Evidence of meeting #113 for National Defence in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was nato.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Thank you.
Let me just say two things quickly.
I'm glad to meet you because I'm from the Saint-Laurent riding in Montreal.
Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Second, I won't say it now, but I'd like to have an opportunity at some point to say things about Trump, NATO and the far right in Russia, because I have an alternative, let's say, even on the drones.
On the question—it's an excellent question—we had the war in Donbass in 2014 and it was seen as bad, destabilizing, a violation of international law, etc., but the unsaid consensus in the west, so in Canada, the United States and among the NATO alliance, was that it was a regional conflict. It was illegal. Crimea was illegally annexed, but with no danger of spilling over. It had to be contained. The corollary was that we were not sending any weapons, due to fear of escalation. Then, there was the Minsk protocol. We had to find a diplomatic solution, and it didn't work.
The qualitative change in 2022, which has been very clear to NATO members, was that this is a threat. The full-scale invasion is a threat to international security. It's a threat to European security. Canada is part of the alliance. What that means in simple terms to the public is that Putin will not stop in Ukraine. He will not stop, so the idea is that we have to find a ceasefire. Just let's stop the war. The war will not stop. Maybe the shooting will stop for a while and then it will start again.
We could say, just ask the Poles. They were part of the Warsaw Pact. They had been occupied for 40 years. Just ask the Estonians. They used to be in the Soviet Union. They're emotional. Why don't we ask the Swedes, the Finns, the Danes, the Dutch and so forth? They have the realization. In the case of Finland and Sweden, they basically overnight put an end to, what, 75 and 200 years of neutrality, because they really fear Russian aggression. That would be my answer.
Liberal
Emmanuella Lambropoulos Liberal Saint-Laurent, QC
Thank you very much for your response.
Would you like to weigh in as well?
Paterson Chair in International Affairs, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, As an Individual
I agree with the larger sentiment here. It has already impacted us. We've been having this debate about inflation for the past few years in Canada. Where did that inflation come from? It came from, partly, a spike in food prices because the Russians attacked the breadbasket of Ukraine, a major grain producer. There are economic implications of this that Canadians have been feeling for the past couple of years. Our foreign policy is aimed not only at our national security but our economic security. This war has been bad for us, just like if China attacked Taiwan, it would disrupt international trade and cause a dramatic challenge to our economy. We're involved in the war, and in the world, to prevent these things from visiting us either indirectly or directly.
Part of the war, Putin's war, is also to test NATO. He is a bad strategist, because it has actually led to a strengthening of NATO. We need to support NATO. We've made a commitment to NATO and this is a threat. This war is not a direct, immediate, physical threat to Canada, but it is a direct, immediate, physical threat to the countries in the region. We have a commitment to NATO, as we belong to that alliance, and we continue to need to support it.
Liberal
Emmanuella Lambropoulos Liberal Saint-Laurent, QC
Thank you very much.
Mr. Arel, you also mentioned that Russia has been working more closely with Iran and North Korea. I was wondering if you can speak a bit more to their involvement with Russia at this time.
Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
North Korea has sent a ton of artillery—we're talking millions of shells—so clearly it has an impact on attrition in the war in Donbass. At some point the ratio of Russian versus Ukrainian artillery reached 10:1. Now it's down maybe to 5:1, but it's still a massive advantage. It has sent ballistic missiles. For the first time we have.... Forever the North Korean threat has been the nuclear threat, and now North Korea is sending ballistic missiles to Europe for a European country to attack another European country. In a sense, it's not World War III, but suddenly we have a war that is far beyond the European continent.
What's happening with Iran—now having also sent ballistic missiles, it's been confirmed—and the great danger is what, of course, Iran or North Korea are getting in return. What is the Russian role in these regions, so in the Middle East and southeast Asia, to destabilize the region? It can impact, in the case of North Korea, very much South Korean policies—
Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
—and the South Korean policies vis-à-vis Ukraine.
Liberal
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Arel, I had another question for you, but I want to let you continue on what seemed to interest you with regard to Donald Trump and the right.
Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Obviously, the return of Donald Trump would be very worrisome, both for American democracy and, therefore, for all of us, certainly in Canada, as well as for NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I won't belabour the point.
However, I still want to say that, during last week's debate, he was asked twice, directly, whether he would defend Ukraine, whether he was for the defence of Ukraine. He refused to answer that question. That's pretty clear. In other words, the war must end on Russian terms. That's clear. J.D. Vance is adding another layer with his peace plan, which is essentially the Russian plan. Once again, it would involve a kind of surrender of Ukraine, which would be demilitarized.
What I mean is that, right now, within the Republican Party, Donald Trump seems to have sort of an impunity about what he can say, or at least about what he wants to do on virtually all issues, without any criticism from the Republicans themselves, except on one issue. That's empirical. In the last year, the only major issue that has divided the Republican Party has been aid to Ukraine. It was suspended for six months. There was a little political revolt within the Republican Party. However, what is remarkable is that it was the Republicans who finally reversed course, without Donald Trump speaking out publicly against the agreement.
On the very issue of missiles and whether the United States should allow the use of missiles, the Republicans are divided, and the officials, the chairs of the defence, security and foreign affairs committees in the House of Representatives, are all in favour of allowing Ukraine to conduct strikes. If Donald Trump comes back to power, there will obviously be chaos and uncertainty. It's not unlikely that the policy will change on this issue. That's what the Ukrainians are banking on. Mr. Zelenskyy will be meeting with Kamala Harris next week, but he will also be meeting with Donald Trump for the first time in person. They have never met, except hastily, once, at a United Nations meeting a few years ago.
That is my somewhat alternative vision, based on American political dynamics.
I don't have enough time to talk about the far right. Maybe I'll leave that for another time.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Thank you, Madame Normandin.
Ms. Mathyssen, you have two and a half minutes.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
You talked earlier, Mr. Arel, about the power of deterrence.
Of course, we all understand it. As a parliamentarian on a committee of nuclear non-proliferation, I find this concerning. There's always this contemplation about where that balance lies. In any nail-biting action movie, it's always the president, at the end of the day, who says, “No, I'm going to stand down. I'm not going to push that button.” At what point are we there? Who makes that decision at the end of the day? Canada has the opportunity to sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. It hasn't yet.
Who is making those final decisions?
Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
If there is evidence Russia is threatening to help Iran and North Korea technologically acquire the nuclear bomb, is that sufficient, then, for the United States to say, “Well, we can't now 'provoke' Russia for fear that it is doing that”? Is that your question?
Of course, I'm not privy to classified information, so I don't know the extent to which this may or may not already be happening—except that we know Russia, last spring, vetoed the renewal of the oversight security council-led committee to enforce sanctions vis-à-vis North Korea. Anything can go in and anything can go out, such as North Korea sending ballistic missiles to Russia—which is, of course, an enormous violation of the sanctions. However, Russia is not there anymore.
If the escalation has already occurred, a reaction like “we need to stand down” may actually fuel further escalation. This would be the counter-argument: Russia will continue doing what it's already doing and, seeing weakness, advance. Again, it's using the threat of nuclear for aggressive purposes, whereas, throughout the entire Cold War, the deterrence theory was that it was basically defensive—a last resort: “If the security of the state is at stake, we can resort to nuclear weapons.”
Of course, Russia claims the war of aggression in Ukraine is a war of self-defence, which nobody buys—certainly not NATO. However, that's the claim, again using the official NATO-era doctrine but putting it upside-down.
Conservative
September 19th, 2024 / 9:25 a.m.
Conservative
Dean Allison Conservative Niagara West, ON
Okay. That sounds good. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
To our witnesses, thanks for being here.
First I'm going to continue on that train of thought, but I want to get Ms. Kepe into the discussion.
I asked our witnesses on Tuesday what their thought process was when it came to nuclear threats. The ambassador said she wasn't concerned. The generals also said that. I'd just like your take, Ms. Kepe, in terms of what you think.
There's lots of disinformation coming from Russia. Is this just more sabre-rattling? Is there some point at which we should be concerned?
We have talked about weapons moving around. We can come back to that in a second, but I'd just love to have your thoughts on it.
Senior Defense Analyst, RAND, As an Individual
I'll try to be very quick this time.
On the nuclear threat conversation, I'll be honest: I'm not a nuclear deterrence expert. I look at it from the sort of broader defence analytical perspective.
I do not see a very big nuclear risk at the moment. I think there is a lot of conversation. A nuclear threat is something that Russia likes to use every now and then when it wants to affect conversations, opinions and decisions, and we are again at that point.
I also want to caution against.... Really, you need to have a conversation about what it actually is to have.... Sometimes you talk about the use of a tactical nuclear weapon as a deterrent, but you actually have to think about what it means to use a tactical nuclear weapon. Where would it be used, how would it be detonated and what kind of impact would it have and where?
Then you really have the realistic understanding of whether that is going to work as a deterrent, as escalation or not. I think the part of the conversation that we sometimes forget about is what it actually means in practice.
Conservative
Dean Allison Conservative Niagara West, ON
Thanks.
Dr. Arel, I'll go back to you because we have been talking about it. You mentioned that, as pieces move around the board, we may be concerned. I'd just love to have your final thoughts on that.
Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Is the issue on proliferation or the use of so-called tactical nuclear weapons?
Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
It's on the use of tactical weapons? Okay.
There's a military and an alliance component here. For the military component, it's not clear what Russia would even gain militarily by using a tactical nuclear weapon in terms of the situation on the battlefield.
The political effect of basically breaking the taboo for the first time since 1945 would be enormous. Now, enormous in terms of the reaction of NATO.... Radoslaw Sikorski has been very explicit about what NATO would apparently do. It's basically a complete, massive, conventional attack on any Russian positions in legal Ukrainian territory. Also, in terms of Russian alliances, there are not that many. They're relatively isolated.
The one thing that China has said that is not inclined towards Russia since the beginning of the war is “don't do it”. They've said that publicly and it's on their peace plan that dates from February 2023. It's don't use nuclear weapons. Of course, they use different diplomatic language, but the message was very clear.
The military gain is questionable. The military cost might be huge coming from NATO. Then the diplomatic cost to that alliance and, therefore, also to supply chains—a lot is coming from China that has dual use—might be too high for the Russians.
That would be my understanding.