National Defence Committee on Feb. 2nd, 2022

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

I call this meeting to order. This is the third meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence.

We are in a hybrid format. I'm sure all members are familiar with the rules and regulations that go with a hybrid format. I'm declining to read them all. We'll get right down to business.

We have two witnesses for our opening hour, Dr. Jolicoeur and Ihor Michalchyshyn. I understand, Mr. Michalchyshyn, you're going to go first, and then will be followed by Professor Jolicoeur. You have five minutes, please.

[Ihor Michalchyshyn, Executive Director and Chief Executive Officer, Ukrainian Canadian Congress]

Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to the committee for the invitation.

I'm here on behalf of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, where I'm the executive director. Our organization is the federation of national, provincial and local Ukrainian organizations in Canada. We work to coordinate and represent the interests of our community, which at the last census was tallied at just under 1.4 million Canadians. We've been active since 1940. We work in a number of spheres, including on defence policy.

As members of Parliament know, in February 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine. Since 2014, Russia has occupied Crimea, parts of the eastern Ukrainian oblasts of Donetsk and Luhansk, and prosecuted a war in eastern Ukraine where over 13,000 people have been killed and 1.5 million have been internally displaced within Ukraine.

In November of this past year, Russia once more intensified its troop movements near the Ukrainian borders. A series of diplomatic discussions in the past few weeks among the United States, NATO, Ukraine and Russia have yielded no concrete results or commitments from Russia to de-escalate its aggression against Ukraine.

The UCC and the Ukrainian Canadian community believe strongly that now is the time to act to further deter a Russian invasion of Ukraine rather than wait until it happens. We feel the most effective way to deter a Russian invasion is to take solid proactive actions rather than reactive steps.

In recent weeks, the United States, the United Kingdom, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, the Czech Republic, and most recently yesterday Denmark have all agreed to supply defensive weapons to Ukraine's armed forces in response to Russia's escalation of aggression and threats against Ukraine.

We note and welcome the extension and expansion of Operation Unifier, Canada's military training mission in Ukraine, which was announced by the Prime Minister on January 26. In the long term, the extension and expansion of this critical mission will strengthen Ukraine's defences. However, the threat of an immediate Russian invasion grows every day and the Ukrainian armed forces need our assistance now.

Ukraine is under severe threat of increased Russian aggression and needs these weapons now. Ukrainians are not asking anyone to fight for them, but they need our help to defend their country against a colonial power seeking their destruction. We understand that the Government of Ukraine has requested from the Government of Canada these defensive weapons for a number of weeks.

Stronger sanctions will help deprive the Russian state of revenue with which it continues to wage a war and finance its troop movements. They will reinforce a message to the Russian government that the west is resolute in countering Russian aggression.

The Ukrainian Canadian Congress urges this committee to support the provision of defensive weapons and the strengthening of sanctions against the Russian Federation. We know that the Canadian people overwhelmingly support this provision of weapons. We conducted a survey just last week, which found that three in four Canadians were supportive or open to Canada's providing defensive weapons to Ukraine, and 42% explicitly supported the provision of weapons, which outnumbers the number of Canadians opposed, or 23%.

I'd also make note that the 2017 report of this committee noted that the Government of Canada should provide lethal weapons to Ukraine to protect its sovereignty from Russian aggression.

No significant Canadian sanctions have been implemented since March 2019, when 114 individuals and 15 entities were sanctioned for aggressive actions against Ukraine. In the intervening 32 months, both the United States and the European Union have greatly expanded their sanctions against Russian officials and entities much more broadly than Canada has.

In summary, we're making two major recommendations to this committee and to all members of Parliament: to support the provision of defensive weapons to Ukraine by Canada as soon as possible, and to support the strengthening of Canadian sanctions against Russia for its increased aggression against Ukraine.

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Mr. Michalchyshyn.

We now turn to Professor Pierre Jolicoeur from the Royal Military College of Canada.

Welcome to the committee, sir. You have five minutes.

[Pierre Jolicoeur, Associate Vice-Principal Research, Royal Military College of Canada, As an Individual]

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Good afternoon, everyone. I thank the committee members for inviting me to testify today.

I will not repeat the background information provided by the previous witness. I share his views and believe his description of the situation to be accurate. However, what I'd like to add to complement his presentation is what Russia is currently asking for and why this crisis is happening now.

First of all, through Vladimir Putin, Russia is practically demanding an end to NATO expansion efforts in Eastern Europe. He is trying to prevent future enlargements that would bring NATO's borders closer to Russia, because Russian decision makers still see NATO as a threat.

In addition, Russia is demanding that NATO withdraw its troops and stop strengthening its military presence in its new member states. Essentially, it's demanding that NATO revert to essentially the position it had during the Cold War.

So, these are explicit demands from the [Technical difficulty]. The Russian authorities know very well that these are unacceptable conditions, and that NATO member countries could never subject their decisions to a foreign power. It would be like giving Russia a veto of sorts on the decisions of NATO member states. So these conditions are impossible to meet, and Russia knows this very well.

We can ask ourselves, what does Russia really want, what does Vladimir Putin want? If you look at more recent foreign policy, what he's really trying to do is restore Russia to its former glory. He wants to regain Russia's respectable status in the international order. He is also trying to protect Russia's interests and security. Again, he believes that NATO is a threat to Russia. So he's attempting, by any means necessary, to move that threat away from his borders.

He's also looking to preserve Russia's sphere of influence. Russia wants a buffer around it of countries that will comply with its demands. These countries would therefore not be fully sovereign. The problem with these Russian demands, which are long-standing, is that they call into question the international order we live in.

In Russia's eyes, the world is made up of two kinds of countries, those that are sovereign, which theoretically [Technical difficulty], that is, they do not need to bow to any larger foreign or international powers. Then there are the “near abroad” countries—that's what Russia calls them—that emerged from the former Soviet Union. The 14 former republics—15, including Russia—are considered part of the “near abroad” and, the way Moscow sees it, they grew out of the former Soviet Union and are not fully sovereign because they must align their foreign policy with whatever Moscow wants.

Countries that comply with Moscow have no problems and Russia cooperates with them. For example, last month Kazakhstan experienced riots and asked Moscow to send troops to help re‑establish order. Russia complied, and once order was restored, it withdrew its troops without issue. Kazakhstan aligns its foreign policy with whatever Moscow wants.

However, other states, like Georgia—as we saw in 2008—or Ukraine, that do not necessarily want to align their foreign policy with Moscow's and they run into problems. Moscow encourages such things as secession movements in those countries, and that's something Moscow can easily use to manipulate and pressure them. In other words, those countries are not fully sovereign.

I will say a few words about—

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Professor Jolicoeur, we're at five minutes. Can you wind up in a minute or two?

[Pierre Jolicoeur]

Okay.

So, in closing, I would say that the current crisis seems somewhat manufactured. Russia is acknowledging NATO's desire to expand, but the last time NATO announced plans to expand was in 2008. Why is this crisis happening now? This looks like a manufactured, artificial crisis manipulated by the Russian authorities.

It's happening right now because Russia seems to think that Ukraine's desire to look to the West can only get stronger. Ukraine is strengthening its security forces thanks to training by Canada and other countries helping Ukraine. The military assistance to Ukraine has included sending it weapons.

Russia feels pretty strong right now, as it has just completed military reform. I'm not saying that Russia has to enter Ukraine, but if it's going to do it, better now than later.

I will stop there.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Thank you, Professor Jolicoeur.

We now turn to the first round of questions. They are six minutes each. The Conservatives have the first six minutes. We'll go to Mr. Ruff and then Mr. Fisher, Madame Normandin and Ms. Mathyssen, in that order.

Mr. Ruff, you're on for six minutes, please.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Thanks, Chair. I've just subbed in here, so I'm getting caught up. Fortunately, for the witnesses' sake, I have a bit of background experience with the Canadian Armed Forces, having just retired a couple of years ago after 25½ years, and having been involved in some initial discussions when we were standing up the Operation Unifier mission.

My first question will be to both witnesses. I'd like both your perspectives.

Can you give us a probability or what you think the chances are that the Russians will actually conduct a land incursion into Ukraine?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Mr. Jolicoeur.

[Pierre Jolicoeur]

I can start, if you like.

In my opinion, there are six possible courses of action Russia could take. I will list the scenarios for you and quickly assess their likelihood.

The first scenario is Russia does nothing, and it was all a bluff. I believe that this scenario is unlikely because Vladimir Putin has set the bar very high in subjecting NATO member states to very specific recommendations. In addition, so far he has refused to compromise—on the contrary, he seems to be ramping up his demands. In other words, I feel he can't back down without losing face.

The second scenario is a limited intervention in the Donbass. Russia may want to do what it did with Georgia and spur on secession movements, eventually recognizing the independence of Lugansk and Donetsk. I believe that this is highly likely, because Russia has done it before. It doesn't cost Russia very much, other than exposing it to additional sanctions. The international community would be reluctant to step in and liberate the two areas. That would fall on Ukraine's shoulders.

The third scenario is a variation on the last one. It would involve expanding the current secessionist regions. The two areas do not occupy all of their provinces as defined in Ukraine's administrative structure. Russia could therefore help them gain control over more land than what they currently occupy. In my opinion, [Technical difficulty] this scenario is somewhat likely.

The fourth scenario is a limited intervention in southern and eastern Ukraine. In this case, Moscow would seek to establish territorial continuity between secessionist regions in the Donbass and Crimea. This would establish territorial continuity for Russia across southern Ukraine. I feel this scenario is somewhat likely to happen.

The fifth scenario is an intervention into half of Ukraine, all of eastern Ukraine, to expand military occupation to the Dnieper River, which acts as a dividing line in Ukraine. All of eastern Ukraine would be under Russian military occupation. This is somewhat likely, because Russia has mobilized the military capacity it needs to do it, so technically it would be able to pull it off.

The sixth scenario is an intervention with the intent to take over all of Ukraine. In my opinion, it's unlikely this will come to be, but I wouldn't totally rule it out.

Finally, the last possible scenario would be a general intervention against NATO. In my opinion, that's out of the question, because Russia doesn't want to start a third world war.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

You have a little less than two minutes, Mr. Ruff.

You're on mute.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

I'm sorry. I was just saying thanks to the professor.

Could we please get the other witness's take?

[Ihor Michalchyshyn]

Thank you for your service, Mr. Ruff, as well, especially with Operation Unifier.

I think those scenarios should be taken seriously. I would say the best predictor of future behaviour is past behaviour, and we've seen Russia wage a war in eastern Ukraine, pretend to have a hybrid kind of invasion of Crimea—which ended up being a real invasion of Crimea—carry out an illegal annexation of Georgia and Moldova, and the list can go on.

People have been asking me about the percentages. I think 100% we need to take seriously the 130,000 troops they have in Belarus and on all three borders of Ukraine. We 100% need to take seriously the threats that Putin is making in the media to NATO, to Canada and to the United States.

What we can do, as per our recommendation, is to raise the level of risk that the Russians have, raise their calculation and change their calculation of what the risk of invading Ukraine would be. The risk is low if Ukraine has nobody supporting it, but if it is part of an alliance, the risk is now being raised by the United Kingdom, the United States and other allies, as I've noted. I think that's the most important thing we can do in this situation.

[Alex Ruff, Conservative, Bruce—Grey—Owen Sound, ON]

Thank you. I believe my time's up, Chair?

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

It is indeed.

With that, I'll turn to Mr. Fisher for six minutes.

Go ahead, please.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. One moment while I let my dog out.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

You have to know this is a real committee.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

You have to know that that could be the worst possible timing ever for a dog to tap at the door to want to get out.

Mr. Chair, I want to thank both of our panellists for being here today, for sharing their expertise and also their incredibly valuable time at a very volatile time in our history. I'll tell you it's very good to be back on the national defence committee. I served from 2015 to 2019.

I want to be very clear when I say that Canada is a friend to Ukraine and to the Ukrainian people. I was fortunate, blessed, with the ability and the opportunity to visit Ukraine a few years ago with this very committee. I met with some amazing people, with some locals and with some world leaders, and I have to tell you that it was one of the finest visits I've ever made.

As you know, Canada has clearly condemned Russia's continued threats and buildup of their military around Ukraine. Although we're all calling for and hoping for a diplomatic solution, we have other tools in the tool chest. As the ministers have said, any further aggression on the part of Russia will be met with consequences.

Now I'd like to talk about Operation Unifier, which our government has just extended and we're expanding. When it comes to Ukraine's armed forces preparedness, how is Operation Unifier helping to prepare Ukraine's defence team for this increasing Russian aggression in the region?

I'll go to Ihor on this as we've met several times in the past.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Mr. Fisher's dog seems to be quite anxious to hear that answer.

[Ihor Michalchyshyn]

Thank you, and again it's great to see you virtually here.

I actually had the opportunity with former minister Champagne just the week before the pandemic started. We were at the base in western Ukraine, Yavoriv, where we saw in action Canadians, Americans and, I think, Swedes and Danes. Operation Unifier certainly has been bringing in other bilateral and NATO allies to help Ukraine, and it's the largest permanent mission, I believe, that operates in Ukrainian territory.

The expansion of that mission speaks to the trust and the deep relationship between the armed forces. I'm sure many of you have heard from the returning rotations of Canadian Armed Forces we see coming back. They tell us that they have learned as much as have the Ukrainians they have been training. They have learned about hybrid warfare and technology. They have learned with admiration about the battles and the real cost of the war that Russia's waging, because they are talking to these soldiers who have served on those front lines.

All of that being said, again we think the extension and expansion of Operation Unifier is wonderful. I think, though, we have to realize that that is a medium- to long-term goal in terms of a program. Right now, obviously Minister Anand has announced that even now, before an invasion has begun, those soldiers have been moved back to the west of the Dnieper River, to safer positions in western Ukraine.

Unfortunately, I think we all realize that the minute an invasion begins, for their own safety, we would be evacuating Canadian soldiers and missions. I think Operation Unifier is important, but as we're saying today, the defensive weapons would make an immediate impact and would remain behind in the case of an invasion.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

In my opening, I talked about other tools in the tool chest. We've made it very clear, and the ministers have made it very clear, that we're willing to take further steps should Russia continue this aggression. Strong sanctions, I think the minister said, are at the ready and can be instigated within half a day's notice.

Ukraine has asked for defensive weapons or lethal aid. Tell us more if you can, Ihor, about what these shipments would mean for Ukraine's readiness. Is there the possibility of these shipments causing further escalation of the situation with Russia?

[Ihor Michalchyshyn]

Two or three weeks ago, we saw that there was a shift in the position of Ukraine's partners and allies, both bilaterally and in NATO. Everybody was holding off on doing anything, because there was a concern that any action would be Russian provocation. We then saw a shift, starting with the United Kingdom and then the United States.

I've lost track of how many planeloads of ammunition and missiles have been sent by those allies, and the growing list of countries—yesterday, it was Poland and Denmark. All of that gear and all of that kit do several things. It is morally important for Ukrainians to know that they have literal aid from these partners all over the world for their own self-defence. It is technologically advanced gear that they don't necessarily have, so there is an element of that.

We need to remember that nobody hopes to use this defensive equipment. This is the worst-case scenario, if Russian tanks were to cross the border or if Russian airplanes were to bomb—God forbid—major cities or infrastructure in Ukraine. Helping Ukraine defend itself actually extends, as you said, the work of Operation Unifier. We're there to help Ukrainians defend themselves. There's no ask to send combat troops from Canada or anywhere else. That's never been anything that Ukraine has asked for.

The sanctions are important. We're pushing for sanctions now. It's very clear that Putin keeps adding more and more of his military personnel to the deployment, so we think he should be facing some consequences now, as opposed to the day after or the afternoon after he decides he should roll in.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Unfortunately, Mr. Fisher, that's it for your time.

[Darren Fisher, Liberal, Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, NS]

Thank you.

[The Chair, Liberal, John McKay]

Ms. Normandin, you have six minutes.