National Defence Committee on Sept. 19th, 2024

[Marta Kepe]

Prime Minister Kaja Kallas uses a really interesting way of talking about the shadow war and that is, exactly, something we put under what we normally talk about as activities under the threshold of war, grey-zone activities and also hybrid security risks.

There are a number of issues that are going on. There are attacks on infrastructure, and not only attacks on infrastructure but also the collection of intelligence and valuable information on critical infrastructure and vital services, which is something, through the accumulation of information, the adversary does to gain a lot of the valuable information they need to do what we refer to as “information preparation for the battlefield”, understanding the battlefield that you would fight in.

I actually advise against reading a lot about preparation for war in some of these activities that are happening in the Baltic Sea region in general. A lot of that can also be directed. The intention here can also be to sow uncertainty and intimidation, as well as to continue tactics to undermine cohesion and create this sense that maybe we have to live with Russia in our backyard and this is just how life is, so let's just work with them in a way that works for them.

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Thank you.

My next question for you is a two-part question. Speaking of cyber-threats, we've certainly seen an increase of cyber-threats from Russia against Ukraine, Europe and North America. What do you believe the NATO nations' main vulnerabilities are to cyber-threats from Russia?

The second part of the question is this: What types of scenarios should we realistically consider as potential imminent threats and where should we focus our mitigation efforts?

[Marta Kepe]

These are very difficult questions, I have to say.

The first one about cyber-threats, the main issue here is that what we see is.... We—in general, “we” as the west—have a lot of experience already with cyber-threats, not only Russian but from other actors as well, so the capability, skill and understanding of how to work and the procedures and processes are in place. However, processes and procedures can always be improved, especially when it comes to information and intelligence sharing, so that we can help our friends and neighbours across the west to be better at addressing the threat that's coming in. NATO created new channels to ensure that there can be help when needed. I believe it was a western Balkan country that was the first to use this new framework of assistance.

The other thing is the ability to respond to cyber-attacks and threats that are waged at scale. New technologies, automation systems, AI...what does it really do? It helps the adversary in creating a lot of attacks at the same time. That would be, probably, my main concern. It's definitely not the only concern at this time, but I highlight that.

I'm sorry, but the other is the main vulnerability in general...?

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Where should we focus our mitigation efforts against these threats?

[Marta Kepe]

We look at hybrid threats in total. The focus.... I'm talking about this focus because this is the area where, if we do have a vulnerability that is exploited, then it can have a lot of effect, a lot of bad consequences. That means really creating and building resilience in our critical infrastructure of vital services—our energy systems and our food and water systems—things that people need to survive. I would put a lot of focus on that.

Of course, many other things also need resilience building, information sharing, co-operation and best practices sharing. A lot of the how to do that, I would say, is really about informing and sharing best practices, because then countries, local governments, etc., can actually figure out how to do it and what the things are that would work best for them.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

You have 45 seconds.

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Oh, goodness.

Mr. Saideman, you talked about how there's no Trump-proofing NATO. Can you expand on that in probably 30 seconds now?

[Dr. Stephen Saideman]

Sure. With respect to NATO, the challenge is that the heart of it is article 5, an attack upon one is equal to an attack upon all. He's made it very clear that he's not very concerned about that. He has talked about making it contingent on 2%, and now we have his VP candidate talking about it being contingent on other dynamics related to immigration and other strange things. It's clear they don't take NATO very seriously.

They spent a lot of time, the last time around, trying to educate Trump about NATO. He was pretty ruthless about not learning those lessons. He has a lot of resentment towards NATO, because he remembers not feeling very comfortable at all of the summits and not being a member of the club. He is a man animated almost entirely by resentment, so it doesn't portend well for the organization, and he was always.... I mean, his first campaign commitments in 2015 were about being anti-NATO.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Ms. Lapointe.

Ms. Normandin will speak en français, so just adjust if need be.

Ms. Normandin, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Professor Saideman, I will come back a little later to the matter of Donald Trump and NATO.

Mr. Arel, you talked about the risk of escalation if long-range missiles were authorized. You said the risk of spillover into the Middle East was more significant than the fear of nuclear escalation.

Should we revise our narrative so that the public understands the real issues, that deterrence is happening in the right place when it comes to ultimately authorizing the use of long-range missiles? Should we completely revise our narrative in order to facilitate the authorization Ukraine is seeking, so that it can use long-range missiles?

[Dr. Dominique Arel]

That is an excellent question.

In fact, it is best to say nothing at all.

It's the fear of escalation.

According to the American side, 90% of bombers launching balloon bombs or supersonic missiles are out of range of ATACMS missiles in any case. It changes nothing. It is somewhat more empirical.

As for the rest, in the public debate at NATO, the United States lacks transparency about the risks of escalation. It is not much better in Europe. What are we talking about exactly?

Since Europe, Canada and the United States are democracies, that information will eventually leak. We must follow that closely. The general public is afraid of nuclear weapons and a third world war; I’ll leave it there.

What seems clear to me from the outset is that barely veiled threats were made on the first day of the invasion, February 24, 2022. The reality remains one of conventional retaliation and increasingly conventional attacks against civilians. Ukrainian civilians are being targeted. That’s the retaliation against Ukrainians. You talked about deterrence, but from a strategic point of view. And yet, the greatest danger is giving in to the fear of escalation in a context where, for the first time, a nuclear power is threatening to use its nuclear force as an act of aggression, not for defence.

If NATO, including Canada and the United States, give in to that fear, I think it will be the end of a fundamental standard on an international level. It will have consequences. In Europe, I think the general perception is that it will not stop at Ukraine if it were to fall, specifically because of the fear of escalation. If that happens, Ukraine will not be able to defend itself.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

Mr. Saideman, on the issue of Donald Trump potentially winning the election, I'd like to hear you talk about other countries around Ukraine, where we have operations, enhanced forward presence and deterrence. I'm thinking in particular of Poland, where the U.S. has a strong presence. However, Poland has met the target of 2% of GDP for military spending; it has even exceeded it by a considerable amount.

What can we expect from these countries that have ultimately complied with what Donald Trump had asked them to do, which was to sort themselves out? Can we expect American support to continue?

[Dr. Stephen Saideman]

I would say that even those countries that spend 2% should not expect the support of Trump. He creates lots of uncertainty about everything, and the whole idea of NATO for 70 years was to try to create some certainty about the American commitment to Europe.

Perhaps the most controversial thing I can say about this is that, if Trump becomes president, I would expect Poland to seriously consider nuclear proliferation because they can't counter the American nuclear umbrella with a Trump presidency, and nobody's counting on the French or the British nuclear weapons to be extended to deter attacks upon the Baltics. They would be on their own to a certain degree.

The history of the European Union trying to develop significant international co-operation to be a replacement for NATO has failed. Now, maybe the impetus of having the United States no longer being a committed defender to eastern Europe would encourage that, but I think that if you talk to the people in the region, you'll hear that they don't have a lot of faith in the European Union standing up if NATO were to become less effective or become irrelevant.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

Ms. Kepe, I don't have much time left, but I would like to come back to you quickly on the issue of conscription. I wanted to ask that question before you brought it up.

What is the mindset in the various Baltic countries?

I think Estonia has not yet reintroduced conscription. Is it considering the possibility of doing so?

What is the public's perception of conscription? Is that perception changing as the conflict in Ukraine continues?

[Marta Kepe]

Thank you.

All three Baltic countries by now have conscription. Estonia never actually said goodbye to its conscription. It has had it since the early 1990s, when they regained independence. In fact, the Baltic states and also the Nordic countries all have some sort of total defence system or “whole of society” defence system, where the civilian contribution to national defence and security is paramount to those systems. Lithuania basically had a sort of hybrid conscription system. They also went back to a fuller type of conscription earlier.

In terms of population support for conscription or national service, which Latvia reintroduced a year or so ago, there always tends to be some sort of concern as to whether the population will be fine with it and whether people will actually be happy to serve. What they have done, and what we see also in some other countries that are trying to reintroduce conscription, is that at first there actually is a lot of interest—

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Unfortunately, Madame Normandin has gone way past her time.

[Marta Kepe]

I'm sorry.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Next is Ms. Mathyssen, who's very time sensitive.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Thank you.

I would like to get back to Trump. Actually, it's more about the connection to what we're seeing within NATO allies now and that movement, with the far right being specifically linked to very pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian sentiment. We're seeing it with America. We're seeing it with Hungary a bit now, which is concerning, of course.

Could you expand on that in terms of describing that link and why that exists?

[Dr. Stephen Saideman]

That's a really good question. There are a variety of links between the far right and the Russian government. The Russian government has engaged in significant disinformation efforts that have been facilitating the far right.

Why does the far right find Putin attractive? Part of the far right's endeavour is to delegitimize existing institutions. They're also proto-authoritarian, so they find Putin's efforts to be helpful and they find Putin to be a model. They want to have an authoritarian regime that's far right. They're anti-democratic.

Viktor Orbán has been at the forefront of this. Hungary has led the movement on democratic backsliding. He's been fond of talking about illiberal democracy. He's been very fond of using homophobia, anti-Semitism and other forms of hatred to mobilize support for his regime and to undermine his opponents and to do that in the neighbourhood as well.

That playbook has been imitated by far-right politicians in Europe and North America. It's not an accident these days that trans people are demonized. It's not an accident that anti-Semitism is rising. It's not an accident that Islamophobia is rising. All these things travel together. Putin's ideology is very similar to the ideology by the far-right political movements in the United States, Canada and Europe.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

Does NATO have any sort of actual defence to that within its own internal structures?

[Dr. Stephen Saideman]

Yes and no, in that they have spent a fair amount of time thinking about disinformation. They have a strategic communications centre of excellence in Latvia. They've been talking about disinformation for quite some time. The problem is—I had a graduate student work on this—foreign election interference and that stuff depends crucially on domestic allies, so it really depends on the domestic politics of each member of NATO and whether the right-wing parties will fight against the far right or ally with them. We've seen mixtures of this one way or the other, and it makes a big difference which side the right-wing parties take on this stuff.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

This certainly isn't anything that's new to Canada as well. Even just last week we saw that far-right start-up called Tenet Media. It was a front for Putin propaganda. They've been promoting very anti-Ukrainian messages. They do so about vaccines, residential schools and like you said, anti-LGBTQ+ attacks and anti-trans attacks. They're making videos. They're combining with Rebel media, which does the same, and True North, which does the same. That's part of that larger strategy.

What responsibility do we have here in Canada to defeat that internally as well? How do we do that in a nutshell, in a few minutes?

[Dr. Stephen Saideman]

In the 30 seconds I have left.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

You have more than that. I'll give you my time.