National Defence Committee on Sept. 17th, 2024

[H.E. Yuliya Kovaliv]

Thank you for that question. It's really important.

As we saw back in 2022, we were able to liberate the Kherson region because we had HIMARS. HIMARS has the ability to strike the Russian infrastructure supply chain and all of the military stock deposits. We saw how this Russian front line was cracking. The war is also about logistics and the ability to supply soldiers to the front line.

What are we facing now?

We are now facing Russia using its air drones to launch missiles from deep inside Russia. It also understands that because we have these restrictions, the only thing we are doing in asking you for air defence systems against their missiles.... We're trying to bring down Shahed drones, ballistic missiles and all kinds of the missiles. Almost every night, we have this air siren. They are flying over Ukrainian skies. They're all over Ukrainian territory.

It's also the same with supply chains. If we could attack and destroy Russian supply chains and those legitimate military targets, including the air bases where Russia is launching these missiles, it would significantly change the situation on the front line and for the civilians throughout the whole country.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

I have a longer question for you, but I will save it for the second round.

In the meantime, I'd like you to talk to us about disinformation. We could say, for example, that the Ukrainian incursions are not real, that things aren't going as well as they say. Fighting disinformation could be done through the use of satellite imagery, for example.

Should more resources be provided for the use of satellite imagery, particularly to counter disinformation? This would make it possible, for example, to confirm that when Russia claims the attacks don't work, it's not true.

[H.E. Yuliya Kovaliv]

I could probably spend hours and hours telling you about examples of Russian disinformation, not only since February 2024 or 2022, but going back 10 years.

You need to realize that Russia is very sophisticated in disinformation and propaganda. We have historical cases of Russia targeting Ukrainian communities 30, 40 and 50 years ago, when it was one of the most active countries supporting Ukraine's independence.

This is the same problem here. The tools are probably a bit different. We now have social media. We have other resources, including so-called cultural diplomacy that Russia has been using to spread a few false narratives.

Sanctions are not working, but you you can see the financial results of one of Russia's formerly biggest companies, Gazprom. It's now making a loss. It has decreasing investment and decreasing efficiency. It's one of the examples to look at.

The same thing is happening on the front line. There were even cases of Russian disinformation campaigns attacking particular soldiers in particular brigades in Ukraine to break the morale of the people who were there in the trenches and on the front lines. They were so sophisticated by sending the messages through Telegram channels and other social media, saying they'd better surrender, because all of the other commanders had left the battlefield and so on.

These are very sophisticated operations. Many of them are done in the shadows. We just saw recent news from the U.S., where there was an investigation into a few of the companies that were working with and financed by Russian operatives.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

You have six minutes, Ms. Mathyssen.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Madam Ambassador, for showing up today.

There have been a lot of conversations about the equipment that's so important as part of these defensive actions that Ukraine has to take. I know Canadians are very proud to be a part of that.

Of course, we want them to be sufficient and safe. One of the things Mr. Bezan has talked about in this committee was supplying the CRV7 rockets. A lot of the conversations we had in this committee were about ensuring that they were safe and effective, and that they would be safe during transport.

I would love to hear from the generals and from you, Madam Ambassador, about what we are doing on those reviews to ensure that all of that older equipment is safe, and how that's delaying it—if that's delaying it. What are we doing with all of those checks and balances in place on both sides to ensure that safety is part of that conversation?

[MGen Gregory Smith]

Chair, I can talk at least from the Canadian side.

Indeed, for the CRV7s, as indicated, there's an initial tranche that has arrived in Ukraine, and we're preparing for further shipment. As was identified, we have to make sure it's safe. A small number of those rockets have a warhead on them. The vast majority, though, are rockets, so they have an explosive capability to project forward.

Going through the necessary process to make sure they can be transported, either by aircraft or ship, is enormously important. Obviously, we won't hand something over to our Ukrainian partner that's going to damage their soldiers. We've gone through that and therefore ensured those weapon systems are safe when we're transferring them.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

In terms of that reliability on the Ukrainian side....

[H.E. Yuliya Kovaliv]

There is a bit of a different perception of safety when you're fighting a war.

On the one side, we really value the procedures that were maintained to ensure that all of the security for their transportation and usage was tested. Now the first shipment is in Ukraine.

However, you also need to understand that there is always a balance between safety standards and pressing need. If the brigade is unarmed, all talk about safety and security is very theoretical because, tomorrow, these people could be injured or, unfortunately, killed if they are not equipped and don't have armoured vehicles to use—whether it's to fight or for evacuation.

We do value this specifically for the rockets. While is is very important for us all to ensure that the needed safety and security measures are maintained while they are being shipped or used in Ukraine, for many other types of equipment we have a different perception. Urgency very often prevails with us, because that's the choice.

I would like to thank DND's approach in helping us build these capabilities—providing not only armoured vehicles and other types of weapons, but also kits of spare parts and the maintenance to support them. It's very important because it keeps those weapons' most efficient for use, and in the longer term too.

I want to reiterate that we really appreciate it.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Part of the issues we found.... You mentioned that our slowness on sanctions is not working. There were disappointments, of course, when it was found that Canadian-made electronic components were being found in Russian missiles and drones. I think we discussed that here at the committee a bit.

I would love to hear from you, Madam Ambassador, about Canada's doing its due diligence in monitoring that end use of arms exports and how that's impacting Ukraine right now, in terms of our obligations on arms exports.

[H.E. Yuliya Kovaliv]

Thank you.

Indeed, we continue to find a lot of western-produced spare parts in different types of Russian weapons. Recently, regarding information I can share, there were no Canadian spare parts. We thank you for monitoring it. We know DND takes preventing Canadian technology from being used in the Russian war machine very seriously.

There are other allies with whom we are working closely to step in with more precise actions, because many of those western spare parts we find in missiles, drones and so on. We are working with DND and Global Affairs. They raised the internationally set mechanism for all export licences. We're fully compliant on our side with that.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Could you talk about Canada's role in promoting—within the international community, as well—anti-mine initiatives? What support does Ukraine need to further demine? I know Canadians are some of the best to do that, but what additional supports might you need for the demining of the countryside, especially after this war?

[H.E. Yuliya Kovaliv]

Thank you.

Indeed, we greatly value the support Canada is providing us in the demining field. Ukraine is now one of the most mine-contaminated countries, including its grain fields. Unfortunately, many of the casualties are civilians and farmers who continue to work in the fields, because we remain one of the biggest grain exporters in the world. It is a big challenge for both our civilians and our military. Demining equipment for the military is important. It's one of our requests on the lease.

However, regarding demining equipment for civilians, Canada was among the first countries to step in and double, at that time, our capacity on the big demining machines to help us clean, first of all, the fields, so our farmers can come back, work on the fields and supply the world with food.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you.

That completes our first round.

For the second round, we start with Mr. Allison for five minutes.

[Dean Allison, Conservative, Niagara West, ON]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to the ambassador for being here, and to the major-generals as well.

I have a question for you, Ambassador. You mentioned the term “nuclear blackmail”. Obviously, Putin has mentioned that he is threatening that.

In terms of the fact that he has done some terrible things and they are known for their disinformation, how likely would you think or rank the fact that he is threatening a nuclear response? Do you feel that's just more disinformation, or do you feel that he's actually serious when he talks about that?

[H.E. Yuliya Kovaliv]

If I am not mistaken, I have the figure that since February 24, 2022, Russia has blackmailed with nuclear threats 72 times. That is also a part of their campaign to put down so-called red lines. Do you remember what Russia did when Ukraine was first asking about NATO weapons? It was the same narrative then; we were talking about tanks; then we were talking about air defence and then we were talking about the fighter jets. Now we are talking about long-range strikes. It is the same pattern.

If you see what's happening in reality, including with our Kursk operation, you can make your own conclusion that this is blackmail. It's a common Russian strategy just to hold our partners and some of their decisions with respect to the support of Ukraine. It's all about that.

[Dean Allison, Conservative, Niagara West, ON]

Do you feel the same? Do you feel it's just disinformation, or is there a legitimate threat?

[MGen Gregory Smith]

Chair, the only thing I'd add is that their escalation dominance is standard Russian doctrine; they're always trying to make it look like they're going to go further.

There are nuclear weapons, but at the same time, on the alliance side, the alliance is very well aware of that and is obviously providing the deterrence that it has with its own nuclear capability.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you, Mr. Allison, for splitting your time.

Ambassador, the Government of Canada promised back in January 2023 that we were going to send some NASAMS air defence systems to you. In March of 2023, Minister Anand said it was en route, and now we're hearing it might show up sometime in January 2025.

I know you need them now. That system would be very important for protecting the cities and the civilians of Ukraine. Have you received a hard date for when the NASAMS will be delivered?

[H.E. Yuliya Kovaliv]

Thank you.

Indeed, we really appreciate the decision to help us with an air defence system. It's in production. Both the Canadian system and the system that our other partners also committed to support us with are now in production by a U.S. manufacturer. We are looking forward. At this stage, none of us can help to expedite that. That's the production process. We have some estimates for dates, which are more linked to the producer.

Also, what would be very helpful is the additional supply of missiles for this air defence system, because we have few of them now in Ukraine. We, of course, are looking forward to getting more, but without the missiles, we can't use them. If there is any possibility to also provide us with the missiles for the system, that would be very helpful. Meanwhile, we are waiting for the system to arrive.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Ambassador, the maker of the CRV7 rockets, which are Canadian-made, is also a manufacturer of missiles and is still in existence and still has the capability to produce missiles. I hope that the Government of Canada would be looking at our own domestic capabilities and industrial strengths in the defence industry to provide you with more of those missiles.

We talked a little bit about the M777 howitzers and the 155-millimetre shells. The government has delayed and dithered on getting our production increased here.

Can you tell us, Ambassador, whether or not Canada is shipping any increase in 155-millimetre ammunition rounds to Ukraine, or are you getting those rounds from other countries?

[H.E. Yuliya Kovaliv]

As I've said, the Department of National Defence joined the Czech coalition to supply Ukraine with 155-millimetre artillery shells. That's the international coalition. Many other countries joined with financial contributions to allow our Czech colleagues to procure and supply those 155-millimetre artillery shells to Ukraine.

We greatly value that, but we also see that in general there is a lack of production capability around the world. We also see it as we are starting our own production. There are a lot of supply chain issues for this production. We started to talk about this two years ago. The defence industry is now our great partner, but also a big bottleneck. By working together, we need to ensure that we are all able to produce. Sometimes it's not about the funding; it's just the physical capacity.

I would also like to thank the many Canadian defence producers who are working on production of this military supply. I think a bigger part of the military support that Canada has provided for us is produced in Canada here. I visited a lot of them and I really want to take this opportunity to thank those companies, and the people who are working there, for their efforts.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you.

The five-minute questions seem to be getting into the six-and-a-half and seven-minute range.

Madame Lalonde, you have five minutes.

[Marie-France Lalonde, Liberal, Orléans, ON]

I'm going to pass it to my colleague, Emmanuella.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Madame Lambropoulos, you have five minutes.

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for being here with us to discuss this important matter today.

My first question will be for Ambassador Kovaliv.

You mentioned in your opening remarks that the support that Ukraine has received from allies is one of the major reasons why it's seen the successes that it has seen, along with, of course, the bravery of the soldiers on the ground.

Canada has committed over $4.5 billion in military assistance and has trained over 40,000 Ukrainian troops.

I'm wondering if you can speak to which investments have been the most helpful and what more we can do at this stage.