National Defence Committee on Oct. 27th, 2022

[The Vice-Chair, Bloc, Christine Normandin]

Welcome, everyone.

It is 11:00 a.m. and I see that we have quorum. I therefore call the meeting to order.

I am replacing Mr. McKay today, but I will also be speaking as a member of the committee, and I will take my turn as usual.

I confirm that the witnesses have done the appropriate sound checks.

I would like to officially bid you welcome to the 36th meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on October 6, the committee is continuing its study on Arctic security. Today, we will be looking at the issue of geopolitical competition in the Arctic and its repercussions on international security and cooperation.

I would like to welcome the first group of witnesses. Today, we have the pleasure of hearing Mr. Aurel Braun, who is a professor at the University of Toronto, and Mr. Stéphane Roussel, a professor with the National School of Public Administration. They are participating virtually.

I will now ask both witnesses to make their opening statements.

Professor Braun, you will have the floor for five minutes as soon as your microphone is turned on.

[Dr. Aurel Braun, Professor, University of Toronto, As an Individual]

Thank you.

Can you hear me now?

[The Vice-Chair, Bloc, Christine Normandin]

We hear you very well. Whenever you're ready.

[Dr. Aurel Braun]

Thank you so much.

A vast and forbidding region that is also enormously important strategically, the Arctic holds as much as 25% of the fossil fuel reserves in the world. Among western states, however, the Arctic has hardly been a centre of geostrategic interest, and policies have often been driven by noble hopes and limited attention.

In Canada, to some the far north is too far, too large and environmentally too hostile to attract foreign conquest or significant interference. It has been tempting, then, to view the Arctic in terms of a zone of peace and co-operation, where the priorities are cultural exchanges, rescue operations and aviation regulations.

Unfortunately, to state an inconvenient truth, this attempt to segregate the region from global geopolitics has been a naive amalgam, a mirage of wishful western thinking and Russian manipulation. I would respectfully suggest that we have no choice but to face a harsh geopolitical reality: Any attempt to separate the international from the regional risks creating a dangerous illusion.

There are three major areas of concern in the Arctic that are deeply interrelated: the political, the economic-environmental and the military. In all of these Russia plays an outsized role that has been complicated further by climate change and the evolution of Russian-Chinese relations.

Certainly we do need to appreciate that Russia, the largest Arctic state, has legitimate concerns and interests. No other country has as significant a percentage of its population or derives as much of its GDP from resource extraction and shipping in the region. Compare at least 20% of GDP for Russia in contrast to less than 1% for the U.S. The Russian threat, however, derives from motives and ambitions that go far beyond these legitimate national interests.

First, from a political perspective, Russia, which has an increasingly repressive personalist regime, is seized by four intertwined actual and pending crises that are key motor forces shaping foreign policy: a political legitimacy crisis, an economic crisis, a national identity crisis and a succession crisis. Combined, these motor forces shape a Russian foreign policy that seeks to compensate for the failure of the Putin regime to create a successful modern state by creating diversionary “external successes”; thus, domestic repression foreshadows external aggression.

Second, with an economy that is so highly dependent on energy extraction, with over 60% of exports consisting of fossil fuels, Russia has made the Arctic central both to its economy and to its political and military strategy. Though Moscow pays lip service to global climate concerns, it has been an extremely poor custodian of the fragile ecosystem of the Arctic. It has engaged in massive and risky exploration, especially with funding help and direct involvement from China. As climate change has indeed induced a significant decline in the amount and the thickness of sea ice, Russia has ignored the threats and focused exclusively on economic opportunity, stressing Arctic energy extraction and navigation. Moreover, Moscow overall, in a predictable progression, has moved from pipeline diplomacy to weaponizing energy.

Third, despite Putin's reassurances about not militarizing the Arctic as well as some western assumptions of Arctic military exceptionalism, Russian military doctrine going back to 2014 shows exactly the opposite. From a new generation of nuclear weapons to its most advanced anti-aircraft system, Russia has been engaging in a massive military buildup, having more bases north of the Arctic Circle than do all other countries combined and with more heavy icebreakers than all other states.

In conclusion, ostracizing Russia in the Arctic Council recognizes Russian aggressiveness but is far from sufficient. As long as Russia remains a dictatorship with a failed economy that looks for political legitimacy via foreign adventures, as long as it is so energy-dependent, as long as it continues to drift from junior Chinese partner to a Beijing vassal, Moscow poses a growing threat that should be addressed with prudence but not with panic. Canada needs to, one, have a permanent rather than just a persistent military presence in the Arctic; two, achieve a qualitative edge in the face of Russian numerical superiority; and three, with allies, including Sweden and Finland, build a credible northern regional military capability. Security and sovereignty are central concerns in light of 21st century geopolitics, and there is no magical solution. There is little choice—

[The Vice-Chair, Bloc, Christine Normandin]

I'm sorry, Professor Braun. I hate doing this, even more so than our usual chair, but I have to interrupt you because your five minutes are up. I hope that you will get a chance to talk more on the subject during the round of questions.

Professor Roussel, you have the floor for five minutes.

[Dr. Aurel Braun]

I understand.

[Dr. Stéphane Roussel, Professor, National School of Public Administration, As an Individual]

Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

I would like to thank the committee and the clerk for inviting me. It is always a great pleasure and an honour to contribute to the ongoing work and discussions of the House of Commons.

I would just like to say at the outset that I am not a specialist on Russia. My main field of research is Canadian foreign and defence policy, especially in the Arctic, and I've been working on these issues for 15 years now.

My statement will be based on three main points that I will try to make in four minutes.

At the end of February and the beginning of March, I received many calls from journalists, mainly from the francophone media, who were expressing their concerns on Canada's vulnerability in the Arctic and the possibility that the international tensions caused by the war in Ukraine would have an impact on the Canadian Arctic.

The first thing that I have to say on this issue is that I am optimistic. I do not believe that Canada's military interests in the Arctic are threatened, whether it be in the short or medium term. I do not believe that the hostilities and tensions with Russia will have a direct and immediate impact on Canadian interests in the Arctic.

Russia has not staked any claims to Canadian territory. In my opinion, Russia has no strategic interest in claiming Canadian territory. If ever that were to happen, it would be an attack on Canadian territory as per article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. If it ever came to be, we'd be worrying about much more than just the Arctic.

In the short and medium term, however, Russia does represent a threat to Canada, especially in terms of disinformation and cyber attacks. I don't have any major concerns when it comes to the Arctic, however.

My second point, which is linked to the numerous calls I fielded from journalists, is to remind committee members that Canadians are very much concerned with issues related to the Arctic. It is a question of national identity. To be Canadian is to love the Arctic and to worry about it, so much so that any hint of a threat, even if it is far away and up to a certain point made up, will whip up public opinion. The committee should be aware of these strong feelings and potentially disproportionate reactions.

That brings me to my third point. If you were to ask me to give advice or direction to the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence on the Arctic right now, it would be to carry on doing what the CAF and the department have been doing for the past 20 years. Their main concern should be the impact of climate change in the Arctic and the increased human activity that will follow. Tourism, economic activity, support to the communities, all this will increase over the next decades. The Canadian Armed Forces are usually the main tool used by the government to act in a region as isolated as this one, which means that there will be more calls upon the armed forces and more pressure on them.

In conclusion, last week you heard the Chief of the Defence staff who reminded us that the Canadian Armed Forces are lacking recruits and that they had a lot of difficulty increasing their capacity to provide the services expected by the government. This pressure will continue, even more so because there is a demand now in southern Canada for these services also. I think that is the main challenge that we will face over the next few years, and it directly concerns the Canadian Arctic.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

[The Vice-Chair, Bloc, Christine Normandin]

Thank you. You were able to make all your points and still have 30 seconds left over.

We will now proceed to our first round of questions. Mr. Zimmer will have the floor for six minutes.

[Bob Zimmer, Conservative, Prince George—Peace River—Northern Rockies, BC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for appearing.

My questions will be for Professor Braun.

Thank you for your testimony. I agree with your three points. You talked about a permanent presence; you talked about a qualitative approach; and you talked about working with allies to build up strength in the region.

I was up in Inuvik and Iqaluit just last summer. You know, Liberal hot air really won't cut it anymore. It's been seven years. We're still seeing a huge lack of infrastructure and huge lack of security delivered on the ground in the Arctic.

Are you familiar with the green hangar situation in Inuvik?

[Dr. Aurel Braun]

I do not know the specifics of it.

[Bob Zimmer, Conservative, Prince George—Peace River—Northern Rockies, BC]

Let me explain.

The green hangar is the hangar the Canadian Armed Forces have used for the last decades to house our air-to-air refuelling tanker when it's up there, the CC-130. In 2021, this Liberal government, which talks a big game about security, deemed it no longer necessary.

Right now that hangar sits empty in Inuvik, and we're getting into the winter here and the snow is flying up there. We don't have access to that hangar for our CC-130 to refuel our CF-18s. What that means is that at -40° conditions, it takes at least two to three hours to even get that air-to-air refuelling tanker up to speed, so any kind of quick response is really off the table. If you don't know and you're not familiar with it, I challenge you to look up a little bit about it.

Currently that NORAD asset, which is key in the north—as we know, Inuvik is the key NORAD base in the Arctic—is up for sale. We've had some interested buyers look at it, namely the Chinese and the Americans, so I guess my question to you is this: How can Canadians believe anything this government says around what it's doing to support Arctic security? We see promises from this government, but very little delivered.

Please respond.

[Dr. Aurel Braun]

I'm not going to get into any partisan politics, but what I would point out is that we have to be very careful how we define a threat from Russia. If we ask whether there is a threat that Russia would massively invade the Canadian north, that is not what is likely to happen.

We need to take a nuanced approach, and this is what's really essential. In many ways, Russia presents a spectrum of threats. This is why we have to have a response capability, one that is effective and one that does not present Canada as a soft or a tempting target. Those were the last parts of what I was going to say in my presentation.

Let me give you an example. Russia is claiming sovereignty over the waters above the Lomonosov and the Mendeleev ridges. This would cover an area of about 1.2 million square kilometres of the Arctic. What if they acted unilaterally? What would we do about that? Navigation through the northern sea route is becoming more possible with climate change. How would that impinge upon Canadian sovereignty?

Russian—

[Bob Zimmer, Conservative, Prince George—Peace River—Northern Rockies, BC]

Professor Braun, I have only a few minutes left, so I'll ask you another question.

I'm very familiar with the competing sovereignty claims around the seabed as well. Russia has made a claim for what we deem to be our Arctic seabed. You talked about it before, even environmentally.

We need to be able to assert ourselves. If Putin decides to set up a drilling rig 200 nautical miles off our shores, we need to be able to act and to do so decisively. I understand what you're saying. Maybe you don't think it's a threat, but they're currently invading a country.

This is from a source on the ground:

Our weather is changing rapidly. As a precursor to the fall, rains and fogs are starting. At present, the most critical NORAD base in Canada does not have any hangarage, parking, C-130 air-to-air refuellers. The A310 AAR—air-to-air refueller—cannot land in Inuvik. The C-295 SAR is not operational. [There is] insufficient fuel. As of yesterday, four airports in Nunavut, one of which is Resolute Bay—a regional hub—are short of aviation fuel.

This hardly sounds like the lead NORAD base in Canada, as our Minister Anand would reassure us. I've asked her questions in the House about this before. She says it's all great in the north. Does that sound like Inuvik is ready for any kind of response in the north?

[Dr. Aurel Braun]

Unfortunately, Canada has neglected its hard power for quite some time now. Given the geopolitics today, we can ill afford to do that.

Whether we're looking at general issues or at the specifics you have mentioned, all of those need to be addressed, and they need to be addressed pretty urgently, because as much as soft power is important, soft power operates together with hard power.

Russia is an aggressive dictatorship. It is backed up by China, and China is becoming increasingly interested in the Arctic. They want to make sure there's maximum extraction and a maximum amount of control by Russia with the help of China. China has talked about a polar silk road. We therefore have to confront that reality.

As much as I would like us to shift as much spending as possible to education and health care, we have little choice but to have a military capacity that is effective and credible.

[Bob Zimmer, Conservative, Prince George—Peace River—Northern Rockies, BC]

Thank you, Professor Braun.

All I would add is that we think of this as a threat, and we're here in Ottawa. It's an even more profound threat if you actually live in the Arctic.

Thank you.

[The Vice-Chair, Bloc, Christine Normandin]

Thank you, Mr. Zimmer.

We now go over to Ms. Lambropoulos, from the Liberal Party, who has six minutes.

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

Thank you, Madam Chair.

I would like to thank the witnesses for being here today and for answering our questions.

Mr. Roussel, you stated that in the coming years and decades, population numbers and tourism in the Arctic will increase, probably because of climate change and other factors. You also spoke of the fact that the Canadian Armed Forces are having a hard time retaining their members and attracting new ones.

In terms of the Canadian Armed Forces' strategy in the Arctic, what potential role do you see for indigenous peoples who are already in the Arctic? Could you tell us more about that?

[Dr. Stéphane Roussel]

Absolutely.

I thank you for the question.

First of all, I would like to say that we already well served. I'm referring to the Canadian Rangers, who support the Canadian Armed Forces by serving as guides and mentors in the North. This organization works extremely well and has major social and economic benefits. The Canadian Rangers are for the most part members of the local communities, which builds up strong links, especially within those communities. The Canadian Armed Forces and local communities enjoy an excellent relationship thanks to this organization. There's a consensus on the fact that the Canadian Rangers are important and that they have to be maintained.

The problem is possibly one of growth. The organization is probably operating at full capacity and it would be difficult to add any new patrols and responsibilities. I don't think we need to establish new relationships, but rather cultivate the ones we already have. We should continue to gain as much as we can from the knowledge that these communities have in the regions they call home and the concerns that they can communicate to the Canadian Rangers and to certain bodies, such as this committee. Moreover, I hope that the committee will invite representatives from these communities as witnesses.

However, for the time being, I would say that it is the communities that we should be asking advice from on what more we can do right now. I also believe that things are going exceedingly well with the Canadian Rangers.

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

Why do you think that operations are at full capacity and that we can't increase them? It is because of the number of Rangers?

[Dr. Stéphane Roussel]

That is correct. The organization currently has 5,000 Rangers, and patrols are made up of 20 to 30 members, depending on the size of the communities. We quickly reach the maximum number of people who can or want to be part of the Canadian Rangers.

Many communities want to be included in the Rangers' patrols. In many cases, these communities contact the Rangers command to ask for a new patrol for them. However, in my view, at this point the benefits would be marginal at best.

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

So it is vital to maintain that relationship and use it to try to improve—

[Dr. Stéphane Roussel]

That relationship should be strengthened, absolutely.

[Emmanuella Lambropoulos, Liberal, Saint-Laurent, QC]

All right. Thank you very much.

Mr. Braun, my next question will go to you.

You spoke a lot about the threat of Russia and what may come in the Arctic in the years to come, based on how much they rely on the Arctic. You also spoke about the northern military capability of other western countries in terms of protecting the Arctic. You said that Canada should work with its partners in order to build a northern front, I guess, that could counter Russia in the event of an escalation intention between the countries.

Can you speak a bit as to what you think Canada should be doing with its partners in order to build that capability?

[Dr. Aurel Braun]

Yes, absolutely. Thank you so much for that question.

Again, I want to emphasize that we have to look at the Russian threat not in terms of a kind of standard military invasion, because that can be easily dismissed. That's not how threats manifest themselves, and this is not necessarily how Russia acts. It is something that we need to understand across the entire spectrum, and because we have been co-operating with other countries, because we are a member of NATO, because we are a member of NORAD....

NATO now will be enlarging, and I'm quite confident that Sweden and Finland will be members. They're almost there. We're just waiting for Turkey, basically, to decide that this is a good idea, so we have to consider the best way to make our collective defence posture more effective.

Years ago I testified before this committee, and I strongly urged that we get fifth-generation fighters so that we'd have a qualitative edge. Now that has become even more important, and we're in the process of getting that edge.

Of the other Nordic states, the western Nordic states—

[The Vice-Chair, Bloc, Christine Normandin]

Dr. Braun, I am sorry to have to cut you off once again, but unfortunately Ms. Lambropoulos' time is up. Please hold that thought. You might be able to come back to it in response to another question.

I will now begin my own six-minute round by thanking our two witnesses.

Let me start with you, Dr. Roussel. You mentioned at the outset that you were not really concerned by a potential Russian military threat in the Arctic. We know that Russia is not going to plant its flag on Canadian soil to claim it for itself anytime soon.

However, I would like you to expand on that, more specifically on the economic aspect, the passage of ships in our territorial waters, and the political claims. Since these could ultimately lead to a more militaristic approach, is that situation not cause for concern?