Evidence of meeting #120 for National Defence in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was world.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Last week, we saw a significant escalation by the Beijing regime with a military exercise off the Taiwan Strait that included 153 aircraft and 36 naval and coast guard breaks. Several of our allies, including the U.S., Australia, France, Japan, and the European Union, have voiced concern. In contrast, there has been silence from the Government of Canada from the Minister of Foreign Affairs on down.
What do you make of that?
LGen (Ret'd) Guy Thibault
First of all, I would say that what China undertook was not a surprise. They expected when President Lai was going to have the Independence Day speech that they were going to demonstrate, so they've characterized President Lai as a separatist. The bottom line is that there was nothing that was unanticipated about what they did.
The problem, I think, in some respects is that the peaceful status quo in the Taiwan states—upon which we've said we're going to maintain our policy of strategic ambiguity and our one China policy, all without wanting to harm or put at risk the peaceful status quo in the Taiwan states—is changing every day. The status quo isn't peaceful and—
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
I'm sorry, but my time is brief.
Should the Minister of Foreign Affairs—the Government of Canada—join her allies in condemning that escalation?
Conservative
Michael Cooper Conservative St. Albert—Edmonton, AB
Okay.
When we talk about engagement with Taiwan, often the push-back is Canada's one China policy. The joint communique that sets out Canada's one China policy says that Canada merely takes note of Beijing's contention that Taiwan is part of the PRC. It does not endorse that in any way, shape or form, and quite deliberately so. Therefore, often we see the one China policy conflated with Beijing's very different one China principle.
Can you elaborate a little bit about the significant flexibility that the policy provides and how Canada might leverage that?
As an Individual
I will try.
First of all, as I was trying to say in my remarks, the one China policy is our policy. If we want to change it, we can change it. If we want to interpret it differently, we can interpret it differently. I happen to be of the view that if we do that, we should do so with our allies as much as we can. It's like any other policy of the Government of Canada. If it is our policy, we can change it.
I believe, and I think General Thibault agrees, that the current government interprets it rather conservatively or restrictively. While I don't think that we should interpret it so broadly that—to use my expression—we enrage China, I think that there's a fair bit of space there that would enable us to do a great deal more.
October 22nd, 2024 / 5:30 p.m.
Liberal
Marie-France Lalonde Liberal Orléans, ON
Thank you very much.
First, I want to say thanks to General Thibault for his service, as well as to Mr. Fadden for being here.
In recent years, Canada has certainly had increased presence in conducting transit, as we mentioned, in the Taiwan Strait. It is certainly our objective to keep free, open and inclusive the Indo-Pacific and to reaffirm the freedom of the navigation on these international waterways.
This past weekend, and I think my colleague was trying to refer to it, Canada successfully completed a joint transit through the strait with frigate HMCS Vancouver alongside the U.S. destroyer USS Higgins. This transit was completed in a safe and professional manner, but we know that this, unfortunately, has not been the case for all transit, certainly for us and some partners.
I would really like you both to speak about the danger of interfering with the transit and the diplomatic implication of it, please.
LGen (Ret'd) Guy Thibault
I think the rules of conduct that we had, say, at the height of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the allied forces were pretty well demarcated in how to work together to avoid having an event that would snowball. I think we don't have that in place with the PRC today, and that's one of the challenges we see in the South China Sea, off the coasts of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.
We are seeing them undertake quite dangerous activities and there is the potential for an act that will result in casualties. In fact, there was an event with fishers off the island of Kinmen recently.
This is one of the concerns, and it is one of the reasons that you need to continue to engage with China. Notwithstanding the fact that we're picking friends and choosing sides, you still need to keep the lines of communication open with your adversaries to avoid things that would complicate things as a result of miscalculation or behaviours which create an accident and kill people.
As an Individual
I think that's right. I'm going be more practical and say we're arguably living in one of the most dangerous periods since World War II. I don't think any country on the planet wants war.
What worries me more than anything is a mistake or an accident. What I think General Thibault was saying, if I interpreted him correctly, is we have no protocols to deal with accidents, including Russian bombers and fighters that go down most of our coast. We scramble our CAF jets to keep an eye on them, but what if something goes wrong and one of them blows up or they blow each other up? There are no real protocols to deal with this.
That's why I think the general is right. We absolutely have to keep hounding the Chinese for a protocol to deal with accidents, but we can't stop, because if we stop and the allies stop going through the straits, the Chinese will take them over and that will be the beginning of the end.
Liberal
Bloc
Christine Normandin Bloc Saint-Jean, QC
Thank you very much.
We know that China is providing drones to Russia as part of the war against Ukraine.
Mr. Fadden, I'd like you to tell us about the nature of the relationship between China and Russia. Are they allied countries? Does their relationship change depending on what's in their interest?
For example, would Russia help China if it invades Taiwan?
As an Individual
That's an interesting question. I don't think there's a consensus on that. I would say they're allies on an ad hoc basis. They're not strategic allies, mainly because China is much more powerful than Russia. That's clear.
However, can a relationship between the two countries cause a lot of problems, in Taiwan or Ukraine? I certainly believe it can.
At the end of the day, I think China is much more useful to Russia than Russia is to China. What worries me more than anything is that neither country really cares about international law or their people's welfare.
I don't think they're strategic allies, but I think the west should do everything it can to prevent them from becoming strategic allies.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
I've heard a number of concerns from the Filipino diaspora about the Indo-Pacific strategy and our goals of expanding military capacity and building initiatives with regional partners, which also lists the Philippines, yet their current government has taken part in horrific human rights violations.
As General Thibault mentioned, we need to be careful with those who are hostile to our interests. I would consider human rights protections and so on to be our interests.
How do we adapt that Indo-Pacific strategy so that we're not empowering regimes working against those interests to uphold the international, rules-based order?
As an Individual
I'm probably not the best person to ask this question of, because I think the Indo-Pacific strategy was largely, on the part of the government, an opportunity to revise its policy on China. It was the first time the government called China an adversary, a strategic adversary. The rest of it was all very important, but I think that was the core of it all. It changed its view on China, which I think was highly desirable.
I think we have a great deal of flexibility in how we implement the Indo-Pacific strategy. You may disagree with me on this, but I think that despite the fact that we likely share the view that human rights are important, we have to have relations with some countries that violate human rights, because the only way we're going to change them is if we dialogue with them.
Any number of countries in that part of the world don't share our views on the rule of law and a whole bunch of other things, but I think that failing to deal with them through the Indo-Pacific strategy will only make it worse over time. We already have a problem in the world about the west restraining itself and a lot of countries tending towards China and Russia on a whole variety of fronts.
It's an imperfect answer to your question, but it's the best I can do. I don't know if the General can do better.
Conservative
Cheryl Gallant Conservative Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON
To make sure I get both questions in, and fulsome answers, I'm going to ask both at once.
Earlier today, the PLA conducted large-scale live-fire exercises on its island closest to Taiwan, which is only 66 miles away. How will Taiwan actually know when the first real shot in a conflict is fired? That's question number one.
The west has underestimated the PLA's technological progress in the past, and so we expect a war by 2027. In your estimation, can an armed invasion of Taiwan happen sooner than that?
LGen (Ret'd) Guy Thibault
I know there's a lot of speculation about what the PLA may or may not do. I don't think anybody really knows. We've heard the Davidson 2027. We've heard Xi Jinping say that for the centennial they need to be prepared for the reunification of greater China.
How will we know? Well, I think Taiwan has said they're going to do nothing to provoke China, so China they're going to take the first shot. They will take the first shot, and that will be the shot that's going to change the course of that region, perhaps, based on what the PLA is doing.
I think this is one of the concerns about all of their posturing and the exercises they're doing, and the testing. It's to say, is this real or isn't it? Is this when they're going or not?
We saw it with Ukraine, with Russia building up. The Americans were saying that it was going to happen. They could see all the indicators, and I think that with China we'll have those same indicators.
What is probably true on the nature of the exercises they have, even though they're really impressive and they're very significant, is that the rest is all the logistics would have to follow, all of the things that would have to happen on the mainland. I think the United States for sure will be telegraphing what China is doing to the rest of the world as well with their intentions, based on the intelligence we'll have on what China is doing.
I don't think there's any real risk in the short run. I don't think that's the view we saw in Taiwan: that they're expecting to be invaded tomorrow. I don't think the conditions are there. I think that in some respects China is changing the status quo without having to do that, and I think China would prefer that, because it's a hard military nut to crack in terms of Taiwan. If you've been there—and I think a number of the members of the committee have been there—you will get the sense of it. It's a mountainous region. It's rainforests. It's tropical. There are very few accesses to undertake an amphibious assault on the island.
It's not an easy problem, I think, to take Taiwan. China is watching what's going on in how the west has reacted to Ukraine and how the Ukrainians themselves have responded to them, and I think they're taking notes.
I think that would be my take. I think we all walked away thinking that it's not an imminent problem that China is about to invade Taiwan.
As an Individual
Can I add two sentences to that? I think you have to define what's the first shot and whether it's kinetic or whether it's cyber. If China closes down Taiwan's electrical grid or closes down its telecommunications with the outside world, currently my understanding is that international law does not recognize that as an act of war. A few years ago, it would have been, because it's the same as being bombed.
I agree entirely with what the General was saying, but I think we—this country and the west—have to develop a more comprehensive definition of what the first shot is. The Russians certainly had a number of first shots in the cyberworld, and it facilitated their kinetic invasion.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Thank you, Ms. Gallant.
You have the final three minutes, Madam Lambropoulos.
Liberal
Emmanuella Lambropoulos Liberal Saint-Laurent, QC
Thank you, Chair.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here to answer some questions.
I'm going to take us back to an earlier part of the conversation.
You both said in your testimonies that we need to do more, that we can do more and a lot of our allies are doing more, that, regardless of what it is we decide to do, we shouldn't do it on our own. We should do it along with our allies.
Can you give us some concrete examples of what they are doing that is not stepping too far or setting off too strong of an alarm with China?