National Defence Committee on Nov. 7th, 2024

[Don Stewart, Conservative, Toronto—St. Paul's, ON]

I'm sorry. We are time-limited here.

You mentioned earlier that Canada is in the top 10% of military spending. Is that globally, or within NATO? Where is that top 10%?

[Dr. Branka Marijan]

It's globally.

[Don Stewart, Conservative, Toronto—St. Paul's, ON]

Okay.

How big is the gap between the top of that 10% and the bottom of that 10%?

[Dr. Branka Marijan]

There is a significant gap. I think we tend to compare ourselves with the United States. However, if you look at the U.S. budget, it still outpaces any other collection of states.

[Don Stewart, Conservative, Toronto—St. Paul's, ON]

Of course. However, let's compare ourselves with other middle powers in NATO. Earlier, you talked about our need to do more work with them to advance diplomacy. How do we compare with some of those other countries? Where are we in that 10%? Are we at the bottom of that 10%, or in the middle of it?

[Dr. Branka Marijan]

We are squarely in the middle on a lot of these things.

We tend to think of ourselves as being much less significant, militarily, than we actually are compared with other middle powers. Of course, there has been a spending spree by other middle powers, some of it due to geographic reasons and recent developments.

I don't think we're a laggard, by any means.

[Don Stewart, Conservative, Toronto—St. Paul's, ON]

If we look at our defence spending and don't measure up on GDP.... Maybe one factor is GDP. Other ones might be things like land size or the number of resources we're trying to protect. We may arrive at a number much bigger than 2% if we did that exercise.

Can you comment on that?

[Dr. Branka Marijan]

I can certainly see that being one perspective. The challenge we have is a vast territory that is underpopulated. It's a unique challenge.

We also, I think, have to consider the broader defence context. Geography is destiny, in many ways. We have a strong ally to the south, still, despite whatever administration comes in. We tend to overplay some of our defence concerns. We never work alone. We're always working with allies. I think the other factor that should be put in there, as well, is collaborating and working with allies.

[Don Stewart, Conservative, Toronto—St. Paul's, ON]

Thank you.

I will take another change of direction here.

You mentioned earlier that we should be co-operating with Russia. Where can we co-operate with Russia?

[Dr. Branka Marijan]

There are multilateral institutions. I'm not saying we co-operate with Russia. We should have a very realistic diplomatic engagement—again, working with our allies—because that relationship is quite fractured. We have to engage with these adversaries. We don't live in a world where we cannot engage with them.

I can understand how, for many communities in Canada, that's not something that's very palpable, but I think the reality of diplomacy is precisely that: We need to talk with adversaries, not just like-minded states.

[Don Stewart, Conservative, Toronto—St. Paul's, ON]

When we think about some of the excellent technology companies we have in Canada.... We have quantum computing, for example. Are we using those civilian technological advantages to help prepare ourselves for the military application of those technologies so that we can punch above our weight?

[Dr. Branka Marijan]

One challenge we have is that we're not using those companies to the extent we should be for our economic gain. When we look at military applications, there is a gap in terms of understanding how these technologies could be applied, and also how they could be misused. There's an enormous opportunity here, if there is political will to understand these economic advantages.

We have an enormous intellectual property issue, however. We're losing a lot of intellectual property, including to our allies. We have a lot more work that needs to be done on that front.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Stewart.

The final five minutes go to Mrs. Lalonde.

[Marie-France Lalonde, Liberal, Orléans, ON]

Thank you very much to all our witnesses this morning.

I'll start my questioning with Ms. Marijan.

As we are talking within this committee, I would like to hear a little bit more about the research projects that you and Project Ploughshares are currently undertaking. How do they relate to the Canada defence policy update?

[Dr. Branka Marijan]

We have one broad project on understanding climate impacts and understanding how Canada can best respond to coming climate emergencies and what the role or the vision is for the CAF in responding to these emergencies.

My own project is examining responsible military AI regulation, where Canada fits in the broader international framework and how we're contributing to those discussions, including the U.S.-led political declaration on responsible military use of AI and autonomy. Canada is co-chairing a working group there on accountability, so we're examining issues of accountability and transparency in military applications of artificial intelligence.

[Marie-France Lalonde, Liberal, Orléans, ON]

Thank you.

On that note, what would you recommend to this committee from your current research?

[Dr. Branka Marijan]

I think that Canada could play a much more significant role in the discussions on autonomous weapons at the international level. We've sat on the sidelines of that discussion. We haven't really contributed much. Again, I think there's an issue of resources and capacity there, at both Global Affairs and DND. I think we could play a much more significant role in the broader discussion on responsible military AI and autonomy that is happening as part of these summits. Canada could certainly be a leader in that sphere working with our allies. That discussion is a multi-stakeholder discussion, so it brings together academics and industry, and it also has a diplomatic component to it.

I think that being more engaged in these two discussions at the international level would benefit us as we consider how best to craft our defence policy.

[Marie-France Lalonde, Liberal, Orléans, ON]

Thank you very much.

I know that you mentioned the war. It's challenging, I think, for all of us to consider that aspect, the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine. You did mention Russia and China. I had the pleasure of sitting on the Canada-China committee. It is, for me, I have to say, a little bit difficult to think that.... Wanting to engage with those adversaries is counterintuitive to what we're trying to do, which is for Ukraine to win.

Can you share with us a little bit more in depth about how that works in the big spectrum? Like you said, it's a very sensitive subject here in Canada.

[Dr. Branka Marijan]

I really empathize with the Ukrainian community and what Ukraine is going through. One thing we have said from the outset of this conflict is that there is going to be some sort of diplomatic solution. Military victory, at the moment at least, seems elusive. We're seeing Ukrainian lives being lost, and Ukraine is suffering a great deal. I think there is going to be a push, certainly with the new U.S. administration, toward some sort of diplomatic agreement.

Canada needs to consider all our options and consider how that will move forward. Again, as you said, this is a politically sensitive issue. No one wants to undermine Ukraine's need to defend itself. We have to, though, consider what things might happen, including with our ally to the south and what their position on this conflict will be. We have to prepare for that. We don't live in a world of ideals; we have to take the world as it is.

[Marie-France Lalonde, Liberal, Orléans, ON]

Thank you very much.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you very much.

That brings our questioning to a close.

On behalf of the committee, I want to thank all three of you for your patience and for getting up early in the morning and being ready to talk. It is very helpful to our study on the defence policy update.

With that, I'll suspend, and we'll get our new panel in as quickly as we can.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

We're ready to resume.

We have, as our second panel, two witnesses who are quite familiar with this committee. We appreciate their appearance. They need no introduction.

With that, I will first call upon Dr. Lagassé, associate professor at Carleton, and then we have a person who needs absolutely no introduction, retired general Andy Leslie, for the second five minutes.

Sir, you have five minutes, please.

[Dr. Philippe Lagassé, Associate Professor, Carleton University, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

I appreciate the opportunity to share my thoughts with the committee about the defence policy update.

I will be focusing my comments on three commitments that have taken place since “Our North, Strong and Free: A Renewed Vision for Canada's Defence” was released in April 2024. This committee can closely follow these three commitments and make sure that the executive, regardless of which party is in power, follows through on them.

These three commitments are the following: a military off-the-shelf procurement strategy for the Canadian patrol submarine project, defence digitization, and reaching the goal of 2% of GDP for defence spending by 2032.

This past summer, the government announced that Canada would be moving ahead with the acquisition of new submarines. A request for information was then released to potential bidders. The RFI indicates that the government is aiming to procure a military off-the-shelf design with minimal modifications. The current strategy is squarely focused on acquiring the boats, and then managing the integration of specialized weapons systems or the onboarding of new systems after they are delivered. Although this strategy comes with notable risks around future integration and adaptation costs, it is the right approach. The fact is that having imperfect boats is better than having no boats at all.

I therefore recommend that this committee keep a close eye on the CPSP with a view to guarding against efforts to Canadianize or otherwise modify the boats before they are delivered.

The Department of Defence and the Armed Forces are also moving ahead with defence digitization, at least in theory. This effort must become a priority, otherwise the Canadian Armed Forces will not be able to fully exploit its new fleets and Canada will fall behind its key allies.

Indeed, this committee should push the government to move forward with a comprehensive digitization strategy for the entire Canadian national security community, which may necessitate a rethinking of existing data sovereignty policies.

Unless Canada accelerates its digitization efforts, we will be unable to remain fully interoperable with our allies and our case for joining Pillar II of the AUKUS agreement will be weakened.

Finally, this committee has an important role to play in ensuring that Canada reaches the 2% of GDP target for defence spending. Canada will only reach this target if there is a cross-party consensus. Having this committee speak with a single voice about the need to reach the target and holding all governments to account when they fall short is essential.

Suffice it to say, the results of Tuesday's presidential election in the United States reinforce the importance of reaching this target, lest Canada suffer the economic consequences of being seen as a defence laggard.

I look forward to your questions.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

General Leslie, you have five minutes.

[Andrew Leslie, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

My intent is to offer some criticism of the status quo, so that we can learn and then perhaps, in question period, get into some solutions.

Essentially, in my opinion, “Strong, Secure, Engaged”, which was the precursor to the current defence policy, delivered nothing substantive in terms of modern military equipment. It saw Canada, in fact, become weaker, more insecure and essentially absent from the deployable stables of troops required for either United Nations missions or, of course, NATO.

The 2024 defence policy update of “Our North, Strong and Free” is no better, unfortunately, in that it promises some urgently needed equipment years from now, but nothing today. Indeed, the 2024 defence spend will be less than that of 2023.

Of course, we're well aware of what just happened down in the United States. Both Republicans and Democrats are united and increasingly vocal about telling Canada how disappointed, frustrated and fed up they are with Canada's failure to defend itself and its allies, with a special mention of the Arctic.

Meanwhile, as we know—and I was involved in the last NAFTA renegotiations—that's coming due at a time when a variety of key players down south have articulated clearly that a base of 3% perhaps looms on the horizon and that defence, security, trade and border security are all intertwined.

At this time of crisis internationally, with what's happening in the Middle East and in Ukraine, Canada's military readiness is at its lowest level in 50 years. Canada spent, last year, in 2023, more money on consultants and professional services than it did on the army, navy and air force combined, which, quite frankly, is madness.

The army has over 50% of its vehicle fleets awaiting spare parts and technicians. The navy is struggling mightily to keep a handful of elderly warships at sea, specifically in the Indo-Pacific, and they're desperately short of trained sailors. The air force has been unable to participate in significant NATO deterrent exercises, either up north or out over the oceans, in conjunction with our friends and allies because they don't have the pilots, the spare parts or the money to fly the aircraft.

In the Arctic, which is many times larger than Europe, Canada has fewer than 300 military support staff, who are not a deterrent. They're essentially unarmed. Some of them are part-time, bless them. There are about 1,600 Canadian Rangers equipped with Ski-Doos and rifles, who are not combatants. Their role is to observe and report.

The bottom line is that Canada has no permanently assigned combat elements to deter potential presence by the Russians or the Chinese, who are showing up in our waters with increasing frequency, but other people do. Russia, specifically, has between 25,000 to 35,000 combat troops deployed in its Arctic, with huge amounts of operational equipment—air, land and sea.

The United States, bless them, has 22,000 full-time and part-time military professionals with more equipment than the entirety of the Canadian Forces in terms of combat delivery. Thank you, America, for defending our Arctic.

We are facing unprecedented dangers and challenges and, quite frankly, I see no sense of urgency to change, modify or re-guide the efforts of the government toward supporting and assisting the Canadian Forces.

Here are some facts.

We have fewer than 35 military personnel deployed on UN missions. In 2003, we had close to 2,500. We are the only NATO nation whose level of military operational readiness is going down when everyone else's is skyrocketing up.

We have the longest and the least efficient procurement system in NATO—indeed, in any nation that I can find. We are the only nation in NATO that does not have a costed plan to get to 2% of GDP, which was first agreed to by the Minister of Defence in 2008 and reiterated in 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017.... I could go on.

We are the only NATO nation whose defence minister has publicly admitted that he could not convince his fellow cabinet members of the importance of NATO defence spending and the 2% of GDP. As mentioned already, we're the only NATO nation whose defence budget decreased this year.

Mr. Chair, I look forward to your questions.