Evidence of meeting #113 for National Defence in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was nato.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Colleagues, let's get started. It's 8:15. We have our three witnesses in place.
I'm not interrupting anybody else's conversation, am I?
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON
No, we're paying attention, Mr. Chairman.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
I'm glad. I appreciate that.
We have our witnesses in place. It's 8:15 and we have quorum.
I generally consider it disadvantageous to be coming in virtually, but if Marta Kepe is ready to go, then I will call upon her first.
I do also want to welcome Dominique Arel, chair of Ukrainian studies at University of Ottawa; and Stephen Saideman, Paterson chair in international affairs, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University.
I spent some pleasant time last night with your colleague, Stephanie Carvin.
Colleagues, we have these witnesses for two hours, and I hope to get through three rounds of questions. I propose to go through the first two rounds as is laid out here, and then to go to the second hour with the second set of questioners. That way everybody should be able to get in all of the questions they want to ask to these very excellent witnesses.
With that, we call upon Marta Kepe, the senior defence analyst for RAND.
You have five minutes. Go ahead, please.
Marta Kepe Senior Defense Analyst, RAND, As an Individual
Thank you very much for inviting me to address the committee on the topic of security in the Baltic region.
The security environment in the Baltic region has degraded since Russia's full-scale invasion into Ukraine in February 2022. Since then, Russia's military forces have been focused on fighting in Ukraine, which has decimated its land capabilities previously located near the Baltic borders.
Having said that, Russia has announced plans to restructure its military districts on the borders of the Baltics and Finland, and these plans may be indicative of a trend towards a long-term confrontation between Russia and the west.
Russia also maintains capable and dense air defences in Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg, and coastal defence missiles in Kaliningrad, which could be a potential threat, as they are able to reach into the territories of the Baltic states, Finland and Poland and could interdict maritime commercial activity throughout the maritime area.
At the same time, Russia's hybrid activities in the region have intensified. This is what Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas called a “shadow war” against the west. This war is mainly waged through non-military actions such as disinformation, cyber-attacks, acts of sabotage, psychological pressure, weaponized migration and increased intelligence activities.
Some of these activities are not necessarily new. They're just being scaled up. Those include cyber-attacks and misinformation and disinformation campaigns. Some are more novel—let's put it like that—and these are, for example, attacks on undersea and land critical infrastructure, which have revealed a very important vulnerability: that seabed infrastructure is vitally important for modern economies and is also very poorly monitored and protected.
We also see an increase in low-level sabotage and vandalism activities in the Baltic states and elsewhere in what Lithuanian officials have called “political terrorism”. These seemingly random acts of vandalism or sabotage are likely aimed at creating a sense of uncertainty about what is next and are probably also creating the appearance of growing opposition to support for Ukraine as well.
Russian jamming of global positioning system or GPS signals in the Baltic region has also intensified, disrupting air and sea navigation and affecting numerous commercial flights. Here, I have to admit that some of the more recent examples of GPS jamming in the Baltic region may actually be likely due to Russia simply turning up its anti-drone defences around key population centres in western Russia.
We also, then, have Russian violations of Baltic airspace, which have not only increased but actually, since September 7 of this year, have also diversified. You may have heard that on September 7 a Russian Shahed drone fell down in eastern Latvia.
In light of these events, the Baltic states and also NATO have made a lot of developments and changes. NATO Baltic states are among the top spenders across NATO in terms of defence investment and GDP. They have been investing in their armed forces with exercises and training as well. Finland and Sweden joining NATO has been a very important development for how we can think about the defence and security of the region. NATO now is able to think about the region in a more comprehensive manner and in a more joint manner as well.
In terms of military operations and military preparedness, I also want to highlight the fact that we have done a lot to improve military mobility. It is not completely solved, but it has become easier and faster. The Baltic states are boosting their capabilities through equipment procurements and, as I said, training, and also, in the case of Latvia, through a return to conscription.
Now, a continued allied presence—including Canadian military—will be vital for deterrence and for defence of the region. NATO and the Baltics do need to remain vigilant and to continue to develop the defence capabilities in the region. With time, Russia's measures in the region across NATO will likely adjust as it tailors them to new vulnerabilities. This means that Canada, the alliance and the Baltic states will need to closely monitor Russian attempts to shift red lines and exploit our vulnerabilities and boundaries.
As the Baltic states work on strengthening their defence capabilities, allied support will be crucial in key areas. These include air defence. In terms of addressing hybrid and grey zone threats, a lot of things the Baltic states can do are national responsibilities. However, external support will continue to be important.
I will stop here and answer any questions in the discussion.
Dr. Dominique Arel Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Good morning.
The increasing devastation of the war in Ukraine has brought a degree of clarity on three issues.
First, Ukraine cannot defend itself against glide bombs at or near the front lines, or against ballistic missiles aimed at its cities. It would need 25 Patriot-type air defence systems. It was promised seven and has thus far received even fewer, although we don't have the official number. It's secret.
Second, sanctions against the import of microprocessors, on which guided missiles and bombs are dependent, do not work, largely because China refuses to implement them.
Third, Ukraine cannot win Donbass attrition warfare because all NATO members put together cannot match Russia's annual artillery production, and because the huge Russian casualties are not impacting the stability of the Russian regime.
This dire military disadvantage has led Ukraine to conclude that the best defence is offence. The best protection against daily attacks is to hit at the source. Ukraine already does this with fast-developing attack drones against munition depots—we saw a case yesterday—oil refineries and military airports inside Russia.
However, it could do this with far greater impact if it were to receive permission from the United States to use the long-range missiles it already possesses but which are restricted to legal Ukrainian territories. The U.S. has refused due to a fear of escalation, we are told repeatedly. It would appear, however, that escalation is already upon us. Russia escalated before a decision was made regarding the use of these long-range missiles. Escalation is associated with the threat that Russia may resort to nuclear weapons. This threat is empty. Ukraine invaded a part of Kursk oblast, and Russia responded militarily through conventional means and politically by pretending that nothing serious happened.
A more credible threat is for Russia to break the taboo of nuclear proliferation by assisting Iran and North Korea. There are worrying signs that the latter may already be in motion—emphasis on “may”.
A second threat is Russia helping Iran target American assets in the Middle East. Iran just sent ballistic missiles to Russia in a “dramatic escalation”—in the words of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken. The question is, what is Iran getting of great value in return? Once again, this escalation appears to precede the American decision over long-range missiles. Putin claimed last week that, since Ukrainians could not use these missiles on their own and has to rely on U.S. satellite data in particular, this would make NATO a direct party to the war, yet these missiles have long hit in and around Crimea, which Putin considers not only legal territory but eternal Russian territory. The response has been strictly conventional.
A third element of threat—my colleague Marta Kepe mentioned it at length in her presentation—is the threat of attacking communications, energy and military infrastructure in the west, and provocations over crossing through the air, as with Romania the other day.
The argument has been made that these long-range missiles will not be a game-changer. This is beside the point. What the missiles could do is considerably raise the Russian military cost of attacking Ukraine. Deterrence is ultimately the only way to provide Ukraine with security guarantees.
Thank you.
Dr. Stephen Saideman Paterson Chair in International Affairs, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, As an Individual
Thank you for the invitation to be here.
I have to start with some caveats and a call for humility.
My work started out on international relations of ethnic conflict, so I know something about irredentism, which is, in part, driving what Russia is doing these days. I have moved on to alliances and civil-military relations. I am not a Russia, Ukraine or Baltics expert. I have been to Riga a couple of times in the past couple of years. I am more of a Canadian defence person.
When I was asked in 2022 how long Ukraine would last, I underestimated Ukraine's resolve, preparedness and leadership. I also overestimated Russia's military. I need to focus on what we got wrong and what we got right, on what has been consistent and what has been more fluid and more uncertain.
The greatest uncertainty we face in Ukraine, in Russia and in the Baltics is really in Washington, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin and all those other places. Things will change quite remarkably, depending on the election. If Harris wins, we should expect the status quo to remain the same, depending in part on whether the Democrats pick up the House and keep the Senate. If Trump wins, the future is bleak everywhere, especially in Ukraine, as there is no substitute for the U.S.'s support. Similarly, if Trump wins, NATO either will cease to exist or will exist only formally. The commitment of article 5 would no longer be relevant. There is no Trump-proofing NATO. I can talk more about that in the Q and A.
That gets to a very important dynamic that I think has been underappreciated for the security situation in the Baltics and eastern Europe, which is that Russia, under Putin, has been engaged in all kinds of aggressive behaviour, as has been mentioned thus far, but there has not been one single conventional attack across the bright, shiny line that divides NATO from non-NATO countries. That matters a great deal to Putin. As long as the U.S. continues to be led by those who support the alliance, the Baltics' security is actually pretty good; although, the folks in the region will disagree with that.
Canada, along with much of NATO, has invested seriously for the long term. We used to dodge the idea of permanent basing, but we no longer are respecting the long-dead NATO-Russia founding act. We've moved from having enough forces in the region to deter the Russians to potentially defeat an attack upon the Baltics. We have learned much from the Ukraine war about our limitations—not nearly having enough artillery or ammunition for instance—and about Russia's limitations. Moreover, Russia's military is very much depleted, as the first speaker noted. We can have an argument about how quickly Russia can reconstitute its military, but right now, there are far fewer tanks, artillery and infantry on the other side of the border. To be sure, Russian air power and sea power, aside from the Black Sea fleet, is far less depleted by the war.
Where is Canada in all of this? Canada has made a huge contribution in training the Ukraine military before the second invasion. The effort in Latvia has been outstanding in terms of Canada's having the hardest job because we moved last, so we got the smallest contributions from many countries that were not the best militaries in the alliance. The CAF has managed this quite well. The enlargement from battle groups to brigades has put even more pressure on Canada since it means a much bigger commitment, which, in turn, means more troops rotating through Latvia more frequently.
However, Swedish membership in NATO means many more high-quality troops in Latvia, potentially. It promised some troops. The question remains of how many troops can Canada sustain in Latvia. As I said, I've been to the battle group's HQ a couple of times. It is clear that the frequent rotations are stressing the force. It may make sense to have longer tours so that there are fewer people going back and forth, and to build infrastructure for them so that time can pass more easily.
We might want to think about the Cold War model of having families joining their troops in Latvia. That would be expensive with schools, day care and creative ways to keep the spouses employed, but it's not clear that having 1,500 troops come and go every six months is sustainable. For future reference, Canada and other democracies need to be more careful about the numbers we promise. Our army is simply not that big.
Speaking of limitations, our small military simply does not have that much stuff to give to Ukraine. We could consider what some other countries have done, which is to give away entire segments of their armed forces. We have repeatedly reconsidered whether we should have tanks over the past 20 or 30 years. We could, for instance, give all of our tanks, working and broken, to Ukraine and have it handle them, and we could realign our force. In the field right now, this has happened mostly at the battle group I saw in 2023 in Latvia, which was centred not around Canadian tanks but around those from our partners. However, given our own recruitment and retention crisis, and our slow procurement processes, it is unlikely for Canada to make that big decision.
One key underrated change in the region is that we are no longer participating in the rotation of air patrolling. We used to have six packs of six CF-18s rotate into and out of Romania and fly around the region. That was a major contribution to the air situation, and we're no longer doing that.
The one thing I want to point out that hasn't come up is the civil-military relations of the region, which is that we need to keep an eye on what Zelenskyy is doing with his officers, whether he's maintaining good civilian control of the military or whether he's appointing people that he likes for their political favours. That's just one challenge.
Another challenge which has come up is when the Russian military will mutiny. It is how the Russian involvement in World War I ended. Given the bloodshed they've suffered, that is one possibility that could be happening sometime, given the abuse that those soldiers have faced.
I'll cut it off now.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Thank you, Dr. Saideman.
We'll go to our six-minute round. I have MPs Gallant, Lapointe, Normandin and Mathyssen.
Mrs. Gallant, you have six minutes.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON
My first question is for Madam Kepe.
Minister Blair announced in February of this year $46 million to acquire new counter-drone equipment for Latvia to defend against class-one drones. Is this new system sufficient to detect and destroy incoming Russian Lancet kamikaze drones?
Senior Defense Analyst, RAND, As an Individual
I cannot tell you off the top of my head specifically what type of drone it will be effective against.
What I do want to say is that, in fact, when I spoke about the capabilities that Baltic states really need assistance with, they are working on counter-drone capabilities. Assistance in terms of counter-drone capabilities is very important. I mean counter-drones against a number of different types of drones, starting from very small ones, because those can be used, as we know, also to do attacks. We see plenty of examples of those from both sides in the war in Ukraine, all the way to much larger, much more sophisticated, complicated drones as well. The Shahed would be, let's say, a bigger one.
I would say the counter-drone capability is needed across the spectrum.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON
What kind of drone was recovered in Latvia? Was it a kamikaze or surveillance drone?
Senior Defense Analyst, RAND, As an Individual
That would be the Iranian Shahed drone.
The Shahed drone is basically like a loitering munition type of unmanned aerial system. You may refer to it also as a kamikaze drone or as a suicide drone. It's basically an autonomous flying weapon. That is what was recovered in Latvia. The investigation is still ongoing, so we only know what has been in the media—
Senior Defense Analyst, RAND, As an Individual
—but we know that they have recovered it there.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON
Okay.
Mr. Arel, with the lack of ground-based, long-range anti-air capabilities like Patriot missiles or NASAMS for our troops, especially defending Latvia, vulnerable to the high-altitude aircraft like Tu-160 and Tu-95 bombers, cruise missiles and hypersonic missiles, how can we defend ourselves from these threats without any plan from our government to acquire long-range SAMs to counter these threats?
Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
Is the question related to the Baltics or to Ukraine?
Conservative
Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
I can't really address the Latvia situation. I'll leave that to my colleagues and address Ukraine.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON
All right.
Would Mr. Saideman be able to address that?
Paterson Chair in International Affairs, Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, As an Individual
I could try.
I would say that the Latvia situation is a multilateral effort, and we would be depending on our allies for the help in air defence. The United States has air defence capabilities in the region. The British and the Germans have some capabilities. The benefit of the Baltics region is that it's small, so the threats that are facing us are not only facing us but they're facing our allies in the region. We don't have the capability. They're currently trying to reinvest in that capability, but no, we don't have that ability ourselves at the moment.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON
This question may be for Mr. Arel.
There's also the ground-based air defence project, GBAD, that claims to defeat threats posed by rockets, artillery, mortar munitions, air-to-surface missiles and drones with attack aircraft and helicopter relegated to second targets.
Why hasn't our government seen the need to counter threats from high-altitude bombers, given their ability to launch cruise missiles and, more worryingly, hypersonic missiles? That would apply to Canada as well as Latvia.
Chairholder, Chair of Ukrainian Studies, University of Ottawa, As an Individual
What I can say regarding Canada, from my Ukraine vantage point, is that I don't see a political will, really, to engage or to make major changes to what Canada can provide abroad and can produce for itself, as you referred to. Canada promised, 20 or 21 months ago, a system in the family of Patriot systems, and it has still not been delivered. There have been decisions or non-decisions regarding budget reallocations for the military. We are familiar with the problem. Canada is a laggard in the infamous 2% threshold, and that's been two and a half years' going.
From a Ukraine perspective, Canada's not alone. A lot of promises are made, but then the delivery is very slow. The reality right now is that Ukraine cannot defend itself against these systematic attacks. That's the escalation. The escalation is that Russia is doing more of these attacks on civilian targets, which is why the strategy in Ukraine now has to be dual—not just to think about how we can defend ourselves while we're being destroyed but to go on the offence.
September 19th, 2024 / 8:40 a.m.
Liberal
Viviane LaPointe Liberal Sudbury, ON
Thank you, Chair.
My question is for Ms. Kepe. In your opening statement you talked about the “shadow war” against the west. Can you expand on that and provide this committee with further examples?