National Defence Committee on Dec. 12th, 2024

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Thank you.

I know that my colleague MP Bezan was asking about the Baltic regions. I would like to ask a question on that as well.

Major-General Smith, what is your assessment of Russia's military posture and hybrid warfare activities, particularly in relation to NATO's eastern flank? I recently visited, just last month, countries in the Baltic region, as well as Poland. How should Canada be responding to these evolving threats?

[MGen Gregory Smith]

Canada, obviously, has a major footprint, in Latvia in particular. We have excellent relationships with Latvia and the other 12 countries that are participating in that multinational battle group, and indeed just did an exercise entitled Resolute Warrior, which I think was a huge success. The Secretary General himself was there. A number of colleagues were tremendously impressed. I think that's an example of how well things are going from Canada contributing to deterrence under NATO.

That being said, to respond to the question a little more completely, Russia has been extensively damaged. The Russian armed forces have been extensively damaged due to their operations in Ukraine. Russia's own defence industry has equally shown a tremendous ability to reconstitute, so Canada, as part of NATO, is paying a lot of attention to that and is indeed responding to the plans that NATO has put together to make sure that we are able to both deter and defend in that region.

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Iran's use of proxy networks has been destabilizing regions in the Middle East. How does this tactic directly or indirectly affect Canadian security interests in our global military commitments?

[MGen Gregory Smith]

As I characterized earlier, I think that Iran's proxies have been extensively damaged. Israel has dismantled extensive parts of Hamas and Hezbollah itself and has indeed damaged Iran, so I think that is an area we're looking at. I think that what just happened in Syria over the weekend is an excellent characterization of the reduced capacity of both Russia and Iran to influence their “abroad” areas, if you will.

We're going to continue monitoring that, both from a Russian and Iranian perspective, to see what more they're going to do, because they have shown a great ability to reconstitute.

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Thank you.

Major-General Ritchie, what role does Canada play, particularly within NORAD and through co-operation with Indo-Pacific allies, in monitoring and countering North Korea's missile and nuclear development?

[MGen Robert Ritchie]

I'd start out by saying that we are an active participant in monitoring the United Nations' security resolutions to include any ship-to-ship transfers of fuel or technology. Over a cumulative commitment, we had 12 maritime patrol aircraft that undertook missions, as well as 11 warships. Most recently, it happened with maritime patrol aircraft in October and then a warship just last month.

We continue to monitor, and we are, from time to time, having interactions with Chinese PRC aircraft or vessels. Those are, generally speaking, safe and professional. Sometimes they are either unsafe and/or unprofessional, and then we are becoming more sophisticated in our ability to capture those things to then come out quickly with the truth and communicate exactly how something transpired, as opposed to what was mentioned in my colleagues' questions, when sometimes it's portrayed in a certain way that might not match reality.

[Eric Laporte]

If I can just add a few comments on monitoring DPRK nuclear and missile activity, in addition to everything that Major-General Ritchie talked about in terms of the DND/CAF component in air and maritime monitoring, Global Affairs Canada also has some extensive engagement on the diplomatic and financial fronts to reinforce sanctions. For example, in October, Canada, along with a number of like-minded countries, joined what's called the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team, MSMT, which is basically a stand-up mechanism that was established by partners following the fact that in the UN, Russia vetoed the continuation of a panel of experts on sanctions. We've gone outside of the UN and created our own monitoring mechanism.

[Viviane LaPointe, Liberal, Sudbury, ON]

Mr. Laporte, what is Canada's diplomatic strategy to address North Korea's provocations? How does Canada leverage its partnerships in eastern Asia to promote stability?

[Eric Laporte]

As part of our Indo-Pacific strategy, we have bolstered our diplomatic presence in the region. We work closely with DND and CAF personnel in terms of building capacity for security. It's all about leveraging partnerships, including with South Korea, for example, and Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam as key countries.

India was part of our Indo-Pacific strategy. At the moment the relationship is difficult, but India is a key player in the region, and we will want to get back to there when the circumstances allow. However, it's also working with like-minded countries on things like I just mentioned, such as the multilateral monitoring mechanism for sanctions.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Before I let you go, October 7, 2023, was largely regarded as an intelligence failure on the part of Israel. Every commentator, including you, says that we were caught by surprise. It was unanticipated that this event happened in Syria. Does it give you concern that our intelligence is not as good as it should be?

[MGen Gregory Smith]

I'd start by saying this: As you know, under the new defence policy, we have made strategic geographic choices. We're going to protect Canada and Canada's Arctic and we're going to participate in the Indo-Pacific and Europe. Now, that doesn't mean we're not going to look at the Middle East, but that's not where we'd have the majority of our forces, nor is that our focus.

Canada is a big country. We're not a world power, but we focus across the world. There are always going to be gaps. Canada was surprised, but clearly Israel and the United States were too, so we're not the only ones.

[MGen Robert Ritchie]

Mr. Chair, I might add that we're also seeing increasingly sophisticated technology. In this instance, it was discovered that there were extensive subterranean access routes, which Israel has subsequently poured concrete into, in order to deny this subterranean access into Israel.

We now have to be much more aware of pan-domain threats and how capabilities are aggregated in pan-domain space, which certainly complicates how any military acts.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I would love to engage with this conversation, because I frankly disagree with you, General Smith. It's not the first time, and it probably won't be the last.

Yes, Canada is a big country. We are members of the Five Eyes. It appears that there was, at the very minimum, a collective failure of western intelligence to anticipate this development, which has implications for Canada. They may be one, two or three steps removed, but there are implications for our own security.

Unfortunately, I'm out of my own time.

Thank you for this conversation. I thought it was particularly rich, and we particularly appreciate your coming.

With that, we'll suspend and then re-empanel.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I bring this meeting back to order.

We have, for our second hour, Max Bergmann, director, Europe, Russia and Eurasia program, and Stuart Center, Center for Strategic and International Studies. We also have Robert Hamilton, head of Eurasia research, Foreign Policy Research Institute. They are both joining us by video conference.

Welcome, gentlemen. Thank you for making yourselves available.

We'll have Mr. Bergmann open with a five-minute statement and then go to Mr. Hamilton.

With that, go ahead, Mr. Bergmann.

[Max Bergmann, Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a real honour and privilege to be speaking to the parliamentary committee today on what is, I think, an incredibly important topic.

I was going to focus my introductory remarks on the threat posed by Russia in the period ahead, because we need to be very clear-eyed that no matter how events in Ukraine play out, as long as Vladimir Putin remains president of Russia, he will be a determined adversary of Canada, of the United States and of Europe.

Vladimir Putin, I think, is very much driven by seeing the United States, in particular, as Russia's main adversary and as the main obstacle to Russia's geopolitical greatness, and he is consumed by Russia achieving a grand geopolitical stature.

While we have looked at events in Syria with great awe over the last month as sort of a defeat of Russia's efforts in the region, we have to go back roughly 10 years to when Russia intervened in Syria. I was then at the U.S. Department of State, and we were all shocked that here was Russia intervening in a country inside of a civil war in a distant region in the Middle East. Russia had previously, for the past 25 years, focused on its near abroad, and here Russia was in the Middle East, and it made Russia a significant player in the region and helped it build its ties with gulf states and with Israel.

The purpose of this intervention largely was about Russia's ability to act on the global stage and represented Russia for the first time since the end of the Cold War returning to the great power and stature that it had had during the Soviet period. While this past month has been a grand defeat for Russia's grand strategy, it is not going to lie down lightly; it will continue.

What we have to remember, just looking at Russia's military, is that Russia's army has been significantly ground down by the war in Ukraine. It is suffering tremendous casualties of more than half a million, and its ground materiel has been significantly depleted, yet Russia has built up a tremendous defence industrial base and has invested significantly with the help of China and others and its vast smuggling networks, so Russia's production capacity is going to be sustained whether this war ends in 2025 or not, and that will mean, I think, a relatively fast effort to recapitalize its ground forces.

However, when we turn to the other aspects of the Russian military, the Russian navy, the Russian air force and the Russian space capabilities have been far less impacted by this war. What we have also seen is Russia really significantly strengthening its military relationships with not just North Korea and Iran but also China. This means that China is playing an increasing role in the Arctic. This is not something that should cause short-term concern. In many respects, this is driven by China simply looking at the fact that the climate is changing and this is potentially a new and significant global trading route; therefore, it's only natural for China to scope it out militarily.

However, I do think that this portends, down the road and over the long term, a growing Chinese presence in the Arctic. While this may make some Russians uncomfortable, that has been the price of Chinese support for Russia.

As a final comment, I also think that Russia's past history of being, in fact, a rather important actor when it comes to nuclear non-proliferation has been completely reversed by this war. Russia had been a key part of the Iranian nuclear negotiations and sanctions against North Korea, but Russia has reversed that because of the short-term focus on the events in Ukraine, and I don't see it returning. Russia's willingness to provide missile components and other technology to actors like Iran and North Korea, and perhaps others around the world, should be of significant concern to Canada, to the United States and to many in Europe.

I'll close there.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Bergmann. That was nicely within five minutes, too; I appreciate it.

Mr. Hamilton, go ahead for five minutes, please.

[Dr. Robert Hamilton, Head, Eurasia Research, Foreign Policy Research Institute, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear. As Mr. Bergmann said, it's an honour and a pleasure to be before the committee.

I'll start by saying that Russia poses the only existential threat to the United States and its NATO allies, including Canada, due to its nuclear arsenal, but that's a threat that's highly unlikely to materialize under current conditions.

I would argue that a more likely and still profoundly dangerous threat is a combined Chinese-Russian military confrontation with the west. That's also not necessarily likely under current conditions, but it's something that's much more conceivable than a Russian strategic nuclear attack on the U.S. and its NATO allies.

Russia is an acute militarized threat to the entire Euro-Atlantic area. It's an acute militarized threat to the U.S., Canada and all of our NATO allies. China is the only state, as the U.S. national security strategy says, with both the will and the capability to rewrite the rules of international order.

To be blunt, it's of vital national interest to the U.S., Canada and all of its NATO allies not to have to fight a war against China and Russia at the same time. The question then becomes how to avoid this outcome.

Currently, the most serious active threat to North American security, I would argue, is the war in Ukraine. If Russia wins in Ukraine, I'll paraphrase the words of someone who I consider to be one of our best Russian military analysts, Dara Massicot at the RAND Corporation, who says that if Russia wins in Ukraine, it will be bruised, vengeful and overconfident, believing it has bested the west.

To be clear, Russia is fighting in Ukraine, but it believes it's fighting against NATO, Europe and North America. Every time Putin has believed he's bested the west—in 2008 in Georgia, 2014 in Ukraine and 2015 in Syria—he has launched a larger and more ambitious war in the wake of that war. I think it is of important, if not vital, national interest to NATO states that Russia not win in Ukraine.

Also, what happens in Ukraine is going to affect China and it's going to affect the Indo-Pacific region, because both China and our partners and allies in that region are watching the outcome of the war in Ukraine to learn things about western tolerance for risk, western support of Ukraine and western support of partners and allies in other regions.

On the other hand, I think lumping China and Russia together as a singular threat, as you'll sometimes see western policy-makers do, is not in our interest, for a couple of reasons. One is that it obscures the major difference between them. Yes, China is trying to rewrite or remake the rules of international order. Russia, I would argue, is trying to burn the international order down using military power, whereas China, to this point, is primarily using diplomatic and economic tools.

The other thing about lumping them together as a singular threat is that it drives them together. The United States has been called the binding agent in that relationship. It's not for nothing that if we look at where China and Russia are most in partnership, it's in areas where the U.S. and, in some cases its other partners and allies, have the largest footprint—especially a military footprint.

The best way to avoid the outcome of a combined Russian-Chinese military challenge or confrontation with the west is to think hard about policies and actions that drive them together. That means thinking hard about where we deploy military power. Places like Europe and the Indo-Pacific are non-negotiable, because we have binding treaty commitments to our allies and partners there, but it's no coincidence that where our footprint is the lightest—in places like Africa and central Asia—co-operation between China and Russia is also the lightest. In some places, like central Asia, competition is emerging.

I'm at four minutes now. I will sum up by saying that another threat we need to look at, which is not in the military domain—it's more in the informational domain—is our need to strengthen our democratic and societal resilience throughout the west.

Russian election interference is something that's been going on for a long time. Very recent examples we can talk about in the Q and A are in Moldova and Romania. On disinformation, we need to strengthen critical thinking skills and consider ways to prevent Russia's use of our open societies against us.

Finally, on China and information, China has long used the information instrument to build a positive image of China, but it's now using more of Russia's methods, which are to discredit the idea of objective truth altogether and to discredit our own government in the eyes of our people.

I'll stop there.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I hope our colleagues are as disciplined as the two of you are in terms of time management.

Mrs. Gallant is up first for six minutes.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Mr. Hamilton, how does the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime shift the paradigms in the Russia, China, Ukraine and European realms?

[Dr. Robert Hamilton]

As I said in a recent interview with Forbes Ukraine, Russia's defeat anywhere is good for the world. What has happened recently in Syria is, I believe, a defeat for Russia. In terms of how it shifts, I'd be interested to hear what Mr. Bergmann thinks, but I don't think it has a significant impact on Russia's war effort in Ukraine for a few reasons.

One, Russian assets in Syria were fairly light. The number of ground forces was very small. It was never more than several thousand. I think it's much less at this time, mostly advisers and special forces. In terms of the air and naval assets Russia had at Khmeimim air base in Latakia province and in Tartus, it had only a handful of ships. Those have now been moved somewhere around eight kilometres to 12 kilometres offshore in the eastern Mediterranean awaiting developments. If Russia were to reprogram assets from Syria into Ukraine, I don't think it would make a significant difference.

In terms of Russia's relationship with China, I also don't think it has a direct effect. It is a defeat; I would argue that it's not necessarily a strategic defeat for Russia, but it is a defeat of a regime that Russia had propped up for nine years and wanted to see win. I would argue that actually the war in Ukraine, and Russia's demonstrated military incapacity in at least some areas, has had a more direct effect on China's perception of Russia than what has happened in Syria.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

[Technical difficulty—Editor] given the huge buildup over and around Taiwan this week by China, would you reassess the five-year projected ability for China to invade Taiwan to have changed, or are we underestimating that timeline, or was this just another one of Xi's hissy fits going to the U.S. over a new president?

[Dr. Robert Hamilton]

It's a great question.

I will preface this by saying that I do not consider myself a China expert. I wrote a book on China-Russia relations and have done research over the past couple of years on that, but I do consider myself more of a Russia specialist.

The 2027 timeline we keep hearing about that Xi Jinping has given the People's Liberation Army is the date by which he wants the PLA to have the military capability to liberate Taiwan, “liberate” meaning to invade and occupy Taiwan by force. I don't necessarily think it means that the clock is ticking and that in 2027 it runs out.

Xi Jinping sees himself in the same way Putin does, as a historical figure, as an epochal figure. Therefore, by the end of Xi Jinping's tenure, I think his goal, which I think for him is non-negotiable, is to have Taiwan reintegrated. As to how that happens diplomatically, economically or militarily, I can't say.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

You were in Montreal. You witnessed the full-court press of Ukrainian representatives begging and pleading for an invitation to join NATO, recognizing that this would not be immediate—many standards have to be met—but that this would be the best way to stand up to Putin.

I know that there isn't consensus yet, but if that were to happen, what would be the impact in Ukraine? Would that change Putin's aggression, or would it stop the increase or escalation in aggression?

[Dr. Robert Hamilton]

My sense is that however the Ukraine war ends.... Unfortunately, I think it's likely to end with Russian troops still occupying some portion of Ukrainian territory. I listened to the first part of this session. This was also a theme. My sense is that however it ends, the only way to prevent Russia from restarting that war as soon as it's rebuilt its military capability to what it considers the required level is for Ukraine to have legally enforceable security guarantees. Whether it's NATO membership or some consortium of countries—probably almost all NATO members—they would give Ukraine legally binding security guarantees and say, “If you are invaded again by the Russians, we will fight.”

This then becomes the question: How do you deter that invasion? Is a legal document, whether NATO's article 5 or some other legal document, adequate? Do there have to be forces on the ground? Does there have to be a deterrent force from non-Ukrainian militaries present in Ukraine?

I think the latter is far more likely to deter renewed aggression than just binding security guarantees, but it also comes at much higher risk, because then immediately, as we already have in eight frontline NATO states now where there are battle groups present, a Russian invasion of any of those countries, or of Ukraine if there are forces on the ground, would put western military forces in a state of war with the Russian Federation.

[Cheryl Gallant, Conservative, Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, ON]

Do you have any information on these reports we're hearing of drones being dispatched over the Atlantic Ocean to New Jersey? Is there any clarity on that? What's going on there?