Evidence of meeting #132 for National Defence in the 44th Parliament, 1st Session. (The original version is on Parliament’s site, as are the minutes.) The winning word was russian.
A recording is available from Parliament.
Head, Eurasia Research, Foreign Policy Research Institute, As an Individual
That's not for me. My knowledge of that is CNN-deep. I keep hearing it's an Iranian mother ship, and the U.S. Department of Defense has said, “No, there's not.”
Again, though, I'm not an expert witness on that topic.
Liberal
Liberal
Emmanuella Lambropoulos Liberal Saint-Laurent, QC
Thank you, Chair.
Thank you to both of our witnesses for being here to answer some of our questions today.
I'm going to start with Mr. Hamilton. You spoke about the best way to avoid a China-Russia confrontation against the west. You said that this is the biggest threat we should be worried about, and while it's not super-likely in the near future, there are things we can do in order to limit the possibilities. Can you be a bit more specific?
You said we can watch where we're putting our resources and our army. Can you be a bit more specific and give us some more ideas of how we can ensure that this type of collaboration doesn't happen in the future?
Head, Eurasia Research, Foreign Policy Research Institute, As an Individual
Sure. I'll say I saw the narrative about the China-Russia relationship as being either a strategic partnership or an axis of convenience. Those are nice academically ideal types that help frame the debate. I think neither of them is accurate.
I think the relationship is dynamic, complex and contingent. It's dynamic because it responds to things that happen in the world. What happened in Syria recently is one of those things. It's complex because they interact across what we call the instruments of power, which are diplomatic, informational, military and economic. It's contingent because these are great powers that have presence all over the world. It can be affected by things that happen on the ground that might be out of the control of either Beijing or Moscow.
As I said, our commitments to our NATO allies and the countries with which we—in this case, “we” is the U.S.—have binding security commitments to the Indo-Pacific are non-negotiable. They're legal commitments. Therefore, there's a requirement to deploy military force there to deter conflict or to prevail in conflict if deterrence fails.
Other parts of the world, like Africa and central Asia, which I mentioned as examples.... For this book project, I looked at Chinese-Russian interaction in Africa and central Asia. Places where the U.S. military footprint is lighter than in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific are places where Chinese-Russian interaction tends to be either compartmentalized, as I would call it—in Africa, each is doing its own thing and is vaguely aware of what the other is doing, but they're not co-operating or coordinating—or competitive. In central Asia, increasingly they're competitors, especially in the economic sphere.
My admonition to western policy-makers—and this applies to U.S. policy-makers, especially—because I hear from them a lot that we should try to drive a wedge between China and Russia is to not try to do that. That's my advice. Think about where we deploy military power. Be judicious in where we deploy military power and ensure that we deploy military power only where core or vital national interests are at stake. In places like central Asia, I think our strategy is fairly correct.
We talk about things like sovereignty, democratic resilience, civil society development, regional co-operation and economic development. Those are things western partners can make a contribution to in central Asia. They don't trigger fears in Russia and China of some sort of western military presence or intervention. They probably allow conditions for Chinese-Russian competition to emerge, whereas it otherwise wouldn't, especially if we were there in some sort of military sense.
Liberal
Emmanuella Lambropoulos Liberal Saint-Laurent, QC
Thank you very much for that answer.
You also spoke about strengthening resilience in the west against misinformation, disinformation and, perhaps, Russia's and China's attempts to destabilize the west. I'm going to ask you about some examples you can give that have already occurred—in Canada, for example, or in the west—of how they have been successful at doing this.
What things should we be looking out for to take precautions against these situations in the future?
Head, Eurasia Research, Foreign Policy Research Institute, As an Individual
Very briefly—because I was coming to the end of my time—I mentioned Moldova and Romania as the two most recent examples of Russian election interference, but it's also combined with information operations—propaganda, disinformation.
In Moldova, the Russians tried indirectly, through a Moldovan oligarch who's resident in Russia, to buy 300,000 votes against Maia Sandu's candidacy for president and against the referendum on EU accession or integration. In a country like Moldova, 300,000 votes is enough to swing an election, and they came very close. They were able to buy over 100,000 before the Moldovan security services understood what was happening and were able to shut this effort down. However, that's one example.
Another example, in Romania, is Georgescu, this candidate who won the first round of the presidential election and literally came from nowhere. He was in eighth or ninth place among the candidates a month prior to the election. He had no organization. He had no funding. He had a TikTok presence that, according to the Romanian special services, the intelligence services, was created and amplified by the Russians out of the Russian Federation. What's interesting is that it appears that TikTok was initially unaware and then tried to take measures to prevent this but was unable to.
Of course, in the Romanian case, the question becomes whether this was some sort of combined Chinese-Russian effort using TikTok to promote the candidacy of an anti-Europe, anti-NATO, pro-Russian candidate for the Romanian presidency. It doesn't appear that it was. It does definitely appear that there were Russian fingerprints all over this, but it does not appear that even TikTok, much less the Chinese government, was a part of this effort. The Constitutional Court of Romania has now annulled the first round of the election; it will be rerun.
Again, these are two cases in which Russia came very close to swinging the outcome of a democratic election using misinformation and interference.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
We're going to have to leave it there, Ms. Lambropoulos.
Mr. Simard, you have the floor for six minutes.
Mr. Simard will ask his questions en français, so as long as you have the interpretation channel....
Go ahead, Mr. Simard.
Bloc
Mario Simard Bloc Jonquière, QC
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Bergmann and Mr. Hamilton, thank you for your very interesting presentation.
You both talked about China's support for or collaboration with Russia.
What does that support or collaboration look like, specifically?
Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center, As an Individual
Maybe I can start.
I think right now the most significant form that it's taking is that China is effectively blunting the impact of global sanctions against Russia. Sanctions have proven quite effective at tanking an economy, causing economic pain and immiseration. China is blunting that effort. For instance, the Russian car industry has effectively collapsed, but Russians can now buy very good Chinese cars instead. That extends to the military and defence industrial production, as I mentioned.
What is China getting in return? Well, China is getting, I think, access to Russian military technology that's more advanced than what it has: things like aircraft engines, perhaps missile defence, fighter designs and other technology related to kind of advanced systems.
Then, as I mentioned, China is also seemingly getting more access in the Arctic and other places. Maybe just a quick point is that I think we have oftentimes thought that we could wedge these two countries—Russia and China—because of the conflict that emerged during the Cold War because of Nixon's visit to China. However, after the death of Stalin, that has also stemmed from competition within the Communist world over leadership and a 10-year rivalry between China and Russia. What we've seen now is a more than 10-year effort by both Putin and Xi to build ties. Because both leaders really buy into this relationship, I think it's quite durable, and that's extending deep down into the bureaucracies, militarily and economically.
Head, Eurasia Research, Foreign Policy Research Institute, As an Individual
I would just add that the question of China's support for Russia is most important in terms of the war in Ukraine. What you're seeing diplomatically is China mostly supporting Russia in what it is not doing. It's been described as freeriding on Russian vetoes of UN Security Council resolutions on Ukraine. The Chinese know the Russians are going to veto anything that calls for a Russian withdrawal from Ukraine or criticizes Russia's invasion of Ukraine, so they abstain. It's sort of passive diplomatic support.
Informationally, China's information operations are very closely echoing Russia's justification for the war in terms of NATO enlargement, indivisibility of security and all of these things. Militarily and economically, I would describe China's response as self-interest more than direct support of Russia. We know that Russia has asked for direct military support. We believe that China has not provided it. That's the conclusion of all the western intelligence services.
The Chinese are exercising more with the Russian military—ground, sea, and air—and they're doing that because Russia is the only country on the planet right now that is fighting a western-trained and equipped adversary. The Chinese are trying to learn from that, because they think they may have to do something similar in the future. It does provide a little bit of legitimacy to the Russian military exercising with China, but China is also benefiting and learning from that.
Economically, yes, China is providing dual-use items and items that allow the Russian economy to sustain itself in the face of sanctions. Frankly, so are many other countries on the planet, including many EU and North American countries. They're just doing it through intermediaries, like Kyrgyzstan, and until recently, Kazakhstan, Georgia and Armenia.
Exports from several EU countries to Kyrgyzstan, for instance, have gone up 2,000%-4,000% over the last year. We all know where that's going, right? It's going through Kyrgyzstan into Russia. China is just doing the same thing, but directly.
I will end by saying that the Chinese-Russian economic relationship is more and more approaching a colonial relationship whereby Russia exports raw materials to China, such as oil and gas, at a discount. The Chinese are buying Russian oil and gas at a deep discount. Russia is then importing finished goods from China, so more and more, Russia is in a subordinate economic position.
Bloc
Mario Simard Bloc Jonquière, QC
Thank you.
That being the case, if the United States decided to stop supporting Ukraine, what message would that send? Could it increase Chinese pressure on Taiwan? Could it change the strategic relationship between China and Russia in some way?
Liberal
December 12th, 2024 / 9:45 a.m.
Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center, As an Individual
If the United States stops providing military aid to Ukraine.... Let's be clear: The Biden administration is going to spend down all of its military aid budget by the end of its term. That means that in order for there to be additional aid, President Trump will have to request that military aid. That may be unlikely. My sense is that Russia will then move to try to win the war and will not be very interested in negotiations.
I don't really see China stepping up to increase its support for Russia. What it will do is cement the perception within Beijing that the west is not in anything for the long haul. Ergo, even if it were to get into trouble by trying to invade and occupy Taiwan and if that were to be a slog, like Russia's experience in Ukraine, after many years China would eventually prevail. The west would lose stomach for this fight, which sort of confirms the old Communist sentiment about the weak, capitalist and materialistic west. It would affirm that perception—
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
Unfortunately, we're going to have to leave it there. I apologize.
Next, we have Ms. Mathyssen for six minutes.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
I suppose I could pick it up from there. My first question was going to be fairly similar.
With Trump 2.0 coming onto the scene, we may see major differences. There may be consequences in how that may threaten the stability of the world order. Certainly, with new Secretary of Defense Hegseth, could you just continue on with what you were saying before you were cut off, in terms of those differences?
The one thing that I also asked in the previous panel wasn't necessarily.... Yes, there's a potential of a withdrawal by the west, by the United States, in this conflict, but what about the more significant interference in determining how peace will go down at the expense of Ukraine in terms of territory or what have you? What would that look like?
Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center, As an Individual
I'll start quickly.
To extend what I was saying, if we look at negotiations between Russia and Ukraine—with the United States pushing for those—the question we have to ask is this: What's in it for Vladimir Putin? Why would he agree to negotiations when he thinks, right now, that he's winning the war, and that U.S. support may not be there over the long haul?
He experienced what happens to the Ukrainian military if U.S. aid is suspended when we stopped providing aid between October 1, 2023, and April, when we finally passed the supplemental. The Ukrainian military withered greatly and Russia experienced great gains, which Ukraine is still trying to recover from militarily. He could look to the end of 2025 as a real opportunity, when Ukraine will be significantly withered militarily.
Yes, Russia has lost more than half a million people, but we know this here in the United States: The sunk-cost fallacy applies when you're in a long war and you may have lost a lot and think you want to get out, but you can see a light at the end of the tunnel. I think that light at the end of the tunnel for Putin gets brighter with the United States being less willing to support Ukraine over the long haul.
Head, Eurasia Research, Foreign Policy Research Institute, As an Individual
I agree completely.
I would add that trying to incentivize Ukraine into a negotiation now, especially with the prospect of cutting off military assistance to Ukraine, would be a grave error.
As Mr. Bergmann said, first of all, what's Russia's incentive to negotiate? Many different flavours of a possible Trump strategy for Ukraine have been floated. There was one floated by Mike Pompeo and David Urban last summer, neither of whom will be in the administration, so I'm not sure it has much purchase. However, I think it was a little more realistic a strategy in that, in an early phase, we would step up military support for Ukraine by lifting some of the restrictions to increase the pain level on the Russians and incentivize them to come to the table in good faith.
The problem with this and all versions of the Trump strategies for Ukraine is that they're a little unrealistic or even naive about the post-conflict security architecture. They talk about delaying Ukraine's NATO membership by 10 years, or just leaving that question unanswered. If you leave that question unanswered, you're only delaying the start of the war again. The war will start again as soon as Russia has rebuilt its capability. It has to give up on its objective to control all of Ukraine, or at least control enough of Ukraine to make whatever state is left unstable, with almost zero economic and military potential, and massive social and political dislocation and problems.
Increasingly, the most important question about the current stage of the Russia-Ukraine war is whether Ukraine can survive militarily long enough for the strains of the war, economically and politically, to start to have an effect in Russia. I believe there is a time coming. Russia has been a lot more resilient than we expected economically, but many of the indicators point in only one direction, and that is of Russian economic degradation over the mid-term and a possible economic collapse.
Again, these are things that are hard to predict. I'm not an economist, but all recent indicators of the Russian economy are very negative. The Russian central bank is increasingly having problems sustaining the economy and maintaining a level of economic activity, GDP growth and things like that.
Forcing Ukraine into a negotiation without incentivizing Russia to come to the table in good faith, while also leaving the post-war security architecture undefined, would be a very significant error.
NDP
Lindsay Mathyssen NDP London—Fanshawe, ON
You briefly spoke about Armenia and that part of this greater conflict.
Could you give us an update on the state of that? How does the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict play into this larger picture?
Liberal
Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center, As an Individual
I would say that for Armenia, it is clear that Russia is not a reliable security partner. Armenia had banked its security on a Russian guarantee, which was then not there. Azerbaijan has taken advantage. I think Armenia is in a very tough place presently, trying to pivot towards the west and building ties with France and the United States, yet Turkeyy and Azerbaijan are squeezing Armenia. I think there's real danger, especially with the way events in Georgia are playing out.
Armenian democracy may be in trouble. They're in need of assistance because they made a bad bet previously. I think there's real room for Canada, the United States and Europe to play an important role here.
Liberal
The Chair Liberal John McKay
I'm sorry. I apologize, but we're into our second round. I have 25 minutes worth of questions to be squeezed into about 18 minutes, so we're going to be down to four minutes a pop.
We'll go ahead, and I'm happy to go for five minutes. We'll have five minutes, so get going, but I'm going to be really ruthless, Mr. Stewart.
Conservative
Don Stewart Conservative Toronto—St. Paul's, ON
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The question I have is related to Syria and Russia potentially losing some military sites with the fall of that regime. I wonder if you can comment, Mr. Hamilton and then Mr. Bergmann.
Head, Eurasia Research, Foreign Policy Research Institute, As an Individual
Russia's two main military sites in Syria were the air base at Khmeimim in Latakia province and the naval base at Tartus. Those are both very important for status and prestige reasons for the Russian Federation in its own self-image as sort of a global power. They're also important in terms of power projection in the eastern Mediterranean and North Africa as far south as the Sahel in Africa.
They are Russia's main power projection platforms in that part of the world. Up to this point, it does not look like they're in imminent danger of losing them. I've seen assessments of an evacuation under way. I don't see anything. Yes, there are transport aircraft coming in and out. Yes, they've moved the ships from Tartus offshore a little bit, but I don't see the amount of activity that would indicate a major evacuation is under way.
The Russians are very good at back-channel negotiations. I'm sure that they've been talking to HTS and the other opposition groups the entire time. There was a Syrian caretaker prime minister from the Assad regime who stayed on, so I think Russia believes that it can preserve its access to those bases. We'll see, but I think that's the calculus in the Kremlin now.
Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and the Stuart Center, As an Individual
Yes, I agree with that assessment.
The one thing I'd say is that I think the west has a lot of leverage here, particularly if we are going to provide potential aid to the new Syrian government and if we're going to delist it as being a terrorist group. The Russian influence here is simply that they have some military assets on the ground.
The one other thing I would say is that this is a loss of prestige for Russia, but the maintenance of these military bases is key for their destabilizing presence in Africa and also for having diplomatic presence with gulf states and with the Israelis. The Israelis did not provide significant aid to Ukraine at the start of this war, in part because of Russia's presence, and the gulf states have not been necessarily all that helpful when it comes to clamping down with sanctions on Russia and other efforts. They may be more accommodating should Russia be fully evicted from the region.
Conservative
Don Stewart Conservative Toronto—St. Paul's, ON
Chances are that Russia just redeploys those naval assets back to strengthen its forces against Ukraine.