National Defence Committee on Oct. 31st, 2024

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I call this meeting to order. It's 8:15. I see we have quorum.

We still have conversations on the Conservative benches.

Let me run a show today. We're going to adjourn at 9:45. We're going to traipse over to room 420 to meet up with the Finnish delegation, and then the foreign affairs committee is going to join us. We will have a conversation with the Finnish delegation, which will last as long as members want it to last, frankly, but in the meantime, we actually have extra time in the first hour, which has now become an hour and 15 minutes.

We're waiting for Dr. Byers to come in, but we'll proceed with Dr. Steer and then we'll do a sound check Dr. Byers when he arrives.

I'm hoping to get to three rounds. We'll see how it plays out after two rounds.

With that, we'll ask Dr. Cassandra Steer, chair of the Australian Centre for Space Governance, who's coming to us by video conference, to begin.

Thank you for making yourself available. You have five minutes, please.

[Dr. Cassandra Steer, Chair, Australian Centre for Space Governance, As an Individual]

Good morning, Chair. Thank you so much for the invitation to contribute to this study.

My work in space security, space law and space governance spans Australia and North America. I'm particularly interested in what space middle powers can achieve, particularly when they collaborate together and also work with smaller blocs or blocs of smaller nations.

I'll focus on four things. The first is the implications of the commercialization of space; the second is how Canada can and, in fact, already does lead in bringing a gender lens to space security; the third is geopolitical impacts on space; and the fourth, if time allows, is why having a national space policy is essential. I know others have spoken to that.

Firstly, on the implications of the commercialization of space, we really need to think about space and space-based services a little bit all the time, a bit like the way we all think about cyber and cybersecurity a little all the time.

We're all conscious of how much cyberspace permeates our lives. We're all conscious that we need to have strong passwords and protect our personal information. We all understand the risks of cyber-attacks and the need for cybersecurity for national security.

That's how we need to think about space a little bit, as well, all the time. It's permeating. It's ubiquitous. These space-based services are a part of our daily personal lives and a part of our national economic well-being, as well as our national security. It's still fairly early in the morning. You've probably used space at least 10 times this morning, and by this evening, you probably will have used it 20 to 40 times. That's how permeating it is, so space defence is important because space is important to Canada.

I'm not sure if others have spoken to this, but I think it's useful to also understand that space systems are made up of four segments.

There's the space segment, obviously—the satellite or the spacecraft that's in space. There's the ground segment, which is satellite dishes, receivers and data processing. There's the link segment, which is the communication link between satellites and the ground segment that's providing data on the way that we operate the satellites. The link segment is actually the most vulnerable to threats and interferences. The fourth segment is the human segment, so that's you and I, as users of space, the operators of space and decision-makers.

It's quite useful when we talk about space defence to really understand that all of these systems matter to us on earth and that, in fact, three of those segments are not even in space.

Also, as others have already stated to this committee, it's important to understand the degree to which the majority of space services are dual-use. A single space system is providing the same services, such as communications and navigation, both for military uses and civilian uses. This is largely because of how commercialized space has become. There are approximately 10,000 operational satellites in orbit today. As 75% of those are commercially owned and only about 580 of them are dedicated military satellites, space as a service has become the modus operandi. DND, like many militaries around the world, is purchasing space services from commercial providers.

Last month, in Ottawa, I co-led a workshop that was funded by DND, which was delivered by a consulting company I work with called SSCL, or Space Strategies Consulting Limited. The workshop was titled “Defending and Protecting Commercial Space Systems in Times of Tension and Conflict”. We discussed the need for clear contractual terms when it comes to the protections that commercial space providers need to build into their own systems. We discussed the threats faced by commercial systems from adversaries and then, importantly, the implications on civilians when there's a loss of service because of those kinds of threats and interferences. There will be a report coming out early next year about that.

This leads to my second point, which is how Canada can lead in bringing a gender lens to space security. There's globally recognized evidence that girls and women suffer disproportionately during armed conflict for a range of reasons. Then, because of the dual-use nature of those commercial space services, if there's a loss of service because of an attack, that impacts not only the armed forces depending on them but also the civilians who depend on those same services. That often leads to disproportionate impacts for women and girls. One example is when Russia undertook a cyber-attack against a U.S. commercial Viasat satellite in 2022.

As well, earth observation capabilities and communications capabilities can be deployed in a positive way in fulfillment of Canada's obligations under the UN gender, women, peace and security agenda to protect women's and girls' rights during armed conflict. Canada's been very proactive in advocating for gender-neutral language in UN space security discussions and submissions on including a gender lens in space security. There's an opportunity for DND to advance this agenda explicitly in its space strategy as part of its standard operating procedures and also to partner with countries like the U.S. and Australia, who are very keen to advance that agenda.

My time is very short, so I'll speak very briefly to the third point.

Given that this study includes the impacts of advancements in space on Canada's sovereignty and national security, it's important to understand the geopolitical drivers behind those investments in space. I think, in its simplest terms, space is just another domain in which geopolitics are playing out. The tensions we see playing out regionally and globally are playing out in this technological domain as well, and this is exactly why space diplomacy is so important.

Canada has an international reputation of being an effective space diplomat. It works together with allies and partners, including smaller nations, to advance the agenda of responsible behaviours at UN discussions in Geneva and in New York. It was the first country to join the U.S. in committing not to test direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons, and it's also very much recognized for bringing clarity on the international law applicable to space security in those international discussions.

I will leave my final point on the need for national space policy. Suffice it to say that I join others in advocating for that.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Dr. Steer.

It's good to see you again, Dr. Byers. You have five minutes, please.

[Dr. Michael Byers, Professor, University of British Columbia and Outer Space Institute, As an Individual]

Good morning, everyone.

My name is Michael Byers. I have held the Canada research chair in global politics and international law for two decades now. I co-direct the Outer Space Institute, which is a global network of experts working on cutting edge challenges in near-earth space.

Also of great relevance to this committee, I co-direct the MINDS space security network, which is a DND-funded network, through their academic network funding. It deals with cutting-edge issues concerning space security as it relates to Canada and Canada's national defence. I'm delighted to be here on this specific topic. It's exactly what I am working on right now.

I have two simple points, which I will elaborate on briefly. The first is that satellites will always be much easier to attack than to defend. They are acutely vulnerable. Second, Canada has several space companies that have satellite systems in orbit right now that are being used to support the Ukrainian military in an armed conflict with Russia. Nothing I'm telling you is secret. It's all public domain information. These are things you need to know.

In November of 2021, Russia destroyed a defunct Soviet-era satellite at 483 kilometres above earth to demonstrate its ability to use ground-based missiles against satellites. It created a lot of debris. It put both astronauts and cosmonauts on the International Space Station at some risk of collisions with debris, but Russia demonstrated its ability to do that.

Russia has been jamming satellite transmissions extensively for the last two years across eastern Europe, from Ukraine all the way up to the northern border between Norway and Russia. On the morning of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Viasat, a U.S. company that was providing communications support to the Ukrainian military, suffered a massive cyber-attack. It went dark on the morning of the invasion. I could go on.

Even complex systems involving thousands of satellites, like SpaceX's Starlink, are vulnerable to all those system attacks, including a Cold War weapon called the [Technical difficulty—Editor] November 2021 test right in the middle of the constellation would cause SpaceX to have to engage in tens of thousands of collision-avoidance manoeuvres, thus rendering the system dysfunctional.

Satellites are not something we can actually defend, which is why things like space diplomacy are so incredibly important to remind Russia, to remind China, that we all are acutely vulnerable to things like debris in space and that irresponsible behaviour hurts everyone.

The second point—and this again is public record—is that we know that shortly after the Russian full-scale intervention, the CEO of MDA Space, Canada's largest space company, issued a press release saying that MDA was providing synthetic aperture radar imagery to support the Ukrainian military, incredibly useful imagery. It can produce high-resolution images at night through clouds and track Russian tank movements at night. That's fine. It's been a really important part of Canada's contribution to the Ukrainian effort.

Telesat operates communication satellites from geosynchronous orbit. It was revealed by the then defence minister that Telesat had a contract from the Canadian government to provide communications support to the Ukrainian military. One can presume that's ongoing.

As Dr. Steer said, this is quite normal. Lots of satellites are dual use. Lots of governments contract with commercial operators. The challenge is that, by engaging in this kind of support, arguably these Canadian companies are making their satellites legitimate targets under the laws of war and, therefore, potentially implicating Canada in a role in the conflict that we might not want. We've been working really hard to avoid any direct conflict with Russia. We've been working really hard to avoid triggering article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. These satellites bring us very close to the line of actually being directly engaged in that conflict.

I would encourage members of this committee to think about how Canada should respond if, for instance, RADARSAT-2, the principal satellite used by MDA to support the Ukrainian military, was in fact shot down by a Russian missile. What would that mean for Canada's involvement in the conflict? How would we respond?

The next time we get into a situation like this, what kind of considerations would we want to make when deciding whether to allow a Canadian company to engage in this kind of role? It all happened very quickly in February and March of 2022. I'm not saying the wrong decisions were made, but we found ourselves much more involved in the conflict than I think decision-makers realized at the time. These are new issues and new areas, but satellites bring us very close to the front line in terms of providing support for things like targeting in conflicts that we're otherwise trying to stay out of.

With those two points—that we can't really defend satellites and that some of these satellites, in the way they are used, are bringing us into foreign armed conflicts—I'll leave it there and wait for questions from the members.

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Dr. Byers and Dr. Steer. You've both given us a great deal to think about.

We'll start off our six-minute round with Mrs. Gallant.

You have six minutes, please.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Dr. Byers, NATO, as you note, struggled for a number of years to decide whether or not...and what would constitute triggering article 5. Because it's dual use, has there been any discussion in terms of applying article 5 to a satellite attack?

[Dr. Michael Byers]

I don't have security clearance, so I don't know whether those discussions have taken place between NATO militaries. I do know—it's public record—that NATO spends a lot of time on space security and that there are Canadian officials who are based at NATO in Europe dealing with these issues, so my assumption is that, yes, it has been considered.

I would suggest that one simple change to make, and it may already have been made, is that, if Canadian companies are going to be involved in supporting a foreign military, they should not tell anyone about this. It was quite remarkable that the CEO of MDA issued a press release in March 2022 to announce MDA's involvement in the conflict. That was a very bad decision, with all respect to the CEO. A lot of people were scrambling. Mistakes were made in those early weeks of the Ukraine war. That was a mistake. It put a big bull's eye on the side of a billion-dollar Canadian satellite that supports not only military operations but also a whole range of civilian operations—everything from ice navigation in the Canadian Arctic to climate change research. The list goes on and on.

The problem with dual-use satellites is that, if you lose one because of involvement in an armed conflict, not only do you risk an escalation of the conflict, but you also lose all the incredibly important civilian uses of that piece of equipment.

Again, the answer to the question is that I assume it's been talked about. I am not allowed to know.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Dr. Byers, were you to have security clearance and you knew the answer to my question, would you be able to share it with this committee?

[Dr. Michael Byers]

No. Of course not.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Why is that?

[Dr. Michael Byers]

It's because the record of this committee, the transcript of this evidence, is public domain.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

All right. Thank you, Dr. Byers.

Are there any emergency preparedness measures aside from redundancy in space? Are there measures in place ready to execute to protect the Canadian public should there be a hostile attack on one of our satellites?

[Dr. Michael Byers]

Thank you for the question.

My first point, about the fact that satellite systems are always easier to attack than to defend, actually goes to the point of redundancy in space. I don't think redundancy in space is much of a protection, at least in terms of having hundreds or thousands of satellites in a single system spread around in a single orbital shell. One of the recommendations that my colleague Aaron Boley and I have made to the Department of National Defence and other NATO militaries is that they distribute their satellite systems across multiple altitudes to spread them out and make them less vulnerable. That is one simple answer to this problem.

In terms of our vulnerability in the day-to-day operations of civilian and military systems in Canada, we should keep non-satellite systems operating. To give you a simple example, we are incredibly dependent on global positioning satellites. The American GPS system is central to the Canadian economy to the point that commercial airliners are heavily dependent on GPS. For reasons I don't understand, we are removing the ground-based air navigation systems that used to exist before GPS so that more and more, we don't have a backup. If Russia or another hostile state were to somehow take down a GPS or interrupt its operations through some kind of jamming system or in-space attack, we would have a total catastrophe in civilian aviation in Canada, so don't take out those ground-based systems.

We have redundancies. Don't take out the fibre optic cables because you're relying on satellite systems. The more we have different kinds of systems in different places providing redundancy, the better we will be protected, not just against hostile attacks but against something like a massive solar storm that could also take out thousands of satellites.

Let's keep the ground-based systems in place. Don't think we can save money by removing them and just relying on satellites.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

I'll bring that clip out the next time my family complains about my map collection.

When the outer space treaty is violated, what types of actions can be taken to ameliorate it?

[Dr. Michael Byers]

The question applies to all of international law. International law is respected and followed 99.9% of the time. Sometimes, you get a bad actor that chooses to violate a rule or a treaty.

In the case of Russia, it is now a pariah state. It's subject to widespread sanctions. It's facing NATO providing massive numbers of weapons and amounts of other support to Ukraine as it fights its defensive battle. Russia is paying a price for its illegalities, not just with regard to the outer space treaty but with regard to things as simple as the United Nations Charter and the prohibition on the use of force—

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Okay. Unfortunately we're going to have to leave the answer there.

Mr. Collins, you have six minutes, please.

[Chad Collins, Liberal, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Thanks, Mr. Chair.

Good morning and welcome to our witnesses.

Dr. Byers, I'll start with you on space debris. I was formerly a member of our science committee and wanted to undertake a study on space debris. What I found fascinating about that subject was that many of the agreements that govern space are decades old. They were nation-to-nation when they were signed in the sixties and seventies, and not a lot has changed in updating those agreements or signing new multilateral agreements that would address not just space debris but other governance-related matters in space.

The question I have for you is this. You've talked about some of the threats that are posed to our commercial infrastructure in space as well as our military infrastructure in space when it comes to space debris. I'm just wondering what recommendations you have for the committee in relation to possibly updating those agreements or continuing along the line of the tacit, soft agreements that are in place that govern this whole issue related to space debris and how we deal with it.

After that, I have a supplementary question related to the same issue, but I'll ask you this first.

[Dr. Michael Byers]

That's actually a very tough question. Thank you for it.

You're right. The major multilateral treaties concerning space were all negotiated and adopted in the 1960s and 1970s and have proven to be remarkably resilient, but they've been supplemented by lots and lots of co-operation. For instance, in Canada, we're heavily reliant on a satellite-based search and rescue system called Cospas-Sarsat. It was created in 1979 at the height of the Cold War in partnership with the Soviet Union, France and the United States, and saves thousands of lives worldwide each year. Russia and China are still participating in that system.

There is [Technical difficulty—Editor] space station. Indeed, an American astronaut launched on a Russian Soyuz rocket from Kazakhstan just a few months ago as evidence of that continued co-operation.

Internationally, at the United Nations committee on the peaceful uses of outer space, there's still co-operation taking place. Canadian diplomats are playing a central role, I should say. We have very effective diplomatic representation at United Nations bodies dealing with space. At that level, things are actually pretty good.

With regard to space debris specifically, there are two things that people need to realize. First of all, you can't avoid space debris. Our tracking systems, our radar systems, our telescope systems can only detect pieces of debris that are roughly eight centimetres across or larger. There are millions and millions of pieces that are too small to detect all going at 17,000 kilometres an hour. The piece the size of a paint fleck can destroy a billion-dollar satellite. You can't avoid space debris, and you can't clean it up. You can clean up the big pieces but not the small pieces. At least, theoretically, you could clean up the big pieces.

As a result of this, there is a situation of mutually assured destruction in low-earth orbit where you have all this debris. Any country, any actor that engaged in an action that created tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of additional pieces of debris would be putting its own satellites at severe risk. There is a self-interest in avoiding catastrophic collisions and the use of anti-satellite missiles on the part of those states that are heavily dependent on space. The United States, China, European countries, Canada and even Russia have a very strong interest in avoiding the creation of much more debris.

My big concern into the future is that there are countries that are not very dependent on space that are acquiring the capacity to cause a lot of debris in space. I'm thinking about Iran, and I'm thinking about North Korea. When North Korea develops the ability to launch half a million steel pellets into low-earth orbit to create a pellet ring, we have a serious problem.

This is all part of arms control. It's part of our attempt to restrain rogue nations like Iran and North Korea. We do it with nuclear weapons. We now do it with parts of space.

[Chad Collins, Liberal, Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, ON]

Dr. Byers, I'm sorry. I think I have less than a minute left.

I've read some of your stuff, and you talked about it just being a matter of time within the next decade that it's likely someone on earth will be killed by debris that's re-entering the atmosphere. I read an article earlier that, at a Saskatchewan farm, SpaceX equipment fell onto a field. Thankfully, no one was injured. A Florida family had a piece of space asset that went through their roof and into their living room, I think.

Can you talk about how a space policy should address these issues, knowing that we really have no guardrails right now that protect people around the world from some of the infrastructure that's finding its way back to earth?

[Dr. Michael Byers]

A year ago, the Outer Space Institute partnered with the International Civil Aviation Organization to look into the risk to commercial airliners from re-entering space debris. A piece of debris that is just 300 grams could fatally damage a Boeing 777 or an Airbus A350, so 300 people could die as a result of a collision with a piece of space debris re-entering through earth's atmosphere. It's an extremely low probability with a very high consequence.

How do you reduce the risk? One of the ways you reduce the risk is that you stop launch providers from abandoning rocket stages in orbit after they engage in a launch. You demand, you require, that they engage in what's called a controlled re-entry and put that rocket body into the South Pacific Ocean where it doesn't pose a risk to anyone. We've been advocating for a controlled re-entry regime. I know that the U.S. Space Force will now only contract for a launch if the company can assure them that the rocket stages will come back in a controlled way and go into the ocean.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I'm sorry to keep interrupting, but unfortunately, this is a six-minute round, not a 10-minute round.

Madame Normandin is next. She will speak en français, so make sure your computers are set to the translation mode, if you need it.

Madame Normandin, you have six minutes please.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

Thank you to both witnesses for being here.

I'll be alternating between the two of you so you can take breaks.

Ms. Steer, I'm going to start with you.

You talked about the importance of cyber-hygiene when it comes to the use of space. We discussed cyberspace and the fact that humans could become a vector for entry into a computer system, which confirms the importance of this cyber-hygiene.

When it comes to space, to what extent should ordinary citizens also be aware? Is it the same as it is for cyberspace? For example, in the space domain, how can I, as a citizen, become a risk, the vector for an attack or something like that?

[Dr. Cassandra Steer]

Thank you very much for the question.

If it's okay, I'll respond in English. It's just better for everybody.

It's very important to understand that, in fact, cyber-attacks are the greatest risk to space systems. Of the direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons that Michael Byers mentioned, there are only four countries that have demonstrated that capability. It's a highly unlikely kind of interference precisely because of the debris it creates and the risk that it creates to their own capabilities. Cyber-attacks and other forms of link segment interference, like jamming and sending a false spoofing signal, are happening every single day already.

In terms of the risk of a citizen becoming a vector in that, the risk is very low. We're not likely to accidentally interfere with that link, but we are at risk of losing out on the service when there are those cyber-attacks. Again, it's the example of Russia launching a cyber-attack on the U.S. Viasat satellite in 2022, deliberately. It had the desired effect of interfering with communications, not only for the Ukrainian forces but also for all Ukrainian citizens and for many citizens in neighbouring countries as well.

I think there needs to be a greater level of awareness of that. I advocate a lot for space literacy. I do a lot of executive education for the Australian government and, together with SSCL, for the Canadian government. There's a space fundamentals course that you all can take to get a greater understanding of what those risks are.

As individuals, there's probably not a lot we can do in terms of cyber-hygiene or protection, but there's a great deal we can do in terms of raising the understanding of the risks and of our uses of those space systems.

[Christine Normandin, Bloc, Saint-Jean, QC]

Thank you very much.

My next question is for you, Mr. Byers. I want to come back to my colleague Mrs. Gallant's question about the use of article 5. This question was also asked about cyberspace, and often the problem is determining what triggers the article. That doesn't seem to apply as much to satellites.

However, I would like you to tell us about the damage that can be caused by an attack on a satellite. Indeed, we know that, in the case of cyberspace, attacks on critical infrastructure can be extremely serious and even deadly, as in the case of a water purification station.

What is the risk when it comes to satellite attacks and infrastructure? Can the damage be as significant as the damage caused by cyber-attacks?

[Dr. Michael Byers]

Thank you very much for your question.

Again, I will respond in English, just because it's better for everyone.

The first thing to realize is that invoking article 5 is a decision that NATO states will make. If there were an attack on, let's say, a Canadian commercial satellite like RADARSAT-2, one of the first decisions that the Canadian government would have to make is whether it would treat this as an armed attack that would trigger the NATO obligation.

My guess is that in the situation involving a single satellite, we would not invoke article 5. It would be an attack on an important piece of Canadian infrastructure, but it would not be an attack within Canadian territory. We would be conscious that invoking article 5 would signal that we were into a direct conflict with a nuclear-armed state, which would be seem to be highly undesirable. It's a self-judging invocation. That's the first thing to say.

The consequences, however, could be very serious. RADARSAT-2 is the principal source of revenue for Canada's largest space company. I don't know whether its bottom line could handle losing such an important revenue-generating piece of equipment. Then there are all of the users who make use of RADARSAT-2—everything from oil companies using the imagery to monitor pipelines, looking for slumping of ground and looking for erosion problems around their equipment and their operations in remote areas, to the Canadian Coast Guard icebreakers navigating the Northwest Passage, trying to avoid multi-year ice. The list goes on and on.

Yes, it would be a very serious thing in terms of being just as important as a piece of critical infrastructure located on the ground here in Canada.