National Defence Committee on Sept. 24th, 2024

[Marcus Powlowski, Liberal, Thunder Bay—Rainy River, ON]

I want to ask a bit about recruitment and what we're doing to address the problem of recruitment. It seems to be a big issue.

In the last meeting, we talked to some analysts who said that Canada would find it difficult to sustain our deployment of 1,900 troops in Latvia, which is pretty astounding given that we're a population of 40 million people.

The policy update does talk a bit about recruitment. It doesn't say a whole heck of a lot about it, though. My understanding is that we're trying to grow our forces to 71,500, and there's a shortfall of 15,000. Minister Blair says it's 16,500. General Eyre said we need 30,000 more military personnel, yet, if you look at our recruitment for 2023-24, we had almost 71,000 applications and only 4,000 were accepted. Moreover, when it comes to people with permanent residence status, they had 21,000 applications and 76 were accepted.

The report mentions a couple things like new probationary periods and re-evaluating the medical requirements.

How big of an issue is this, and what do we have to do to address the issue?

I'm not sure which of you to ask. Could both or either of you respond?

[Dr. Justin Massie]

I can start, if I may.

This is a major issue. No matter how many pieces of equipment we want to buy, if there is no one to operate them, they will be completely useless. So personnel is at the heart of a defence policy.

The problem is not simply the shortage of 15,000 soldiers that you mentioned, but the fact that, if we want to expand the force, we need more than the 71,000 authorized soldiers. In addition, there is no plan to increase the size of the Canadian Armed Forces to a level comparable to that of the Cold War, when there was only one front, the European front. We are heading into a world where the fight will be on two perhaps even three fronts: the Arctic, Europe and the Asia-Pacific, with fewer soldiers than we used to have.

This shortage does not seem to be taken seriously because, as you noted, the update makes no mention of any concrete plans to increase the number of soldiers, nor does there seem to be any sense of urgency to increase the number of soldiers in the Canadian Armed Forces.

I fear that the problem is unfortunately more difficult to solve than the one related to the need to inject money into the Department of National Defence.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

There are three things at the heart of your question, sir.

The first, of course, is that your statistics speak for it; we have Canadians who want to join the forces. Furthermore, the more successful we are at actually addressing those who are willing to step forward and say they want to come in, the more we know there is a multiplier effect. Once they actually successfully get in, they talk to people in their communities and people there start saying, hey, that's a pretty neat job, and maybe that's something they want to do.

That existing number that you quote us is in fact an indication that this is not a problem of reaching Canadians. It's often portrayed as having to allow people to have long hair or having to relax the dress codes. That's not the issue. Let me be very clear on it. We have the people stepping up to do it.

There are two problems. The first one is that our forces are stretched so thin that we can't dedicate the necessary personnel to say, “Okay, how do we bring these people in? How do we train them?” Anecdotally, I have a number of students who applied to join the military. They signed up and they passed the medicals, and then they were sitting for a year or two before they got the call back. Once again, I don't know if that is indicative of everyone, but I have talked to enough students to think this is a serious problem.

The second element is that we have allowed perfection and a fear of failure, i.e., letting the one or two bad apples in means that we have to have such a perfect system that we're not willing to.... We need numbers. We need a system that says, instead of being perfect, instead of having everybody screened and examined so carefully, we have to loosen that up and accept the risk that comes with it.

I would argue it's much more important to get the numbers up, to have that sustainability, to get those communities involved rather than saying, oh, we had that one person that the Ottawa Citizen said was a military person. How could the military ever have allowed that one individual in?

I think we have to change the mindset on that, and we have to do it right now.

[Marcus Powlowski, Liberal, Thunder Bay—Rainy River, ON]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Ms. Normandin, you have two and a half minutes.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

One comment we often hear about procurement is the fact that we have to operate more and more quickly, given the speed at which technology is evolving.

When it comes to new technology, there seems to be a lack of flexibility and speed in Canadian procurement. We are often told that a problem exists and that we need specific technology to solve it. When the technology exists, it takes years of bureaucracy. Often, a stakeholder is added to the process, such as Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada.

Can you suggest any solutions that could lighten the bureaucratic side of procurement when it comes to new technology?

[Dr. Justin Massie]

I think we need an industrial policy. If Canada were to establish one, there would be daily exchanges with people in the industry. It would not just be when we need to discuss a contract and we make a request for information to see what is available. Then it takes up to two years to get the information and another 10 years to actually get what you need. For example, the drones that Canada has purchased belong to an outdated generation of technology, and yet they will be used for future conflicts.

We need to be having a daily conversation with people in the industry, with Canada saying it is prioritizing aeronautics because it is an economic powerhouse, helps support the artificial intelligence and hi-tech sectors, and contributes to national security.

The answers to the questions about what exists and what technologies are available and can be produced in Canada will already be known. We will then be able to say that we will make preliminary orders to acquire a few prototypes. If that works out, we will be able to make a bulk order.

It's something you have to do on a daily basis. We can't wait 15 years, realize that our entire fleet is becoming obsolete and then decide to buy everything at the same time.

I hope that this lack of planning will be corrected in the defence policy update. If we only conduct a review every four years, we will always be asking ourselves questions. Your work on the committee will be essential in keeping this information updated daily. However, until the relationship between industry and the Department of National Defence is strengthened, this conversation will always be happening too late.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Could targeting dual-use products more closely also be a potential solution, considering that things can move more quickly if dual-use products are developed?

[Dr. Justin Massie]

That is absolutely the case. Think of drones. They will be used in both a civilian and military capacity. The military applications are different, of course, but it's the same type of aircraft equipment. The same goes for artificial intelligence and other technologies.

I do believe that Canada will probably not be able to produce all of the equipment. That is the case for submarines, for example. However, certain pieces of equipment for the communications system or the weapons system, whatever it may be, can be produced using expertise that has been established in the civilian sector, expertize that can then be used by the military. To know that, you have to be in contact with people in the industry that produces these capabilities, or tell them that, 15 years from now, Canada wants an industry in this area, because it is essential not only in terms of national economic production, but also national security.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

You'll have to leave it there.

Ms. Mathyssen, you have two and a half minutes.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

I want to jump in on a very important element, though, for your supply chain, and this is a solution—

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Excuse me, Dr. Huebert. I'd love to have you jump in, believe me, but I have a lineup I'm trying to organize here. If you could work it in later somehow or another, I'd appreciate it.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Just remember the supply chain. I do have something important to say on that.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I love supply chains, as my colleagues well know.

Ms. Mathyssen, you have two and a half minutes.

[Lindsay Mathyssen, NDP, London—Fanshawe, ON]

I'll tell you what, if I can make it work for you on supply chains, I will.

I want to follow up, Dr. Huebert, on your point about taking in more people and taking the risk. I am concerned, though. We certainly have seen, in terms of that environment within the armed forces, that one bad apple—it's more than that, and we know it—can hurt a lot of people. They can hurt their co-workers. They can do a lot of damage. As the overall employer or entity and the institution that provides that ability, how do we navigate that?

After that, maybe you can talk about the supply chain.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Absolutely.

It's not an either-or in terms of having a perfect system or a completely open system so that we're recruiting Hells Angels and the types of individuals you are describing. Keep in mind—and we always forget about this—that within the forces, we do need individuals we may say are bad apples within the general society, but we are looking for people who are willing to kill. That is the essence of what a military does, and that's a very different type of personality than we have in common society. If you were in my class, I'd say that's what Clausewitz tells us about the actual essence of how you conduct war.

On the supply chains, since you've been so kind to give me the time, you guys have the solution. If you really want to understand how we can improve supply chains in Canada, push all governments, including the provinces, to have a royal commission on what we did right and wrong on COVID. COVID is the case study of how we mishandled and how we were able to manage supply chain crises in a period of dire economic, health and security conditions.

If we want to learn how to move forward, we need to look at what we did right and wrong before, and the COVID example is a brilliant opportunity to be honest with ourselves about where we were able to keep the supply chains going, how we got the vaccinations and how we got the necessary drugs, and where we failed. The moment we understand in an open and honest fashion that is not trying to hide political mistakes and address those issues with an open royal commission, we will be able to really situate ourselves well going into the future.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Mr. Allison, you have five minutes.

[Dean Allison, Conservative, Niagara West, ON]

Thank you, Chair.

Thank you to the witnesses for being here.

I'm going to talk a bit about artificial intelligence and ask a question or two.

In part of the DPU, one of the three defence and security challenges affecting both domestic and international security is those new and disruptive technologies that are out there. I think some of you alluded to those in your opening remarks. Minister Blair made an announcement on artificial intelligence in the Canadian military a few weeks ago, so I know it is definitely a big disrupter in business. It will be a big disrupter, as it is already, when it comes to security.

Do you have any thoughts on whether the government is doing enough to harness the power of AI as it relates to its potential in the defence sector?

[Dr. Justin Massie]

In general, I would say that this isn't the case. Canada's productivity rate is one of the lowest in the Organisation for Economic Co‑operation and Development, or OECD.

Productivity would rise with increased robotization of domestic production, rather than a reliance on cheap labour. Unfortunately, Canada's strategy is to rely on cheap labour rather than to invest in high technology, which would boost production faster.

We need to respond effectively to the matter of autonomous weapons, which our enemies—rival states—may increasingly produce.

In addition to governance to express disapproval of autonomous weapons systems, which may be fine in a moral sense, we'll need military responses to prevent these weapons systems from threatening our external operations and national security, since they can be produced in massive quantities.

Personally, I didn't see in the defence policy update or in the minister's statements any idea or strategy to address the high‑volume production of drones or autonomous technologies that can carry out combat operations.

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

The other problem we face—and we stopped doing this at the end of the Cold War—is we seldom have the large-scale exercises that say, okay, we have something such as artificial intelligence. Where does it come into the various elements of the armed forces, both in getting ready and in actually conducting war? How do we know what we don't know unless we practise it?

One of the greatest difficulties that we face as we deal with the issue of artificial intelligence, as we're seeing from the reports coming out of the Russian-Ukrainian war, is of course that we're still trying to understand what it actually means.

Many people still have the science fiction view of the robots taking over, like in Terminator, and that's the fear. That's not what it is, but the problem is that we don't know where it actually adds to our capability, and we don't know where we have to be thinking about where our enemies are using it against us. The only way you really get to know that is by engaging your enemies. Short of that, it's the engagement with the training exercises in a realistic environment that is large-scale, and it addresses that. To my knowledge, we're not doing that type of exercise.

[Dean Allison, Conservative, Niagara West, ON]

Thank you.

I have more questions than that, but I do want to finish off the question that Ms. Lambropoulos asked. Are we the weakest link when it comes to NATO?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

Well, you know, Luxembourg has a smaller armed force, so there are some countries that are smaller, but again, the geography of where we are within the American nexus.... Of course, we always tend to try to divide NORAD from NATO, but the reality is that the moment that we are weak, the fact that we are the weakest link within the greater geopolitical nuclear strategic...is a concern here. In that context, it's a long answer to say, yes, we are the weakest link here.

[Dr. Justin Massie]

I think that Portugal is doing worse than us. However, I don't think that we should be comparing ourselves to Portugal to defend Canadians. We shouldn't compare ourselves to the weakest countries, but rather to countries that ensure the national security of their people.

[Dean Allison, Conservative, Niagara West, ON]

Okay. I will go back to the AI then. How do we fare in terms of countries like China and Russia? I think, Doctor, you already mentioned that, but once again, when it comes to integrating the AI, I think you pretty much said it: We're not even on the scale of China and Russia. Is that correct?

[Dr. Robert Huebert]

From what I have read.... Once again, you always have to be so careful about the open literature, because we're aware that AI is actually used to taint our thinking about how we think about AI. However, it seems that what you have just said is a fair assessment.