must do likewise in the Arctic. That's because the Arctic has a critical vulnerability, where A2/AD is heavily dependent on space assets. In other words, space defence is Arctic defence, Arctic defence is continental defence and continental defence is allied defence, because it secures extended deterrence, including extended nuclear deterrence.

Canada's a regional partner anchor for the Arctic, and Canada's ability to defend NATO's northern flank ultimately depends on space. Adversaries understand this, which is precisely why malign actors are actively challenging our ability to dominate and control the space domain. In other words, strategic rivalry is on full display in space, and whoever controls space is bound to control the 21st century.

There are four key takeaways.

First, if the government is actually serious about a values-based foreign policy, then Canada should be joining the ongoing U.S. effort to bolster the outer space treaty, to which both Russia and China are signatories. This established, functional regime's deterioration or abrogation would run fundamentally counter to Canada's values and interests.

Canada must support approaches that regulate not just space capabilities, but also how these capabilities are used. Canada must make multilateral space diplomacy a top priority. In years to come, there will be two new UN open-ended working groups, with one for each approach.

Second, Canada needs a whole-of-government approach to space to forge a coherent national strategy. However, with limited resources, the execution of a space defence strategy requires Canada to double down on collaboration with allies and the private sector. See the “Combined Space Operations Vision 2031”, which is the Five Eyes effort with France and Germany that was submitted to the committee. Our space policy framework dates back to 2014.

Third, space is a prime example of why cultural evolution matters to the CAF. When the U.S. stood up Space Command, it was quite unlike other commands. Its institutional culture is flat and it recruited from other services. Space Command is heavily civilian because the skill sets required are not really found in the military.

Fourth, modern militaries cannot operate without space technologies, capabilities and data. In the event of a conflict, Canadian space defence capabilities will afford allies strategic depth and have a key multiplier effect on allies. Canada's support to Ukraine in the form of geostrategic intelligence is one indication.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you.

Mr. Allison, you have six minutes. Go ahead, please.

[Dean Allison, Conservative, Niagara West, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for being here today.

Christian, I'm going to start with you. That seems to make sense. It seems obvious that we should be spending time and money on space, because trying to police or manage the Arctic seems almost impossible from a physical asset point of view.

What kind of money are we looking at here? When you talk about flat budgets, having the same type of budget we had after the Cold War and the shrinking number of forces members, where do you even start in trying to prioritize that? We all know the Arctic is important. We all know that everything you said makes complete and total sense. Where do we start?

[Prof. Christian Leuprecht]

I'll give a short answer so you can come back with more challenges on this.

Ultimately, given the challenges the defence force has, and given that we have a pretty good defence policy update but no real means the government has laid out to effectively resource that, I think we need to focus disproportionately on asymmetric capabilities, which is to say cyber and space, precisely because of the strategic depth argument that I made and precisely because it has a force multiplier effect for NATO's northern flank and, ultimately, for continental Arctic and Canadian sovereignty.

My worry is that we're having too much debate about the conventional domains because that's what we can all see and that's what many parliamentarians like because it brings money and resources into their ridings. We're not having enough of a conversation about cyber and space and the disproportionate allocation in this heavily resource-constrained environment. That's also going to have a multiplier effect for Canadian prosperity, Canadian innovation and the DIANA accelerator that Canada is hosting on behalf of NATO. There are a lot of second-order effects if we focus more on that conversation.

[Dean Allison, Conservative, Niagara West, ON]

You're saying that we should be doing all of the above, meaning we should be working with the U.S. on treaties, with the Five Eyes and with the private sector. You mentioned the concerns about that, but where should the money be spent? Is it directly through Defence or in collaboration in trying to wheel with other partners?

[Prof. Christian Leuprecht]

What I submitted to the committee—the Five Eyes German-French initiative, with a clear vision for 2031—is where we need to put our resources. If you read that document, I think it is the best short-form articulation I have found of the challenges and how we can work together to draw clear red lines, deter our adversaries and enable the capabilities we need in everything from fighting forest fires to ensuring continuity of communications, civilian assets and the like.

I think we have a very clear target, and given that Canada has signed on to it, the challenge is how we translate it into effective outcomes. As you know, Canada often has perfunctory announcements about defence, and then we have trouble meeting them. Here's one commitment that, if we allocate our resources and capabilities effectively, we can actually meet. It will offer us a disproportionate payoff and some reputational assets among our key Five Eyes allies, plus France and Germany. This is easier from a multilateral perspective because you have seven countries playing together as opposed to all of NATO, for instance.

[Dean Allison, Conservative, Niagara West, ON]

Between China and Russia, who are you concerned with more in this whole race in space? China has been coming on strong. What keeps you awake at night about those countries and why?

[Prof. Christian Leuprecht]

That's a terrific question. If I could only find it, I have a nice little synopsis on that.

The basic point is that we put a lot of emphasis on Russia and Russian claims of potentially putting nuclear weapons into space. Yes, we should be concerned about that, but nuclear weapons are 70-year-old technology. The Chinese have very disruptive technologies that they've demonstrated and know how to use and deploy. That robo-arm was a real wake-up for the U.S. and the allied defence community. The ability to displace a satellite out of orbit is a pretty sophisticated capability. It's an ability to target disruption rather than this one big bang-and-boom approach that Russia takes.

China has the second-most number of satellites after only the United States, and China has demonstrated that it is a clear peer rival in its investments and capabilities. Where we have disproportionate leverage—and the United States understands this—is by playing together with long-standing key allies that have long-developed space capabilities and investing strategically in those. Of course, the innovation is going to come from private sector investment, which we then need to translate into dual-use and military applications. The problem is that our processes in Canada for doing that are so long. If you look at the U.S., it has changed its defence procurement mechanism precisely to be able to accelerate that exponentially. This is one more reason why we really need to look at our procurement system, which, of course, is one of the department's priorities.

[Dean Allison, Conservative, Niagara West, ON]

I guess if we're going to meet our NATO commitment, we should be investing in Canadian companies. If we're going to be committing money towards defence and towards those numbers, we should be investing in Canadian companies versus other companies.

[Prof. Christian Leuprecht]

Add up the defence policy update. I don't know why the government didn't put this out there, but in my view of the defence policy update, if the government is serious about resourcing it, it gets us to 2% or more. Why we're underplaying our hand with the defence policy update, which I think is a pretty good update, I'm not quite sure.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Allison.

Mr. Fillmore, you have six minutes.

[Andy Fillmore, Liberal, Halifax, NS]

Thanks very much, Chair.

Thanks very much to the witnesses for your time and for bringing your expertise to the committee today.

In the framing of the study that you're now contributing to, the committee acknowledged that we don't know what we don't know. I'd like to use the next five or six minutes, whatever the chair is giving us right now, to ask you both to educate the committee on the importance of Arctic defence in the context of space.

Could I ask you both to keep in mind as you answer your questions what the role of industry is in this? Could you frame in your responses, somewhere along the way, a recommendation that the committee could include in its report?

Perhaps we can go in the order that we heard from the speakers and start with Dr. Hughes. I'll try to keep the time split in half, with three minutes each.

[Thomas Hughes]

They're big questions, but to be brief, on the importance of Arctic defence in the context of space, I completely agree with Professor Leuprecht's conceptualization. Arctic defence is one of the niche capabilities that Canada provides, in my opinion. I think it's useful for Canada, given the current security context, to focus on some of the niche capabilities that it has. The Arctic, therefore, offers an opportunity for Canada to engage in that process.

As I said in my initial comments, for Canada to have a comprehensive defence of its Arctic territory, it is absolutely fundamental to leverage the space domain. This means communications to start with, and secondly, surveillance, whether that's using the new remotely piloted SkyGuardian aircraft, which are due to come into operation in 2028 and will require satellite communication to function, or using satellite imagery itself. We cannot surveil the Arctic and have domain awareness of the Arctic without the ability to operate in space.

That will require, in my opinion, Canada to engage with international partners, particularly Sweden. I think it's an interesting additional partner that hasn't been mentioned so far. I know that relationship is already built and is already strong, and I think that should probably be leveraged further.

In terms of private industry, private industry is simply critical. Private industry has the expertise and the capability to produce what the Canadian Armed Forces requires. The challenge, as always, is ensuring that private industry, which is necessarily operating with a different framework of meaning, if you like, from the government, is on the same page so that we can work in parallel. We can, but that's not something that happens automatically.

[Andy Fillmore, Liberal, Halifax, NS]

Thank you.

Dr. Leuprecht, I'd like to move to you. I remember that you said in your remarks that “space defence is Arctic defence”. You had more in that long sentence, and perhaps that will help to frame your response.

[Prof. Christian Leuprecht]

To reiterate that sentence, space defence is Arctic defence, Arctic defence is ultimately continental defence and continental defence is defending the northern flank of NATO. The NATO centre of gravity, with the addition of Sweden and Finland, has shifted north. The northern flank has become more important.

The really important thing, which I think Canada has always done a terribly poor job of articulating, is that investments in Arctic security are investments in NATO and NATO collective defence. Collective defence depends on U.S. extended deterrence and U.S. extended nuclear deterrence. If the continent is not secure, then it means the United States' ability to deter adversaries is not secure. However, for some reason, repeated governments on both sides have not, in my view, articulated that effectively to the Canadian public and especially to our allies and partners. We still articulate them as somehow separate entities. You can see how the defence policy update was rolled out with this emphasis on the Arctic.

The three things that I would reiterate are more than just where we put the resources. One is inexpensive allocation, but I'm concerned that in multilateral diplomacy, we have very limited resources. As you know, the government of the day decides, and the government has decided to constrain the resources of the departments further. The government has decided to put its multilateral efforts in a separate treaty process. It's a democratic government. It gets to do what it decides to do. However, I think it needs to be all hands on deck when it comes to multilateral space diplomacy because that is existential to Canadian defence and to allied and continental defence for the reasons I just explained.

In terms of the whole-of-government approach, the defence policy framework dates back to 2014. A lot has changed in space since 2014. If we have very scarce resources, both in government and in collaboration with industry, we need to marshal those resources for maximum effect and efficiency in terms of outputs and outcomes. If we don't have an updated framework, we can't marshal the resources we have.

On the defence capability side, thinking about the people who actually do this, it's a classic example of where the Canadian Armed Forces needs extremely high-level, high-quality skill sets. There has been a clear change over the last 30 years in the people you need to recruit. It's not that there are not enough people coming through the doors. There are enough people coming through the doors. It's about the quality of the people the Canadian Armed Forces needs. They are not able to get through the doors, especially in these very high-end capabilities.

Here we need opportunities for lateral entry from the civilian private sector and from other government departments. It's just taken me two years to get someone from a different formation to come work in our formation. That's within the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence. We are not agile when it comes to personnel.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Fillmore.

Madam Normandin, you have six minutes.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My first question is for Mr. Hughes.

You spoke about the difficulty of establishing private and military use of space. Do we know what proportion is public and what proportion is private? Is there a trend? For example, is the private sector winning the space war, or is the military or public sector winning it? I would like an order of magnitude.

[Thomas Hughes]

Thank you for your questions.

Putting an absolute number on that is very difficult, the primary problem being that, as I suggested, a lot of the space infrastructure and satellites can be used for both civilian and military functions. A particular object or satellite may be performing a completely civilian role for a time and a season. If the government to which that satellite belongs decides to change that function or, perhaps more specifically, decides to use the data that the satellite is collecting for a military purpose, then there's no way we can stop that from happening, so I am somewhat reluctant to put a figure on military versus civilian. I think that is part of the challenge of operating in and understanding the space domain and the threat environment that is in the space domain.

In terms of private versus government, to take your question a little further, I think it is useful to see the breakdown by country, because the Chinese government obviously has a different relationship with Chinese private industry from what the United States has with U.S. private industry. Again, that raises the challenge of the dual-use problem and the public-private interface. I suggest that in the United States in particular, the private industry has a lead in what it is providing—we've seen that with SpaceX and Boeing in recent years—but a significant proportion of the need is also driven by armed forces. Again, I hesitate to put a number on that, but it's perhaps more useful to think broadly about what capabilities the United States and Canada require in space and whether those capabilities are being met.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Hughes.

My other question is for Mr. Leuprecht.

You already spoke a bit about the risk that Canada faces, in relation to its allies, by continuing to underfund the space sector. I want to hear more about this. You already touched on the Arctic issue and how we need to work with the United States on deterrence. We know that we're fairly dependent on what type of intelligence the United States wants to share with us.

How else could we risk damaging Canada's reputation, for example, in relation to our allies, if we continue to underfund the space sector?

[Prof. Christian Leuprecht]

Thank you for the question, Ms. Normandin.

I'll give you a concrete example.

Civil flights in the Baltic states must now be diverted and turned around as a result of interference from Russian GPS signals in civil aviation. At a number of Baltic airports, aircraft can only land with the help of satellites.

We have the same issue in Canada's Far North. At many airports, aircraft can only land with the help of satellites. Russia is close enough to do the same thing in Canada's Far North. If the Russians want to, they can now exploit significant vulnerabilities in the Far North, given their ability to interfere with signals in GPS systems for civil and military aviation. I think that this constitutes a significant vulnerability that we should address on a priority basis.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you.

I have another question for you.

You touched on the issue of applying article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty in space. The issue is that satellites can't easily be linked to continents. However, I want to know whether we also have the same issue with cybersecurity, where the challenge lies in connecting an activity to a perpetrator.

Do we have the same issue in space? Is it hard to know who, for example, might have destroyed or pirated a satellite?

[Prof. Christian Leuprecht]

I would say that the challenge of assigning responsibility isn't that significant. The issue is that we can't assign responsibility in the way that we're used to from a legal perspective, so beyond a reasonable doubt.

In general, our intelligence capabilities mean that we know the perpetrators of these activities, especially when it comes to Russian involvement. The Russians, by and large, don't hide their activities. On the contrary, they want us to know that their interference has caused the major chaos. Ultimately, the Russian strategy is to see the world burn.