National Defence Committee on Sept. 24th, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Colleagues, I see that everyone is in the room; we have quorum. I don't think we have to wait out our time. We'll be adding about 10 minutes to the clock, given that we have a late start.

Again, I want to thank Dr. Huebert and Dr. Massie for their patience with us. As you know, we don't always control our own time. I don't need to make an introduction of either Dr. Huebert or Professor Massie, because they've been faithful witnesses before this committee. We appreciate your making yourselves available.

With that, I'll just call on Professor Huebert for his opening five minutes.

[Dr. Robert Huebert, Professor, Centre for Military, Security and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary, As an Individual]

Thank you very much. I very much appreciate the chance to appear before the committee to share some thoughts on the most recent attempts to develop a Canadian defence policy.

I'd like to begin first of all by stating what is good with the policy. The first thing, of course, is the clear recognition and identification of the threat. In Canada, we've had a bit of a tendency to try to soft-pedal what some of the issues are, particularly when we are thinking on the geopolitical threats. Many of the challenges that are in fact identified within the defence update have their genesis in the period of around 2005 to 2008, so it is both timely and important that the very dire nature of the threat has been identified.

The second element is that, of course, there are considerable promises to provide for very needed pieces of equipment. Again, these are all things that are needed. While we might criticize it for being late, at least we are talking about the pieces of materiel, such as the update to the NORAD modernization, along with the development of the modernization of our submarine fleet.

The major criticism I have, however, is that the document still remains a tactical document, when, in fact, what is needed is a strategic document. What do I mean by that? Again, the document itself talks about the different pieces of kit that we will be getting. It talks in great detail in terms of what some of the new pieces of equipment are that are needed to meet the new geopolitical threats that are identified, specifically the threats posed by Russia, China and Iran. On that front, the tactical side is obviously something that is necessary, but we also need to understand why we are pursuing these tactical needs, and that is the strategic environment.

What I would suggest is that while we talk about the rise of these adversaries, it misses one of the most critical points that we are facing, that the new geopolitical environment, really, at the heart of it, is talking about a transformation of the traditional international arena of nuclear deterrence. What we are seeing is the combination of the rise of the authoritative states with expansionary desires and the weapons systems that they have been developing since 2005-08, which have been enduring in a series of conflicts to give them the capability. For example, when we talk about the various wars, with the Russians in Georgia and the Ukrainians and Russia, we really should be thinking about it in the context of the Russian war beginning in 2008 against NATO, because that is really what it is.

The most important point is one I want to have the committee really focus on. The actions of the Russians, the Chinese and, increasingly, the Iranians represent a modernization of their nuclear capabilities, their delivery systems and, most chilling, their policies. When we go and examine what they are talking about—in terms of hypersonics, the stealth, the speed, the disruption of our political will through social media attacks—really what we are talking about is a consideration of these enemy states to not only continue in terms of the maintenance of nuclear deterrence—and that still remains the critical part for the forces of all three countries—but also their ability to increasingly talk about and have the ability to launch a strike using nuclear weapons.

The last point that as Canadians we have to be very aware of is something that we always sidestep. Because of this changing nuclear environment, the Americans are very much engaged. They have already engaged in a $10-trillion modernization of their nuclear forces. We know that they already are building a new nuclear missile-carrying submarine class; they have a new bomber, the B-21; and they have new missiles that will be replacing them, the Sentinels.

All of this is to say that if Canada does not begin thinking strategically, we run two major risks. We run the risk that we are the weak link in regard to our enemies. If they see us as a weak link within whatever format that they are thinking in terms of the possibility of a nuclear exchange, that places all Canadians at risk. We also have a second problem that we must be aware of. The moment the Americans believe that we are also part of the weak link, that will be very detrimental, not only for our security but also for our economics and all of the other special relationships with the Americans.

The only way we can, in fact, endeavour to address these dire threats is to begin to think strategically, not in terms of what we need for submarines or meeting a 3% GDP rate, but how, in fact, we can strategically meet this dire geographical problem or crisis we are now facing, which is in many ways akin to what we faced in 1938.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Professor Massie, go ahead.

[Dr. Justin Massie, Professor, Université du Québec à Montréal, As an Individual]

Mr. Chair, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting me to speak to you today about Canada's updated defence policy.

First, the update is to be applauded simply for the fact that it has taken place, as it is unusual in Canada to produce a defence policy on a regular basis. Its greatest virtue is to provide reasonable defence guidance to future governments, and to commit to an update every four years. If this is achieved, it will be a huge success, because national thinking on defence is unfortunately all too often intermittent and partisan.

That said, I'd like to point out the update's three main shortcomings.

The first shortcoming is its strategic inconsistency. Indeed, 89% of the announced sums will take place between 2030 and 2044. There's clearly no sense of urgency in the face of international threats. Yet Canada faces three sources of threats in the next five years: the end of the war in Ukraine, possible Russian aggression in Latvia and possible Chinese aggression against Taiwan.

These three scenarios call for urgent investments in the Canadian Armed Forces, not by 2044. Peace in Ukraine requires the supply and co-production of weapons in Ukraine, and the offer of tangible security guarantees. Furthermore, preventing Russian aggression in Latvia requires not sample tripwire forces, but mass volume capabilities to win a high-intensity war. Finally, Chinese aggression against Taiwan could lead the U.S. into a war with China and would require Canada to defend the Northeast Pacific zone.

None of the investments planned for the next five years in the update suggest such strategic planning. First of all, a large proportion of the commitments over the next five years relate solely to maintaining current operational capabilities. Next, several urgent capabilities are not budgeted for, including drones, submarines, artillery, tanks and air defences. What's more, investments to increase ammunition production will only start to be significant from 2026-27. Yet Canada has earmarked only $1.6 billion over five years in military aid for Ukraine, including just $320 million this year, while its share of NATO’s military aid pledge for 2025 alone is $1.8 billion. Finally, the update does not propose a concrete plan to address the personnel shortage and reform the military procurement process.

In short, Canada has a 20-year policy to deal with tangible threats within a five-year timeframe.

The second shortcoming is the lack of an industrial policy. The update does not prioritize the industrial sectors in which Canada should concentrate its investments in its domestic industry. Only the production of ammunition is mentioned. Furthermore, the lessons of the war in Ukraine and growing protectionism around the world demonstrate the need for greater autonomy and mass production capacity. Canada cannot develop a military industry in all sectors, so prioritization is necessary. In my opinion, priority should be given to sectors essential to the defence of Canadian territory, i.e., the air force and the navy, including mass production of maritime and aerial drones. This requires major investments and strategic positioning in value chains, starting now.

The third shortcoming is the lack of strategic choices. The update continues to propose a sampling model based on the idea that the Canadian Armed Forces should have a little bit of everything. Canada’s size and the high attrition rate from high-intensity warfare suggest that capability choices need to be made. It is not possible for Canada to support a high-intensity war effort on land in Eastern Europe, in the air in North America and at sea in East Asia. Priority should be given to large, diversified air and sea fleets to support attrition and the demands of high-intensity warfare. The role of the army should be to integrate into foreign multinational brigades, providing specialized capabilities.

Thank you for your attention and consideration.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you.

In our first round, we will have Mr. Bezan, Madam Lambropoulos, Madame Normandin and Ms. Mathyssen.

Mr. Bezan, you're up for six minutes, please.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I want to thank our witnesses for appearing today. They are definitely not painting a rosy picture of what the future holds for us.

To both our witnesses, were you at all consulted by the government when it was doing the defence policy update?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

No, I wasn't.

[Dr. Justin Massie]

I took part at some level of discussion, not formally but because I'm the co-director of the MINDS program network, so I had some encounters with people crafting the policy but no direct consultations.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

Other than knowing people who were actually in the department writing the policy, then, the government didn't reach out to you for your actual input.

Now we are hearing that the government keeps saying that we're going to hit 2% even though there's no budget for it and it doesn't show up in the defence policy update. It was announcements that were made in Washington during the NATO summit, and, of course, they were trying to save face. Every time it's been asked if they could share the math on where they're going to increase it, they've been hiding behind cabinet confidences.

Actually, if you look at the briefing notes that were given to us by the Library of Parliament researchers, you will see that they actually say that the DND and the CAF spending authorities for the year 2023-24 total just over $30 billion, accounting for only 0.95% of GDP. That's direct spending out of the Department of National Defence. Of course, in 2017, the Liberals started doing their creative accounting, adding in veterans' pensions, our civilian Coast Guard vessels and things like that, which actually aren't even a paramilitary fleet. That's the only way you can pad the numbers up to 1.3% for that year.

With the limited financial resources that have been invested—and you talk about strategic planning—where does air defence fit into this?

Professor Huebert, you talked about the nuclear threat, the missile threat. Where does Canada make those investments in that list of priorities?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

That's an excellent question because, again, when we think about the new nuclear environment that we are in, where the indications are increasingly that we are moving from strictly one of nuclear deterring—that is, to stop a nuclear exchange ever occurring because the mutual assured destruction scares everybody from acting—to one where people are asking how we actually do it.... The way we deter it going into the future is that we have to ensure that the air defence systems that we are getting are, in fact, able to convince the Russians and the Chinese that there simply is no chance of successfully launching a surprise attack on the North American continent. The problem is that since 2005 to 2008, the Russians, followed by the Chinese, have very carefully been developing weapons systems that are designed to basically destroy, outwit and out-think our systems of defence. General VanHerck, the previous commander of NORAD, has stated publicly several times that American systems are having difficulty staying up with what the Chinese and the Russians have.

What we need, of course, is to be part of a system of aerospace defence. This is where we have to get beyond just simply saying, “Hey, we're going to buy a bunch of F-35s, and that's good enough.” We need to have the F-35s that can be refuelled, that can maintain their connection. They need to be able to communicate, and that's part of the satellite promises that are, of course, included in the update. They also have to be fully integrated with the Americans. Without that, you simply do not have the time and the technological capability to respond to what we are seeing are the clear capabilities in the advancements of the delivery systems that the Chinese and the Russians have.

One of the problems that we still have in Canada is that we think in World War II terms. We think, “If we only bought more Spitfires, we would be making an important contribution to World War II.” The reality is that in the coming war, you have to be getting a system of systems, so it means all of the above. It means the satellite connectivity, the over-the-horizon radars that are promised, and the fact that you have the refuelling, the fighting, and a point that Justin made, which is, of course, the ability to take hits. You have to have a capability so that if you get hit at the first onslaught of a conflict, you have the ability to replace it. It's not just simply, “Okay, they took out the over-the-horizon radar,” and then we're blinded at that point, or “They took out the 15 F-35s that we had stationed to the north, and we can't resupply or refuel.”

We really have to shift the mindset in thinking about the air defence, that it is not about an individual piece of kit. It's about the system, and it is about integrating with the Americans 100% of the effort. That is expensive, and it is politically unappealing. However, if we're going to defend, we need it.

[James Bezan, Conservative, Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman, MB]

In the last few seconds I have left here, last week at a Mackenzie Institute forum on security in the Arctic, one of our former colleagues, Andrew Leslie, a former Liberal MP and a former army commander, said, in reference to U.S. politicians:

That is their concern and dismay over Canada's paltry contributions to international peace and security and the unacceptable—and I'll use that word again, unacceptable—levels of money spent on defence capability.

In both your expert opinions, does the DPU have enough change on the expenditure side in this trajectory?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

We're going to have to hold those expert opinions, because we are at six minutes for questions and answers.

With that, we'll turn to Madam Lambropoulos.

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to both of our witnesses for being here to answer some of our questions on this subject today.

You both spoke about the importance of being strategic with our funding in this particular area, and you spoke about the fact that other countries, especially our enemies, are looking at how they can use their capabilities and work together to use nuclear capabilities in the future. I'm hearing from you that the DPU didn't really touch on that. Do you have a specific recommendation for what you would have liked to see in that regard in the DPU?

I'll give you each a chance to answer that question.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

What we needed within the document is the acknowledgement that we are not just talking about numbers. In Canada, we have fixated on the 3% when, in fact, if you really look at what our allies are asking us to do, it's to be prepared to fight a war. The 3% is the political answer to make sure governments are doing something, but if we look at all of our European allies, their defence policies are really about how we are going to engage in the fight.

To what you asked about what we specifically needed in it, we needed some discussion of the fact that we will, in all probability, be facing a real shooting war that may or may not involve nuclear weapons. Do we have the ability to mobilize? Do we have any indication we have learned lessons from our hard experience with COVID about how we mobilize the entire population? Do we have the ability to provide more people when people are killed on the front? Do we have the capability to provide the necessary munitions? What happens if part of North America actually suffers some form of hit, either from conventional or from nuclear forces?

None of this is brought forward, because we hate thinking about it, but the probability is that if we don't start thinking about it now, our enemies will think we're not thinking about it, and we will not be prepared.

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

Mr. Massie, would you like to answer the question?

[Dr. Justin Massie]

I made three points. First, over the next five years, we should be investing much more urgently in air defence and drones. It's going to take far too long to build that capacity with the conflicts that are coming.

Second, there is the absence of an industrial policy. There has been no consultation to say that we have to ramp up production capacity and jobs in these strategic sectors in Canada. There's a huge gap there.

Finally, there is also the need to make choices, to change this attitude of always doing a little bit of everything and spreading out expenditures over 20 years so as to avoid difficult political choices, that is to say, prioritizing the defence of Canadian territory rather than having a smattering of forces that do a bit of everything everywhere.

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

Okay.

Thank you.

Since the DPU was announced, have either of you come across in your research how our NATO allies are receiving the DPU? You've spoken a bit about what they would expect to see, but has there been any concrete commentary or anything that has been put out there on how they have received it?

[Dr. Justin Massie]

What I've understood in my exchanges with NATO representatives was that they were relieved that Canada finally had a plan to reach the threshold of 2% of its GDP for defence, but that 2032 seemed to have been pulled out of a hat without any concrete plan to achieve it.

So Canada's credibility is very weak, because we made that commitment more than 10 years ago and it still hasn't been met. Nor will it be in the short term. I think our credibility is weakened because what we say is considered meaningless if we don't follow through. The plan announced last April is a 20-year plan that is not binding on the current government, but on a number of future governments.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

I haven't heard or seen anything written, and that has led me to an initial hypothesis that we are becoming increasingly irrelevant to the thoughts of our allies, and I would include our friends in the Asia-Pacific region.

If, in fact, we had not developed the habit of saying good things.... We can say that “Strong, Secure, Engaged” made a whole host of very important promises that, if acted upon, would have been very useful.

The update that we had back in 2022 about modernization and the subsequent documentation have led me to conclude—since I'm not hearing anything from my contacts within NATO—that Canada is simply devolving itself out of any consideration.

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

Okay, thank you for those responses. I have one question.

You spoke a bit about the fact that Canada will be seen as the weakest link, and I guess I'm asking you if there are other countries that are doing a lot better. Of course there are, but would you consider us currently as being the weakest link?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Again, I'm going to have say, in the same way Mr. Bezan was treated, it's six minutes for a question and answer. I'm sure that both of you are very skilled at working in responses that may or may not be that direct.

Ms. Normandin, you have the floor for six minutes.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Professor Massie, you wrote an article entitled “Parliamentarizing war: explaining legislative votes on Canadian military deployments”, which appeared in 2023. In it, you mention that before launching missions, the Trudeau and Harper governments both called on Parliament more often than the Mulroney government had done before, for fear of being blamed for missed missions.

In order to solve a problem, you have to be able to identify its root cause. You identified three main shortcomings in Canada's defence policy update. Are these due to the fact that our leaders are afraid of upsetting the public, that they do not take the threats that have already been identified seriously, or that they are unable to set priorities for government spending in general?

Do you think there are one or more reasons for these shortcomings?

[Dr. Justin Massie]

The reasons are clearly political. They're not related to capacity. As the 10th largest economy in the world, we would theoretically be able to make the choices that Denmark, a very small country, is able to make.

It's all about politics. We tend to let our allies take care of Canada's defence, thinking that they will decide for us and that we will follow them. If they invade Afghanistan or Iraq, we'll tag along. If there is a war in Ukraine, we will participate. However, we don't think about our needs. This lack of reflection is the first factor.

Second, there is no sense of priority coming out of the Prime Minister's Office. Since this file is clearly not an important issue for the leader of the government, it's not at the top of the pile. The issue is resolved when there is too much pressure coming from the allies, not as a result of a reflection on what is necessary for Canada to ensure its defence and meet its commitments.

As for Canada's influence on the international scene, the fact that we engage, sign documents and make major statements without there being any follow-up on those actions makes the situation even more problematic. It hurts us enormously, not only in defence matters, but on all other foreign policy issues.

If we tell a future U.S. administration that we still don't have a plan to spend 2% of our GDP on defence, but we are crossing our fingers and hope to have submarines in 2032—which is impossible, given the time it takes here for decision-making and procurement—we won't be credible. In our negotiations to reduce the tariffs that will be imposed by a Republican administration, we will not be able to demonstrate in any way our credibility on this issue.

So we're not just talking about an impact on national defence. I think it's important to understand that our underinvestment has a major impact on our influence and credibility internationally.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

Since you are talking about submarines, let me ask you a question about that very topic. The update was released last spring, and the announcement for the submarines was made at the NATO summit. Submarine procurement is a particularly complex file, however. It's hard to imagine that this could be done on the back of a napkin.

In your opinion, does this somewhat hurried announcement of the submarine procurement process also take the shine off Canada's reputation?

Might there still be a positive impact? Some hostile actors, such as Russia, might think that they will have less scope to move around the Arctic, in particular, since Canada intends to invest a little more in maritime surveillance.

I would appreciate it if both of you could answer those questions.

[Dr. Justin Massie]

In terms of the impact of submarine procurement on the thinking of the Chinese and the Russians, I would think they would decide to see what things look like 15 years down the road and maybe adjust their behaviour at that point in time.

In the short term, China is concerned about issues other than those related to Canadian submarines. As for Russia, as you know, it is completely focused on something else, that is to say trying to occupy territory on its border. I don't think there is an impact there.

However, our allies can say that Canada does want to invest in this capability, which could enable it to join pillar 2 of the AUKUS pact. There may be a connection between the two decisions. Again, I think they will want more than just an announcement; it will be a question of waiting and seeing if investments and choices are indeed made. The current government is running out of time. What it announces today will basically depend on its successor.