Good morning.
The increasing devastation of the war in Ukraine has brought a degree of clarity on three issues.
First, Ukraine cannot defend itself against glide bombs at or near the front lines, or against ballistic missiles aimed at its cities. It would need 25 Patriot-type air defence systems. It was promised seven and has thus far received even fewer, although we don't have the official number. It's secret.
Second, sanctions against the import of microprocessors, on which guided missiles and bombs are dependent, do not work, largely because China refuses to implement them.
Third, Ukraine cannot win Donbass attrition warfare because all NATO members put together cannot match Russia's annual artillery production, and because the huge Russian casualties are not impacting the stability of the Russian regime.
This dire military disadvantage has led Ukraine to conclude that the best defence is offence. The best protection against daily attacks is to hit at the source. Ukraine already does this with fast-developing attack drones against munition depots—we saw a case yesterday—oil refineries and military airports inside Russia.
However, it could do this with far greater impact if it were to receive permission from the United States to use the long-range missiles it already possesses but which are restricted to legal Ukrainian territories. The U.S. has refused due to a fear of escalation, we are told repeatedly. It would appear, however, that escalation is already upon us. Russia escalated before a decision was made regarding the use of these long-range missiles. Escalation is associated with the threat that Russia may resort to nuclear weapons. This threat is empty. Ukraine invaded a part of Kursk oblast, and Russia responded militarily through conventional means and politically by pretending that nothing serious happened.
A more credible threat is for Russia to break the taboo of nuclear proliferation by assisting Iran and North Korea. There are worrying signs that the latter may already be in motion—emphasis on “may”.
A second threat is Russia helping Iran target American assets in the Middle East. Iran just sent ballistic missiles to Russia in a “dramatic escalation”—in the words of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken. The question is, what is Iran getting of great value in return? Once again, this escalation appears to precede the American decision over long-range missiles. Putin claimed last week that, since Ukrainians could not use these missiles on their own and has to rely on U.S. satellite data in particular, this would make NATO a direct party to the war, yet these missiles have long hit in and around Crimea, which Putin considers not only legal territory but eternal Russian territory. The response has been strictly conventional.
A third element of threat—my colleague Marta Kepe mentioned it at length in her presentation—is the threat of attacking communications, energy and military infrastructure in the west, and provocations over crossing through the air, as with Romania the other day.
The argument has been made that these long-range missiles will not be a game-changer. This is beside the point. What the missiles could do is considerably raise the Russian military cost of attacking Ukraine. Deterrence is ultimately the only way to provide Ukraine with security guarantees.
Thank you.