Thank you very much for inviting me to address the committee on the topic of security in the Baltic region.
The security environment in the Baltic region has degraded since Russia's full-scale invasion into Ukraine in February 2022. Since then, Russia's military forces have been focused on fighting in Ukraine, which has decimated its land capabilities previously located near the Baltic borders.
Having said that, Russia has announced plans to restructure its military districts on the borders of the Baltics and Finland, and these plans may be indicative of a trend towards a long-term confrontation between Russia and the west.
Russia also maintains capable and dense air defences in Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg, and coastal defence missiles in Kaliningrad, which could be a potential threat, as they are able to reach into the territories of the Baltic states, Finland and Poland and could interdict maritime commercial activity throughout the maritime area.
At the same time, Russia's hybrid activities in the region have intensified. This is what Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas called a “shadow war” against the west. This war is mainly waged through non-military actions such as disinformation, cyber-attacks, acts of sabotage, psychological pressure, weaponized migration and increased intelligence activities.
Some of these activities are not necessarily new. They're just being scaled up. Those include cyber-attacks and misinformation and disinformation campaigns. Some are more novel—let's put it like that—and these are, for example, attacks on undersea and land critical infrastructure, which have revealed a very important vulnerability: that seabed infrastructure is vitally important for modern economies and is also very poorly monitored and protected.
We also see an increase in low-level sabotage and vandalism activities in the Baltic states and elsewhere in what Lithuanian officials have called “political terrorism”. These seemingly random acts of vandalism or sabotage are likely aimed at creating a sense of uncertainty about what is next and are probably also creating the appearance of growing opposition to support for Ukraine as well.
Russian jamming of global positioning system or GPS signals in the Baltic region has also intensified, disrupting air and sea navigation and affecting numerous commercial flights. Here, I have to admit that some of the more recent examples of GPS jamming in the Baltic region may actually be likely due to Russia simply turning up its anti-drone defences around key population centres in western Russia.
We also, then, have Russian violations of Baltic airspace, which have not only increased but actually, since September 7 of this year, have also diversified. You may have heard that on September 7 a Russian Shahed drone fell down in eastern Latvia.
In light of these events, the Baltic states and also NATO have made a lot of developments and changes. NATO Baltic states are among the top spenders across NATO in terms of defence investment and GDP. They have been investing in their armed forces with exercises and training as well. Finland and Sweden joining NATO has been a very important development for how we can think about the defence and security of the region. NATO now is able to think about the region in a more comprehensive manner and in a more joint manner as well.
In terms of military operations and military preparedness, I also want to highlight the fact that we have done a lot to improve military mobility. It is not completely solved, but it has become easier and faster. The Baltic states are boosting their capabilities through equipment procurements and, as I said, training, and also, in the case of Latvia, through a return to conscription.
Now, a continued allied presence—including Canadian military—will be vital for deterrence and for defence of the region. NATO and the Baltics do need to remain vigilant and to continue to develop the defence capabilities in the region. With time, Russia's measures in the region across NATO will likely adjust as it tailors them to new vulnerabilities. This means that Canada, the alliance and the Baltic states will need to closely monitor Russian attempts to shift red lines and exploit our vulnerabilities and boundaries.
As the Baltic states work on strengthening their defence capabilities, allied support will be crucial in key areas. These include air defence. In terms of addressing hybrid and grey zone threats, a lot of things the Baltic states can do are national responsibilities. However, external support will continue to be important.
I will stop here and answer any questions in the discussion.