Thank you very much.
Good afternoon, everybody. It is a privilege to provide comments to this committee.
The space domain is a complex defence issue, but it's important to appreciate that, although we discuss space, the space domain is in itself an enabler. That is, actions in the space domain facilitate civilian and military actions in other domains. Consequently, thinking about the space domain and defence requires us to consider not only what happens in space, but the ripple effects of actions within the space domain. Similarly, the space domain is inherently connected to earth, and conflict related to the space domain may be most effectively prosecuted by targeting components of the space architecture that are not actually in space.
The space domain is likely to have particular significance for Canada due to the Arctic. Satellite-based communications are vital, and it is difficult to conceive of comprehensive surveillance of Canada's Arctic territory without leveraging the space domain. This also provides an opportunity for Canada to develop capabilities in the space domain that are intended to enhance our awareness of, and ability to facilitate and support activity in, the Arctic.
From this foundation, I will draw your attention to three practical and conceptual challenges.
The first is the dual-use issue. That is, satellites can perform roles that have both military and civilian functions. Thus, satellites that are actually intended for malign use may be plausibly denied by using the cover of a civilian function. For example, at a very basic level, imagery of Arctic ice taken from space can be used for scientific research or to assist in military planning. Alternatively, tracking objects in space could be done to ensure that existing satellites are not in conflicting orbits or to generate targeting coordinates to facilitate the use of an anti-satellite missile.
Conversely, this raises the difficulty of demonstrating that a satellite is solely intended for benign purposes, increasing the possibility of unintended escalation. While existing surveillance capabilities provide us with a strong understanding of when objects are put into space and who is responsible for their launch, the intended function of these objects and the way in which data that they collect is intended to be used is rather more difficult to discern. The consequent inability to unequivocally differentiate between military and civilian space infrastructure adds a political element to the existing conversation about protecting our space-related assets from attack. Addressing this lacuna through national technical means and potentially an international confidence-building regime that generates greater clarity on the function of objects in the space domain is vital.
The second is the necessary interconnection of private industry and state interests in space. Private industry has been crucial to using the space domain for both civilian and military purposes, developing physical infrastructure and engaging in research. This also represents a political and operational challenge. An overreliance on private industry may make it difficult for Canada and its partners and allies to pursue their space-related goals at the speed of need and to ensure consistent function at critical junctures. The restrictions on the use of Starlink following its provision to the Ukrainian armed forces are a reminder of this potential challenge. In addition, the sensitive nature of information that may be required by defence departments from or about the space domain complicates the interface with private industry, raising challenges in data collection and dissemination.
Third, as we develop our use of the space domain, it is also important to consider how this changes others' understanding of our vulnerabilities and capabilities. Generating an awareness of how others view our actions in the space domain is crucial for enabling us to maintain an effective deterrent posture without being seen as an aggressor. However, the ability to hamper adversaries from using the space domain to support their military operations is a vital capability. To be clear, we need to abide by existing regulations and understand the ethical implications of any defence-related activity in the space domain. Nevertheless, ensuring that we have an awareness of the role of the space domain in our adversaries' military doctrine and the capability to disrupt their use of the space domain, potentially through interdicting communication between ground stations and objects in space rather than targeting the latter directly, is a crucial aspect of future military capability, particularly as the Canadian Armed Forces moves towards a pan-domain approach to operations.
Thank you.