Thank you for the invitation to be here.
I have to start with some caveats and a call for humility.
My work started out on international relations of ethnic conflict, so I know something about irredentism, which is, in part, driving what Russia is doing these days. I have moved on to alliances and civil-military relations. I am not a Russia, Ukraine or Baltics expert. I have been to Riga a couple of times in the past couple of years. I am more of a Canadian defence person.
When I was asked in 2022 how long Ukraine would last, I underestimated Ukraine's resolve, preparedness and leadership. I also overestimated Russia's military. I need to focus on what we got wrong and what we got right, on what has been consistent and what has been more fluid and more uncertain.
The greatest uncertainty we face in Ukraine, in Russia and in the Baltics is really in Washington, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and all those other places. Things will change quite remarkably, depending on the election. If Harris wins, we should expect the status quo to remain the same, depending in part on whether the Democrats pick up the House and keep the Senate. If Trump wins, the future is bleak everywhere, especially in Ukraine, as there is no substitute for the U.S.'s support. Similarly, if Trump wins, NATO either will cease to exist or will exist only formally. The commitment of article 5 would no longer be relevant. There is no Trump-proofing NATO. I can talk more about that in the Q and A.
That gets to a very important dynamic that I think has been underappreciated for the security situation in the Baltics and eastern Europe, which is that Russia, under Putin, has been engaged in all kinds of aggressive behaviour, as has been mentioned thus far, but there has not been one single conventional attack across the bright, shiny line that divides NATO from non-NATO countries. That matters a great deal to Putin. As long as the U.S. continues to be led by those who support the alliance, the Baltics' security is actually pretty good; although, the folks in the region will disagree with that.
Canada, along with much of NATO, has invested seriously for the long term. We used to dodge the idea of permanent basing, but we no longer are respecting the long-dead NATO-Russia founding act. We've moved from having enough forces in the region to deter the Russians to potentially defeat an attack upon the Baltics. We have learned much from the Ukraine war about our limitations—not nearly having enough artillery or ammunition for instance—and about Russia's limitations. Moreover, Russia's military is very much depleted, as the first speaker noted. We can have an argument about how quickly Russia can reconstitute its military, but right now, there are far fewer tanks, artillery and infantry on the other side of the border. To be sure, Russian air power and sea power, aside from the Black Sea fleet, is far less depleted by the war.
Where is Canada in all of this? Canada has made a huge contribution in training the Ukraine military before the second invasion. The effort in Latvia has been outstanding in terms of Canada's having the hardest job because we moved last, so we got the smallest contributions from many countries that were not the best militaries in the alliance. The CAF has managed this quite well. The enlargement from battle groups to brigades has put even more pressure on Canada since it means a much bigger commitment, which, in turn, means more troops rotating through Latvia more frequently.
However, Swedish membership in NATO means many more high-quality troops in Latvia, potentially. It promised some troops. The question remains of how many troops can Canada sustain in Latvia. As I said, I've been to the battle group's HQ a couple of times. It is clear that the frequent rotations are stressing the force. It may make sense to have longer tours so that there are fewer people going back and forth, and to build infrastructure for them so that time can pass more easily.
We might want to think about the Cold War model of having families joining their troops in Latvia. That would be expensive with schools, day care and creative ways to keep the spouses employed, but it's not clear that having 1,500 troops come and go every six months is sustainable. For future reference, Canada and other democracies need to be more careful about the numbers we promise. Our army is simply not that big.
Speaking of limitations, our small military simply does not have that much stuff to give to Ukraine. We could consider what some other countries have done, which is to give away entire segments of their armed forces. We have repeatedly reconsidered whether we should have tanks over the past 20 or 30 years. We could, for instance, give all of our tanks, working and broken, to Ukraine and have it handle them, and we could realign our force. In the field right now, this has happened mostly at the battle group I saw in 2023 in Latvia, which was centred not around Canadian tanks but around those from our partners. However, given our own recruitment and retention crisis, and our slow procurement processes, it is unlikely for Canada to make that big decision.
One key underrated change in the region is that we are no longer participating in the rotation of air patrolling. We used to have six packs of six CF-18s rotate into and out of Romania and fly around the region. That was a major contribution to the air situation, and we're no longer doing that.
The one thing I want to point out that hasn't come up is the civil-military relations of the region, which is that we need to keep an eye on what Zelenskyy is doing with his officers, whether he's maintaining good civilian control of the military or whether he's appointing people that he likes for their political favours. That's just one challenge.
Another challenge which has come up is when the Russian military will mutiny. It is how the Russian involvement in World War I ended. Given the bloodshed they've suffered, that is one possibility that could be happening sometime, given the abuse that those soldiers have faced.
I'll cut it off now.