Mr. Chair, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting me to speak to you today about Canada's updated defence policy.
First, the update is to be applauded simply for the fact that it has taken place, as it is unusual in Canada to produce a defence policy on a regular basis. Its greatest virtue is to provide reasonable defence guidance to future governments, and to commit to an update every four years. If this is achieved, it will be a huge success, because national thinking on defence is unfortunately all too often intermittent and partisan.
That said, I'd like to point out the update's three main shortcomings.
The first shortcoming is its strategic inconsistency. Indeed, 89% of the announced sums will take place between 2030 and 2044. There's clearly no sense of urgency in the face of international threats. Yet Canada faces three sources of threats in the next five years: the end of the war in Ukraine, possible Russian aggression in Latvia and possible Chinese aggression against Taiwan.
These three scenarios call for urgent investments in the Canadian Armed Forces, not by 2044. Peace in Ukraine requires the supply and co-production of weapons in Ukraine, and the offer of tangible security guarantees. Furthermore, preventing Russian aggression in Latvia requires not sample tripwire forces, but mass volume capabilities to win a high-intensity war. Finally, Chinese aggression against Taiwan could lead the U.S. into a war with China and would require Canada to defend the Northeast Pacific zone.
None of the investments planned for the next five years in the update suggest such strategic planning. First of all, a large proportion of the commitments over the next five years relate solely to maintaining current operational capabilities. Next, several urgent capabilities are not budgeted for, including drones, submarines, artillery, tanks and air defences. What's more, investments to increase ammunition production will only start to be significant from 2026-27. Yet Canada has earmarked only $1.6 billion over five years in military aid for Ukraine, including just $320 million this year, while its share of NATO’s military aid pledge for 2025 alone is $1.8 billion. Finally, the update does not propose a concrete plan to address the personnel shortage and reform the military procurement process.
In short, Canada has a 20-year policy to deal with tangible threats within a five-year timeframe.
The second shortcoming is the lack of an industrial policy. The update does not prioritize the industrial sectors in which Canada should concentrate its investments in its domestic industry. Only the production of ammunition is mentioned. Furthermore, the lessons of the war in Ukraine and growing protectionism around the world demonstrate the need for greater autonomy and mass production capacity. Canada cannot develop a military industry in all sectors, so prioritization is necessary. In my opinion, priority should be given to sectors essential to the defence of Canadian territory, i.e., the air force and the navy, including mass production of maritime and aerial drones. This requires major investments and strategic positioning in value chains, starting now.
The third shortcoming is the lack of strategic choices. The update continues to propose a sampling model based on the idea that the Canadian Armed Forces should have a little bit of everything. Canada’s size and the high attrition rate from high-intensity warfare suggest that capability choices need to be made. It is not possible for Canada to support a high-intensity war effort on land in Eastern Europe, in the air in North America and at sea in East Asia. Priority should be given to large, diversified air and sea fleets to support attrition and the demands of high-intensity warfare. The role of the army should be to integrate into foreign multinational brigades, providing specialized capabilities.
Thank you for your attention and consideration.